THE

# MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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## SIGNS OF THE TIMES

### The Pope and the Peace

Suggestions are being put forward in various quarters urging that the Pope should be represented at the Conference which it is expected will be summoned to determine future conditions for the peace of the world. The latest of these suggestions has been made by Dr. Downey, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool, in his Lenten Pastoral Letter which was published in the *Times* of February 10:

> 'It was said of the ill-fated League of Nations that in excluding the Pope it deliberately enfeebled itself. It has been repeatedly pointed out by shrewd observers that the Pope, as an independent and neutral exponent of the moral and religious ordering of the world, ought to be represented at any forthcoming world-peace conference. As the head of that Church which is actually universal, commanding the spiritual allegiance of all nations, he is better informed as to international relations than many of the secular heads of individual States. The Vatican is an independent State owing allegiance to none. From this spiritual headship the Holy Father's neutrality is above suspicion and his integrity beyond question. Few Christians will deny that special grace is accorded him to enable him to fulfil his high office, and we hope and pray that in the framing of the world-peace to which we all look forward his directing voice will not be raised in vain or his fatherly counsels darkened.'

The admission of the Papal Curia to the Peace Conference is fraught with great difficulty. There is strong opposition to it in Russia, where both State and Church are united in their protest; and there is strong Protestant opposition in the U.S.A. Public opinion in Great Britain is always slow in coming to a decision on international issues; and this is particularly the case where such issues might become political party issues in an approaching

Parliamentary Election. The percentage of Roman Catholic voters in Great Britain and Northern Ireland probably does not exceed 10 per cent.; but the Roman Catholic vote can become, at the dictation of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, a 'block-vote'; and this 10 per cent. 'block-vote' might result in a political party either winning or losing a General Election. The same is true in the self-governing English-speaking Dominions. Accordingly, imperial politicians feel that there is strong inducement for keeping Roman Catholic issues out of politics. We very much doubt, however, whether this is possible or desirable where such serious issues are at stake as are raised by Papal intervention in international politics.

The real difficulty is created by the dual character of the Papacy. On the one hand it is a world-wide religious organization, and on the other hand it is a small politically independent Italian State. As a consequence, the Pope who is head of this dual body finds himself compelled to speak with two voices. When the Pope gave his support and blessing to the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and to the Italian invasion of Albania, he did this presumably, not as the head of a world-wide religious organization, but as an Italian potentate. In supporting the resistance of Roman Catholic officials to Hitler's invasion of the rights of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany, the Pope was acting as the head of a world-wide religious organization; and it was presumably in this capacity that he made Count von Papen a Papal Chamberlain. In which capacity the Pope was acting when he supported the sending of Italian troops into Spain to assist in the overthrow of the Spanish Liberal Government is not so easy to determine. In this case he would seem to have been acting in both capacities.

The influence of his dual position is as evident in the Pope's silences as in his utterances. When an ancient Basilican Church was bombed in Rome, the Papal denunciation was widespread and vigorous; when, earlier in the war, Italian aeroplanes assisted the German *Luftwaffe* in bombing London, and St. Paul's Cathedral and Westminster Abbey were 'blitzed' and many ancient churches destroyed, the Pope was silent. These instances will suffice to indicate how little reliance can be placed on either the justice or courage of Papal utterances in times of international crisis, when it might be supposed they would be most needed.

As for the wisdom of the Papal utterances — stressed by Archbishop Downey—we are bound to confess that their wisdom seems less like the wisdom from above commended by St. James than like that other kind of wisdom which he condemns. Papal interventions in international affairs are too much influenced by considerations based on 'power-politics' and aim too much at serving the Papacy's special interests in this sphere to make it judicious to rely on the Papal guidance at the anticipated Peace Conference.

An open-minded study of Papal history, since Mussolini granted political independence to the Papacy, clearly indicates that this independence has been misused by the Vatican to the detriment of world-peace. In that case, if the Peace Conference is to have any concern with the Papacy at all, it ought to be concerned to deprive the Papacy of the Donation of Mussolini, and so restore the Papacy to the exclusively ecclesiastical status which it enjoyed before the rise of the Fascist *régime*. This reversal of Mussolini's Papal policy is the primary concern of the new Italian democratic State, and we venture to hope, in the interests of Italian democracy and in the interests of world-peace, the Donation of Mussolini will go the way of the Donation of Constantine.

> 'Ah, Constantine! to how much ill gave birth,
> Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower,
> Which the first wealthy Father gained from thee."[1]

Cavour's ideal of 'A Free Church in a Free State' does not demand *political* independence for the Church, but its moral and spiritual freedom. Whatever the future action of the Italian State may be, we hope that no *political* recognition whatsoever will henceforth be accorded to the Papacy by the non-Roman Catholic States, and that no representatives from these States will be accredited to the Papal Curia.

## The New Primate

The election of Geoffrey Francis Fisher, D.D., Bishop of London, to be Archbishop of Canterbury has given general satisfaction. After graduation (with three Firsts) at Exeter College, Oxford, he returned as Assistant Chaplain to his old school, Marlborough, in 1912. In 1914 he succeeded Dr. William Temple as Headmaster of Repton, and was said then to be the youngest Headmaster of a Public School in this country.

As a headmaster he was eminently successful, and after eighteen years at Repton he became Bishop of Chester in 1932 and was translated to London in 1939. His task as Bishop of London during the five years of the war has been one of almost overwhelming difficulty. That he justified his translation to London is demonstrated by his elevation to the Primacy.

It is mainly as a very able administrator and a man of affairs that our new Primate has made his mark. His life has been much too full of practical tasks to permit him to become a man of letters. That he has never held a pastoral post whether as curate or incumbent has perhaps enabled him to approach Church problems in a more open-minded and laic manner than is possible for most

[1] *'Ahi, Costantin, di quanto mal fu matre,*
*non la tua conversion, ma quella dote*
*che da te prese il primo ricco patre!'*
(Dante, *Inferno*, xix, 116-118).

Church dignitaries. He seems to us to be essentially a layman's Bishop, and there is great need of such to-day.

That the Primate is a married man with six sons, one of whom has won the M.C., will commend him to the laity, as also the fact that his churchmanship is of that central kind which does not lend itself to labels. He is untrammelled by entangling alliances whether ecclesiastical or political: he is a comparatively young man, being only in his 57th year. In view of his past, in which efficiency and success have characterized the discharge of the duties of each successive post, we have assurance that he will advance from strength to strength.

Never, perhaps, was the Church of England in greater need of able and courageous leadership. She has been faced with many problems during the last fifty years and cannot be said to have coped successfully with any one of them, although she has made many efforts to do so. ''Tis not in mortals to command success': but whether our Church has deserved success must be left to our historians to decide. Certainly she has multiplied her Episcopate: she has increased the number of her Theological Colleges: she has elaborated her ceremonial: she has attempted Prayer Book revision and has expanded her conception of orthodoxy: she has abandoned Biblical Fundamentalism: she has secured a valuable enlargement in her powers of self-government by the creation of a Church Assembly which includes a House of Laymen: her relations with the Free Churches are superficially more friendly than in Victorian days.

So much for her positive achievements; but unfortunately there is also a record of failure and missed opportunities. We do not propose here to enumerate them, but it is only too plain that the Church to-day has far less influence on the intellectual life of the nation than she had fifty years ago; and unless wise, energetic, and courageous steps are taken to redeem the present situation, her future is unpromising. It is strange that the English nation, which has shown such extraordinary powers of initiative, originality and leadership, and by the exercise of these qualities has influenced profoundly Continental ideals and policies, should possess a National Church which for the last hundred years has been remarkable for its surrender to Continental influences. While creativity and adventure have dominantly characterized our national life, imitation and timidity have characterized and weakened our Church life. Our Church needs to-day to realize her true character and to be loyal to it in a policy of courageous development.

The two most pressing problems which demand a courageous solution are those of the reunion of Christianity in Great Britain and the simplification and reformulation of Christian doctrine.

Rome and Geneva have no help to give us in the solving of these problems; but the history of the English Church since the Tudor Reformation, profoundly studied and rightly interpreted, can provide us with valuable guidance. None knew that better in his day than Mandel Creighton, Bishop of London, when he expounded in his famous charges the true greatness of the Church of England. Had Bishop Creighton lived long enough to pass from London to Canterbury, we should not have been in the parlous situation in which we find ourselves at present.

To-day our statesmen are engaged in re-building our national life in a humane and scientific, liberal and unifying, optimistic and courageous spirit. Our great national leaders desire to transcend old political divisions, out-moded controversies, party shibboleths, class prejudices and the 'vested interests' of the various political parties. Cannot our English Church leaders, not for the sake of their religious denomination only but in their service to the moral and spiritual life of the British people, be moved to similar brave and generous efforts? It is only the Primate who can lead in such a Church policy if we are to have evolution and order, and not revolution and anarchy. May we not hope that our new Primate, in the spirit of Mandell Creighton, will rebuild our National Church and make it not only the influential and well-beloved Church of the English nation at home and beyond the seas, but also the model of what a Christian Church ought to be in the modern world.

### Free Church Co-operation in Reunion, Reform, and Re-establishment of the National Church

We anticipate that, under the leadership of our new Primate, Home Reunion — the only kind of reunion which can claim first place in our Church Reunion policies to-day — will receive immediate practical attention. Our Church's influence is hindered and her development and expansion thwarted until Home Reunion be accomplished. Cordial relations with Churches abroad are being progressively cultivated, and even intercommunion with them has been consummated in certain notable cases; but Home Reunion is stationary — worse than stationary, stagnant.

The Church policy which would make the achievement of Home Reunion subservient to the policies and prospects of reunion abroad is as inept as it is disastrous: it is an example of that type of folly which the wise man condemned when he wrote:

> 'The eyes of the fool are in the ends of the earth.'

How little the cause of Reunion at Home has advanced, during the last quarter of a century, may be judged from the following statements made in a letter contributed to the *Guardian* of the

16th February by Canon Stuart Clark. In it he refers to a Conference held at Mansfield College, Oxford, in 1920, to advance the cause of Christian Reunion at Home. The membership of the Conference included fourteen Anglicans who were then, or afterwards became, Bishops. Among the Free Churchmen attending the Conference were the following : W. B. Selbie, J. Scott Lidgett, P. T. Forsyth, R. D. Horton, J. H. Jowett, J. D. Jones, A. E. Garvie, Anderson Scott, J. H. Shakespeare, Carnegie Simpson, A. S. Peake, S. M. Berry and M. E. Aubrey. An account of the Conference was published in a volume entitled *Towards Reunion*, in the Preface of which the results of the Conference were summarized as follows :

> 'The Church must present a complex unity of government and life, if it is to face successfully the complex unity of our modern world. Episcopacy will be there, as the emblem and instrument of Unity and Order, but with "constitutional" limitations. Presbytery will be there with equal spiritual rights and duties, called by the Church itself to exercise its inherent spiritual functions, not in terms of mere official succession, but in full exercise of spiritual life. But above all, there will stand the great body of believing people, whom we now call the laity, with definite rights and functions worthy of robust spiritual maturity. This great body must find its clear utterance and witness in some Lay-Diaconate, which has its place in the Councils of our Church, and will find appropriate forms of service for the edifying of the Body of Christ.'

We doubt whether any declaration more full of promise for Reunion could be promulgated to-day by so representative a conference of the National Church and the Free Churches : but 1920, as we know from the Reunion pronouncements of the Lambeth Conference of that year, was a peak year in the sphere of Christian faith, love and adventure. When our next Reunion Conference is held in this land, we hope that it will not go behind 1920 but begin its deliberations at the point where 1920 stopped.

Not less significant in Canon Stuart Clark's letter is his statement that

> 'many Anglicans have long ago realized that support of the existing Establishment of religion in England is only tolerable as a temporary expedient, until the time arrives when, by common consent, English Christianity will adequately express itself by an agreed and equitable Establishment. Any hesitation to break the present link between Church and State is due to a two-fold conviction : that the underlying values will never in our days be regained, if once the link is broken ; and, on the other hand, that faith and patience will prevail one day to refashion it more worthy of God, and mightily effective for our people.'

These statements of Canon Stuart Clark make it clear that Home Reunion cannot and must not be dealt with in isolation. Home Reunion must be treated in combination with Church Reform (doctrinal and liturgical) and the sister-problem of Church re-establishment. These three things are in their very nature inseparable, and it is only the combined solution of these three problems

which can secure for this country a really National Church which shall unite in its faith, constitution and worship the treasures of the many-sided, intense and courageous spiritual and moral experience and experiment of our nation.

In the sphere of Public Worship we must, in the interests of Church comprehensiveness, abandon definitely the policy of uniformity. In the sphere of organization, while retaining our historic Church orders, we must be prepared to accord full recognition and status to free spiritual and laic Ministries of the Word and Sacraments within our National Church. In the sphere of doctrine, we must achieve great simplification by concentrating on the essentials of Christian Faith expressed in the simplest, clearest and briefest terms. In the sphere of National Establishment, unfeigned Christian democratic generosity must prevail — based on a conviction that Establishment exists primarily for the moral and spiritual welfare of the Nation, and not for the temporal 'vested' interests of the Church.

We are convinced that the leaders of the Free Churches ought to be invited by our new Primate to work out their own solution of this three-fold problem and offer their conclusions to the authorities of the National Church for their brotherly consideration. Such a Free Church contribution would be of the highest value and would certainly point to the limitations within which the National Church would have to seek its solution of the three-fold problem.

It will be said by many that this is not the time to attempt a three-fold task so difficult and dangerous. Combined or concerted action — as the chess-board demonstrates — can secure results where a series of isolated moves is doomed to failure. We would remind our readers once again of the dictum of Bishop Francis Paget: 'To do nothing when you ought to be doing something is the height of rashness.'

## The Boy, the Creed, and the Protesting Pedagogue

Schoolmasters who are not in favour of traditional Christianity prefer, with few exceptions, to remain silent. They argue that criticism without construction has little worth and may have very unpleasant consequences for those who utter it. They take the view that responsibility for the present religious situation rests with their official superiors or with the parents of their pupils, but not primarily with themselves. Hence they conclude that silence is golden — it involves no reduction of income.

Dr. P. T. Freeman, M.B.E., B.Sc., Ph.D., F.I.C., J.P., Headmaster of Peter Symond's School, is a noble exception, and has dared to deliver himself with absolute frankness and courageous responsibility on the teaching of the Christian Religion to English boys in secondary schools. His utterance is that of 'a practitioner'

—the phrase is his own. His little book, *Christianity and Boys*,[1] expresses what is to-day in the minds of thousands of English teachers, both men and women; but because it is not said openly and repeatedly by them, many who are in authority in the Church and in education frame or maintain religious policies which ignore their point of view.

It is the Church which is most grievously to blame in this matter. Were the Church to lead with courage and enlightenment along the difficult road of doctrinal reform and simplification, her authorities would be amazed at the mass of support which would be given by the rank and file of the laity of all classes, mainly by the educated classes and especially by those engaged in education.

We give the following citations from Dr. Freeman's pages, not because they are novel, but because they are significant and also because their significance is still unrecognized and unacknowledged by our Church leaders and by the rank and file of the clergy. Dr. Freeman writes:

> 'It is constantly being asserted that we must bring up children in the Christian Faith. . . . A few months ago, I served on a Committee of educationists, clergy, administrators and others, convened by a Local Education Authority, to discuss the teaching of Divinity in Secondary Schools. We had spent hours in discussion, much of which I thought to be fruitless. At last, the Principal of a University institution said: "These young people who come up to me from the Secondary Schools are well grounded in Christian Ethics, but hardly any of them have any knowledge of the Christian *Faith*." I immediately asked if anyone would attempt a definition of the Christian Faith, and the answer was immediately forthcoming from the Chairman—a layman—who said, "The Apostles' Creed."
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> Within a fortnight of that meeting, I attended a meeting of another Committee, quite differently constituted, called by another group of persons, but with the same terms of reference. In the course of the meeting I gave the statement of the Principal quoted above, and asked if anybody would define the Christian Faith. This time the answer came immediately from a Bishop, who seemed surprised that such a question could be asked, and who said, simply, "The Apostles' Creed."
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> If this be the official answer to this vital question, it becomes necessary to examine the Apostles' Creed in the light of present-day thought, and to see how much of it we—if we are honest—can include in a list of statements following "I believe . . . ."
>
> "I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth." Substituting "all things" or "the universe" for "heaven and earth," there are, I think, few people who would not assert that.
>
> "And in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord." We do believe in Christ. We are Christians. But *only* Son? Are we not all sons of God, and capable by our own efforts of increasing the amount, so to speak, of our sonship?
>
> "Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost." This means nothing whatever to me, and, I suspect, to most Christians who have thought about it. I therefore decline to say it.

[1] *Christianity and Boys*. By P. T. Freeman. (Macmillan, 1944; 3*s*. 6*d*.)

"Born of the Virgin Mary." So far as my own reading and thinking go, the evidence against the Virgin Birth seems overwhelming. The evidence for it seems to be merely the statements of the authors of the Gospels, who wrote under the limitations described later. It collapses at the touch of historic criticism. . . . The clause ought to be expunged.

As Dean Inge (*The Fall of the Idols*) says: "The ancient Creeds . . . are very far from being satisfactory statements of our living faith. They are like tattered banners hung round the walls of our churches." Yet the Apostles' Creed was given as the answer by a Bishop of the Church of England, and by a layman who occupies an important position in Local Government in respect of Education, to my question as to what is meant by the Christian Faith.

Dean Inge quotes, apparently with approval, an attempt to tabulate a shorter and simpler summary of Christian belief, taken entirely from the words of the new Testament: "God is spirit; and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth. God is light; and if we walk in light as He is in the light we have fellowship one with another. God is love; and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. Jesus is the son of God; and God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His son. We are children of God; and He hath given us of His spirit. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins. The world passeth away and the lust thereof; but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."'

Dr. Freeman adds Dean Inge's *dictum*:

'Those who are content with this creed should not feel themselves excluded from the service of the Church.'

Dr. Freeman adds another citation from Dean Inge's volume:

'The future of the Churches is much more precarious than that of Christianity. . . . The Anglican Liturgies need more drastic revision than was attempted in the abortive New Prayer Book of 1928. Our services are overweighted with the Jewish scriptures. The sermon is no longer, if ever it was, an intellectual stimulus for a public which possessed few books. . . . And there is some danger that we may be keeping our gardeners in hothouses, while the young plants are in the open air. . . . Christianity, if we may say so with all reverence, was a religion founded by a layman for laymen.'

Dr. Freeman's constructive approach to the problem of the religious education of boys in secondary schools is briefly outlined in the following extracts from his chapter headed 'The Problem':

'The problem of religious education in schools is thus far from easy. The old method and content will not do, even now; and, as time goes on, it will lose whatever small effect it may have now. No doubt it will still be possible for masters and boys to "go through the motions," but there will be no permanent effect upon the lives of the pupils unless an entirely new approach is made.

It does not seem to me that we shall get much help at present from the official institutional Churches, and we shall get none at all from the Roman Church. No one likes to make a statement of that kind, but the facts compel it. At a meeting of clergy of all denominations and laymen, called to consider the question, I asked a priest of the Roman Church why they forbade their boys to attend School Prayers each day, pointing out that the service was very simple, consisting of a hymn, a reading from the Bible without comment, the Founder's Prayer, two Collects, the

Lord's Prayer, and the Grace. The priest had to admit that there was nothing in the content of this to which any member of his Church could object. But he added — I will give his exact words, as nearly as I can remember them — "I may as well be quite outspoken. We consider our Church to be the only true Church. Even the act of our boys praying with members of other denominations would be a tacit admission that the various Churches of the other boys were also true Churches. So we forbid it." Clearly, we shall get no help from those who take that stand point. A very intelligent mother of three Spanish boys in a well-known House of a famous Public School said to the House Master: "I cannot understand why Anglicans here in England want to introduce practices which we Roman Catholics retain only because we dare not abolish them."

In these enquiring days, boys need to be given a *reasonable* religion, one against which their intelligence will not revolt in later years, one devoid of superstition (though not of the emotional side or of all mystery), and one which offers them a way of life. . . . They *are* interested in the personality and way of life of Jesus, the older boys are genuinely interested in the application of Christian principles to social problems, and they can easily be led to see that Christianity, if it is to be *lived* as well as professed, demands the highest kind of manliness, and is the only hope of society if the world is to become as we want to see it.

The sense of awe and mystery is important in any religious outlook. But it cannot now be induced permanently by the old subject-matter, but only by the new. By God-made mysteries, and not by man-made mysteries.'

Dr. Freeman's solution of the problem is not one that will appeal either to intolerant traditionalism or to easy-going agnosticism, or to timid officialdom. Moreover it has to be acknowledged that the dead weight of such combined opposition demands the use of an amount of spiritual high-explosive which, while shattering error and superstition, in seeking to rationalize, moralize and spiritualize religious education in our schools, may also have the unhappy effect of further alienating the vital and progressive element in our educational world from any policy of respect for and co-operation with the religious denominations in this country.

Our constant hope has been and still is that such co-operation will be realized, but the prospects of such co-operation are far from being assured. In times of crisis, Roman Catholicism and Anglo-Catholicism understand the effective use of political pressure which is able to deter all except the most resolute and inspired of statesmen from yielding to their demands and minatory gestures. We cannot hope that our rigid traditionalists and those who share their conception of the Christian Religion will give any support to Dr. Freeman's proposals, but we could wish that the large mass of indifferent, agnostic and secularist teachers in our schools could be moved to sympathize with Dr. Freeman's outspoken protest and appeal, and reconsider their own position and prepare themselves to support his policy. This will demand much enterprising self-sacrifice from them — but 'where there is no vision, the people perish.'

## Professor Jessop's Plea for a Rational Faith

T. E. Jessop, M.C., B.Litt., Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in University College, Hull, has written a most helpful little book entitled *Reason and Religion*.* It is reverent and religious, and is loyal both to the spirit of Science and to the spirit of the Christian Faith. Dr. Jessop is conscious that Reason has fallen into disrepute, especially among adolescents. He writes:

> 'The old definition of man as a rational animal has ceased to be solemnizing, and ceased to be challenging, and for many minds has even sunk to the level of a patent absurdity. The exaltation of irrationalism into a gospel of national life, with consequences that are not simply immoral but loathsome and ghoulish, is in Germany the boiling over of something that has been simmering there, and purposefully heated, for a long time. The Nazi phrase, "Thinking with the blood," is but a new name for the old German habit of talking sententiously or rhetorically about the crassest instinctive impulsions. Irrationalism is mercifully less ugly in the democracies, because of a deeper moral education there, but it is rampant enough to be alarming.'

The 'Flight from Reason' has characterized particularly the period between the two great wars. During this period, Dr. Jessop writes,

> 'Purposiveness is one expression of reason, and there has been little of it in our social life since the last war. Sport has become increasingly bound up with betting, and entertainment is expensively garish and shamelessly sensual. In the arts there has been more ingenuity and irresponsibility than inspiration, and art-criticism has been at its worst mercenary, at the middle level cliquish, and at the higher level (short of the best) unsure of its aims and principles. Not all our culture is like this (for traditional currents and standards persist in the unpretentious part of the population), but what is distinctively contemporary in it is. It is humbug to call it *all* by the fine word "experiment." There is more impudent imposition and uncritical acceptance of cultural fashions than a community with a developed rationality could tolerate.'

Dr. Jessop asks what are the causes of the avoidable overplus of irrationality in our social life? He answers:

> '(1) Most of us leave school just when our rational capacity is beginning to be directly educable; (2) reasoning requires more effort than most of us are disposed to give to it; (3) our community having been fairly thoroughly democratized, it is the "most of us" that settle the shape and tone of public life; (4) two wars, and the economic and political futility between them, have seriously shaken our faith that men can govern themselves, one another, and their common affairs, with the clear-headedness and objectivity of reason. To remove the dogmatism from these statements by expanding them would keep us from our main subject.'

At the outset of his enquiry he is concerned to point out that Reason is used in two senses — a narrow sense and a broad sense.

* *Reason and Religion — A Plea for a National Faith.* (Published by the Union of Modern Free Churchmen, 92 Blake Road, London, N.11. 1945. Price 6*d*.)

It is the use of Reason in a narrow sense, especially by its ignorant advocates and its not less ignorant opponents, which has created much prejudice against Reason.

> 'It is a recurrent claim that only in the natural sciences does reason find its genuine expression. The claim rests — when we ignore the boosters that, ignorantly worshipping science, are turning it into the modern superstition — on the undeniable fact that in the natural sciences the three elements of the rational ideal are far more fully realized than in any other branches of study. If we stop there, we shall believe that reasoning is the thinking that keeps rigidly to the well-tried methods of these sciences. That is the narrow conception, and whoever holds it is bound to regard all religion as irrational.'

Of the wider and truer concept of Reason Dr. Jessop finely writes:

> 'On the wider view, then, reasoning is the capacity for thinking under the control of evidence, for finding and recognizing reality or truth. It is sometimes critical or sifting, and sometimes constructive, for evidence has both negative and positive bearings. Sometimes it is discursive, proceeding cautiously a step at a time, and sometimes intuitive, sweeping with explicit inference through a tangle of problems to a sure conclusion, or seeing many things together at one glance. Sometimes it reaches truth, and sometimes only probability. To define it by one or other of these aspects, to allow it only a single method of search and proof, is to exclude from it much obviously excellent thinking. When a man frees his thinking from the narrowing influence of his few prejudices and places it under external control, it will be as various as reality — measuring the distance of a star, spelling out the relations of the number-system, uncovering the occult motives of man's deeds, divining the structure of the moral order, following the gathering argument whithersoever it leads, and seeing the different truths together in their relative worth and their total significance. So understood, reason is not a rigid yardstick, but a resourceful and sensitive instrument of mental sight. The wider conception of reason fits more closely the scope and variety of excellent thinking, and if it were adopted would make our controversies more humane and more fruitful, for it would lead to less quarrelling and more high argument.'

But it is with the relation of Reason to Religion that Dr. Jessop is mainly concerned in this treatise. Here again, what he says seems to us to be excellent, both for clergymen and laymen.

> 'The distinguishing of fact from illusion, or of reality from the pretence of it, the questing for and testing of evidence, and the assessment of value — all the critical scrutiny that aims at truth — are the very functions of reason, and when they are exercized in the sphere of religion they save this from the superstition that is always at its heels. The basic difference between religion and superstition is that in the former healthy thinking is required, whereas in the latter the normal processes have to be suspended. The first makes for mental integrity, the second for a split or an unbalanced mind. . . . When, as all too commonly happens, a person devotes everything to God except his brains, his power of critical and constructive thinking, he reduces his practical worth in the world, his ability to co-operate in its improvement and redemption, and raises to heaven a gift that is smaller than the great occasion prescribes.
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> Because we have it in different degrees, we are not all appointed to become theologians, but we can all honour God by being careful about what we believe about Him, testing the rumours to see if they be truly of

God, and wringing out of the sifted truth the last drop of ascertainable meaning.

It is a psychological howler to attribute pride to Reason, for it is never a faculty, but always a person, that is proud. Well, then, are not scientists proud?'

Dr. Jessop's treatment of the vulgar error, the 'Pride of Science,' deserves attention:

'The rhetorical question is libellous — and it is time we gave up supposing that a libel is justified when it is religiously motivated. As a class, scientists are no more proud than Christians as a class are humble. I find plenty of arrogance in Luther, and none in Newton.'

An extremely difficult and very important problem, the relation of Reason to Revelation, is seriously faced by Dr. Jessop, and here also helpful guidance is given.

'It is objected that the content of religious belief comes by revelation and is received by faith, so that reason has no place except for the orderly unfolding of the implications of the divinely revealed data, these data themselves being beyond the power of natural reason either to discover or to verify. In this objection there is a very precious core which no Christian can throw away without ceasing to be a Christian. . . . The distinctive religious ideas and values are neither discoverable nor rediscoverable by sheer thinking; they arise, and display their evidence, in concrete religious experiences.

Yet we are confusing logic with psychology, the definition of terms with the definition of experience, when we maintain that reason and faith, knowledge and revelation, are mutually exclusive. Any conception of revelation that turns it into the communication of ready-made truth that are deposited like unalterable bricks in any mind that has an empty space for them is at variance with what those whose business it is to study the mind have shown it to be, and is at variance also with the fact of religious differences. Revelation does not communicate the entire object of apprehension, but the core of it, the rest being determined by our past experiences and our present interpretative powers. . . . The religious man who sunders sharply the ideas of revelation and discovery, of faith and reason, is accepting as final the "rationalist's" narrow conception of reason and its objects.'

Dr. Jessop, as becomes a Christian, concludes on a hopeful note:

'The education of Christians must therefore be spacious, liberal, generous and unending. The providing of it would give the Churches a fascinating extension of their interest and work, and the result of it would be a recovered splendour of worship, and an unprecedented expansion of moral power.'

## In a Large Room

The *Church Times* of February 23, 1945, asks in an Editorial 'Where do Churchmen stand?' The query is prompted by a document recently produced by the Council for the Defence of Church Principles and signed by 2,800 'priests in communion with the See of Canterbury.' This document reiterates the well-known Anglo-Catholic attitude to our traditional dogmas and our historic

ministry. In accordance with Anglo-Catholic policy, the signatories protest against attempts at Christian Reunion 'which either explicitly or implicitly impair this apostolic faith' and fail to maintain the apostolic episcopate.'

The simple reply to the question 'Where do Churchmen stand?' is that they stand in a large room, very much larger than that in which Anglo-Catholics stand and Roman Catholics. The English form of subscription, deliberately enlarged by the amended Subscription Act, 1865 (see Stanley's *Essays on Church and State*), bestowed on the English clergy this freedom, and there is not the slightest prospect of English Church people allowing themselves to be deprived of this large room.

The *Church Times* asks 'What does the Church of England want?' and makes reply, 'A Prayer Book of its own, or a National Christian Prayer Book?' The *Church Times* wants the former; but we are convinced that the vast majority of Christian people in this country would welcome the latter. Any Prayer Book revision which is not going to attract many who are not practising members of the National Church to become practising members of the same must be regarded as a failure. The sound solution we believe to be one of Alternative Services loyal to the principles and spirit of the Church of England with rights of local option in every parish.

The second dilemma of the *Church Times* is formulated as follows:

> 'Does the Church of England maintain the traditional Catholic view of the Church as a divinely founded body with a recognizable creed, ministry and sacramental system? Or has it come to regard the Church as the amorphous company of all those who, with whatever far-reaching differences of belief and practice, are united in their reverence for the Person of Christ?'

The *Church Times* obviously stands for the first of these two descriptions. The great majority of Englishmen would support the second definition. The *Church Times* is further concvined that

> 'Questions about order and the ministry are not secondary; they concern the essential structure of the Catholic Church.'

'There's the rub!' For the great majority of English Churchmen these controversial questions are secondary; and if Anglo-Catholics could be persuaded to treat them as secondary, the differences between the Church of England and the Free Churches concerning the Christian ministry could be very easily and happily settled.

The real dilemma facing the Church of England to-day is whether we ought to sacrifice the Church of England to the rigidities of Anglo-Catholic traditionalism and dogmatism, or whether — loyal to Anglican development and Christian liberal-

ism — we ought to enlarge further the bounds of our Church by simplifying her doctrine and popularizing what the *Church Times* scorns as 'the infinite variety of Anglicanism.' It is only too clear, alas, that the signatories of this latest Anglo-Catholic protest are much more concerned to pave the way for reunion with Rome than to establish intercommunion with the Reformed Churches throughout the British Empire. What can our Church authorities do in this situation? Ought they to conciliate Anglo-Catholicism by making concessions? The price of such concessions must be to diminish the influence of the English Church and to deprive her of her unique position of leadership in the modern Christian world. No responsible Church statesman will dream of supporting such a policy of rigidity and contraction. It is only by taking profound and long views of the Christian Religion and its future service to mankind that the Church of England will see clearly what her true function is and will secure the moral and spiritual strength to work wisely and courageously for its realization, ever remembering with devout thankfulness that God has set her feet 'in a large room.'

### Viscount Samuel and the Spiritual Foundations of Peace

Discussions in Parliament dealing with religious issues are rare; but when they take place it is notable that a high level is reached. In the House of Lords on December 19, Lord Templewood in a speech dealing with his five years' experience as British Ambassador in Spain, spoke of the moral and spiritual foundations which are absolutely needful for the maintenance of world peace. His arguments elicited a truly remarkable speech from Viscount Samuel, who, while agreeing that the Continent was suffering from moral sickness and needs a re-creation of moral values, did not find himself entirely in agreement with Lord Templewood as to the method by which this moral re-creation was to be achieved. Viscount Samuel said:

> 'He (Lord Templewood) wants to guarantee certain liberties, to make sure that there shall be the reign of law, no arbitrary arrests or imprisonment, no racialism, religious freedom, equal opporunities. It is easy to declare all these purposes, but why should they be accepted and how can we be sure that they will be maintained? . . . In his last words he invited us to criticize. While I accept, of course, whole-heartedly his aims as being right and proper and excellent, there is this one word of caution that it would be necessary to utter before acecpting whole-heartedly what is *prima facie* so right and proper. I am not sure that his new charter would not prove to be a charter for subversive revolutionaries. . . .
>
> While my noble friend has, as I say, diagnosed a moral sickness, he advocates a political cure. To my mind, we must at this stage in the history of Europe set ourselves to bring in the spiritual forces; and not only that vague religion of humanity which does, in fact, in the modern

world, to a great degree govern men's minds and influence their actions, but also the great organized religions. However, there we come to the fact that while these political, economic and ethical trends of thought have become manifest during the last century and a half, there has been another which has proved in some respects even more powerful, and that is the scientific. The development of science has revolutionized man's ideas on the universe and the Deity, and when we come to invoke the aid of the organized religions we find — and it is only frank to recognize the fact which is in all men's knowledge — that all the faiths, Western and Eastern alike, have closely intertwined their ethical precepts with ancient theological dogmas which are, to a large degree, unacceptable in the modern world; and thereby their influence has been greatly weakened.'

Viscount Samuel then drew the attention of the House to a movement which has recently been taking shape in America, known as the 'Three Faith Declaration' (Protestant, Catholic and Jewish).

'Each faith had its own Preamble and they all agreed on seven points. This is the Protestant Preamble:

"A world troubled almost to despair by the tragedy of recurrent war looks to the forces of religion for leadership. The Protestant Churches, responsive to that appeal, have already sought to show how the practical implications of their faith should guide the relations of nations. The conclusions to which they have come are in many important respects similar to those of men whose religious heritage differs from our own. In this we rejoice, for world order cannot be achieved without the co-operation of all men of good will. We appeal to our constituency to give heed to the following principles, enunciated in common by Protestants, Catholics and Jews, which must find expression in political policies if they are to establish a just and durable peace. Beyond this statement of principles, we hold that the ultimate foundations of peace require spiritual regeneration as emphasized in the Christian Gospel."'

This preamble preceded seven points upon which Protestants, Catholics and Jews were agreed:

'"The moral law must govern world order"; "the rights of the individual must be assured"; "the rights of oppressed, weak or Colonial peoples must be protected"; "the rights of minorities must be secured"; "international institutions to maintain peace with justice must be organized"; international economic co-operation must be developed"; and "a just social order within each State must be achieved."'

In conclusion, Viscount Samuel said:

'Valuable as the diffusion of the principles of Magna Charta may be, there is needed something more fundmental, more universal, more transcendent, if we are to create the right atmosphere in which the world's statesmen may meet after the war to frame a better order for Europe and for mankind.'

We wonder whether, outside the British Empire and the U.S.A., there is any other legislative assembly in the world which would have listened to such a speech with attention and would have marked its approval with applause. At least no assembly so acting could be charged with irreligion or as unfitted to legislate in the sphere of religious issues. It is not without significance that

Viscount Samuel is a liberal Jew and that he selected for citation in his speech, not the Jewish, but the Protestant preamble to the Three Faith Declaration.

### Dr. C. J. Wright and Inter-Communion

The well-known Methodist minister, Rev. Dr. C. J. Wright, was ordained Deacon by the Bishop of Manchester on Feb. 25. The Bishop, preaching on the occasion, said :

> 'Dr. Wright comes to us after many years of service in another and friendly Communion. He does not deny his past, nor abjure it. None of the promises he makes to-day involve that. He enters our larger life and we welcome him, and I especially, for we have often worked together. In these happier days the relations of the various Christian Communions do not involve a war of sects, but each Communion, indeed each school of thought within our own Communion, makes its contribution, contributes its treasure, to our common life.'

A correspondent doubts whether it is permissible for one who is now a clergyman of the Church of England to be also a communicant in the Methodist Church. We have no doubt from the Christian point of view that such practice of inter-communion is in harmony with Christian principles, and we cannot imagine that any of our diocesan bishops would prohibit such a practice. The fact that our Sovereign has the right to communicate both in the Church of England and in the Church of Scotland would seem *a priori* to support the view that there can be no legal objection to such inter-communion as Dr. Wright desires to practise.

It would, however, promote and encourage those cordial relations between ourselves and the Reformed Churches, to which the Bishop of Manchester so happily referred on the occasion of Dr. Wright's ordination, if our diocesan bishops would openly express their approbation of the practice of inter-communion which Dr. Wright so ardently desires to extend.

### A Christian Protest against Pacifism.

The following courageous, judicious and opportune pronouncement by the Rev. Guy Rogers, M.C., B.D., Rector of Birmingham and Honorary Canon of Birmingham Cathedral, demands to be put on record — not only as an expression of the convictions of many Liberal Churchmen, but also as a warning against world perils which lie ahead.

> 'It is well known that the Christian Church ,and by the Church I mean Church members, clergy and laity alike, has been divided on the subject of Christian duty during the present war. The vast majority were satisfied that of all the alternatives open to them the one which presented the least moral difficulty was to join in the defence of the country and the defeat of the Nazi menace.

A small minority decided on equally conscientious grounds to take as little part as possible in this defence and resistance. They did not feel free to refuse their money, taken from them in the ordinary course of taxation, or to feed themselves and their families with the food brought at great cost in human lives by the Navy and Merchant Service. They continued to enjoy the rights of free speech and other privileges of citizenship guarded by the Navy, Army and Air Force in which they could not conscientiously serve.

Their fellow-Christians respected their position although they could not always understand it. They appeared at tribunals to testify to their sincerity; they protested when differential treatment of them was attempted. They made much of the services they rendered to the community. Now that the war is drawing to a close with a great peril averted, a great deliverance achieved, in which the conscientious objector, owing to his convictions, has taken little or no voluntary part, a perplexing situation has arisen.

Some conscientious objectors are now throwing themselves vigorously into the work of making the peace and demanding that it should be made upon lines which seem to imply that there had never been any serious danger to national security or the Christian faith, or to general morals or European culture.

In other words, they are apparently asking for a peace in which security shall not be assisted by force but guaranteed by goodwill alone. Though prevented, by their principles, from fighting on behalf of civic rights threatened with extinction, they do not find it inconsistent to exercise these rights preserved through the sacrifice of others. They conscientiously claim to dictate national policy and occasionally do so with a touch of self-righteousness which their Christian brethren of the majority find a little trying!

We cannot help feeling that it is those who have suffered most and sacrificed most, the young Christian people of the Services, who have the better claim to speak on behalf of the Christian Church. It is they and their children who come after them who will have to bear the brunt, not the conscientious objector, if things go wrong in the future. Their lives may depend on the coming settlement.

I venture to put this point of view before my friends of the Christian minority, asking them if it is not possible for them to be as tolerant to their brethren in the making of peace as we have been to them in the making of war. Some who I know personally are sympathetic and understanding, and quick to recognize the rights of other people's consciences as well as their own. Others, however, are less considerate.

May I be allowed to say that the pacifism which, in our judgment, helped to bring us to the brink of political destruction in 1938 can hardly become the main plank in the Christian policy in 1945. If we of the majority and the minority are to work together to resist peace settlements based on revenge or racialism, and to seek for a peace which will bring a new security to the peoples of Europe, based on righteousness and fellowship, we must have a better understanding than "pacifism" affords.'

This pronouncement was originally published in the *Birmingham Post* of January 16, and was re-published in *The Spiritual Issues of the War*, No. 274, on February 8.

Once again we venture to remind our readers of the sound *dictum* of Dr. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, that it

s not the lovers of peace but the *makers* of peace who are blest in Christ's Beatitudes:

> 'Blessed are the peace-*makers*, for they shall be called the children of God.'

It is the claims of pacifists to be reckoned as peace-makers which demand the most searching investigation on the part of those who are called upon to secure and maintain the future peace of the world. We cannot allow Christian emotionalists, sentimentalists and Fundamentalists to claim the right to solve problems of peace in the name of Christ. Because Christ condemned Zealot militarism in Palestine in the first century, it does not follow that He would to-day condemn as not 'belonging to peace' the prosecution of war fought at the price of immense self-sacrifice on behalf of justice, freedom and humanity against brigandage, tyranny, cruelty and deified militarism.

## IN MEMORIAM

### LORD CHARNWOOD

By the death of Lord Charnwood on February 3, the Modern Churchmen's Union has lost one of its oldest Vice-Presidents. Godfrey Rathbone Benson, educated at Winchester and Oxford, after a brilliant academic career became Tutor of Balliol. He next became Liberal M.P. and received his peerage on the advice of Mr. Asquith. As a writer he became known in the sphere of biography —his Life of Abraham Lincoln secured for him fame in the Old World and in the New. Lord Charnwood was a devoted Churchman and social worker and carried weight behind the scenes with the Church authorities. He was a trusted friend of Archbishop Davidson, and largely under his influence and in loyalty to the episcopate and to the support given by the Church Assembly he—unlike the bulk of Liberal Churchmen—voted for the Revised Prayer Book of 1928, known as the *Deposited Book*. When, however, the House of Commons twice rejected the Prayer Book measure, and the bishops and Church leaders charged Parliament with Erastian tyranny, the strength of Lord Charnwood's Liberal principles became manifest. He pointed out that Parliament had acted constitutionally and in accordance with the exercise of rights to which the bishops themselves had agreed when the Church Powers Bill became law. He also pointed out that further investigation had proved to him that the House of Laymen in the Church Assembly was a poor representative of the views and convictions of the Englsh laity in comparison with the House of Commons,

and that it was the vote of the House of Commons on the Prayer Book issue and not the vote of the House of Laymen which represented English lay feeling.

We believe that many of our bishops have since come round to Lord Charnwood's view. Lord Charnwood was further convinced that the House of Laymen, as at present elected, could never become truly representative of the English laity. The attention of the bishops has been for some years past directed to this serious weakness in our Church system, but so far they have failed to take any effective steps to remedy it. But until they achieve this constitutional reform, they must be content to accept the decisions of the House of Commons in Church matters as the most representative expression of English lay feeling.

Lord Charnwood, both in his Churchmanship and in his politics, exhibited a remarkable combination of judicious moderation with open-minded evolution. He married a grand-daughter of Mr. Mundella, a notable Victorian politician. The marriage was an ideal one, and the happiness which it brought to Lady Charnwood is delightfully indicated in her charming volume *Call Back Yesterday*, published in 1937. H.D.A.M.

## GERALD HENRY RENDALL

The death of Gerald Henry Rendall, B.D., Litt.D., LL.D., Honorary Canon of Chelmsford, at Dedham House, Essex, in his 94th year, deprives Liberal Churchmen of one who gave it loyal service in the academic world of which he was a distinguished member. Like Hastings Rashdall, he was head-boy of Harrow in the great headmastership of Montagu Butler. He became a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Hulsean Prizeman. He passed thence to become Principal of University College, Liverpool, and Vice-Chancellor of Victoria University. Next he became Headmaster of Charterhouse (1897-1911). Here his prime interest was in the teaching of the classics, and he maintained that the level reached in the classics in the great Public Schools of England was considerably above the level of classical scholarship in German schools. He produced a number of New Testament and classical commentaries, the best known of which is *Marcus Aurelius to Himself*, published in the *Golden Treasury*, 1911. The most interesting of his New Testament studies is *The Epistle of James and Judaic Christianity*, 1927. He was much interested in the literary problems presented in *Shakespeare's Sonnets*. H.D.A.M.

# 'A TIME FOR GREATNESS'*

By the Rt. Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps.

THE difficulties and perplexities of the times ahead of us are so immense that no one can doubt the need for 'greatness' in the handling of them. But we may ask ourselves what sort of greatness is required, and how are we to secure that necessary greatness in the world? What sort of situations shall we have to meet and what policies will be necessary for those who have to deal with them?

Perhaps the first matter to remind ourselves of in this relation is the actual manner of dealing with international relationships in our practical everyday life. First, of course, comes the fact that decisions can only be arrived at by agreement between a number of different countries, and that however admirable our desires and hopes may be they are useless and of no account unless we can influence the actions of others or achieve an agreement with them upon practical courses of action. A small amount of positive action in the right direction resulting from international agreement is worth more than any amount of sentimental hope which results in nothing at all. It is certainly not a case of all or none. In international affairs it is a matter of getting as great a measure of agreement as possible and of making advances, however small, provided they are in the right direction.

Indeed there may be a positive danger that those with progressive and international views may try to force the pace in such a way as to stimulate strong nationalist reactions either in their own or in some other country, with the result that the outcome in terms of action is definitely unfavourable to the peoples as a whole. Secondly, let us remember that the actual international arrangements and policies are arrived at by individuals meeting and discussing just as we are meeting and discussing here, but with this difference, that each one of them is constrained by the directions, advice, inhibitions and so forth of the Government he represents. That Government in its turn is affected and guided by what it believes to suit the people of the country, or to be in accordance with their wishes.

There is thus an indirect chain between the peoples' thoughts and the formation of policies and political action internationally. Through this chain must come the pull of all the many diverse national public opinions. But over and above these different and differing pulls of opinion, there is an influence of world public

* An address delivered on 3rd January, 1945.

opinion upon any world conference. It may not be very strong or decisive, but it is nevertheless felt quite distinctly by those taking part and it can and does influence their decisions to some degree at least. It is certainly a factor in the situation to be counted.

Whenever there is an international meeting to discuss and decide policies there will be represented Governments of all sorts and kinds. Some more democratic, some less, some with barely the semblance of democracy. In many cases, therefore, the opinions expressed will be those of an individual or a small group or class of nationals. In every case it will be a matter of ordinary individuals — not super-men, though perhaps more experienced and more intelligent than the average, but nevertheless essentially ordinary human beings with human emotions — who will be meeting together and deciding these great issues.

But we must further remember that even the best forms of democratic machinery easily become misrepresentative. It would be a bold person who would say that to-day our Parliament represents the views of the people on any particular issue or that our Government always represents the views of Parliament, or that our representatives at international conferences or international conversations always represent the views of the Government. At any one of these three stages there may be a conscious or unconscious misrepresentation. But then who can say what is the view of the people on a complex international issue? Very often it will be merely emotional, without reasoning or understanding; indeed the knowledge which alone can form a basis for understanding is often wholly and always partially missing.

A time for greatness — whose greatness? Where and how is the influence of that greatness to be brought to bear? Clearly we want it as wide as possible, that influence of greatness, amongst all classes, peoples and religions, if we are to mobilize a public opinion that can influence the action of those who will be responsible for formulating the policies of the post-war world.

The first foundation, indeed the only true foundation for greatness is the moral and religious faiths of the people. Mere expediency or the rival internal interests of different individuals, classes and nations can never form the basis for *great* actions, in the sense in which we are using that word. At the same time we must not disregard those human desires, ambitions and fears which are bound to play a large part in the actual determination of our future. We shall not come to wiser decisions if we neglect these very material considerations and overlook their influence and power. A realistic appreciation of their tremendous potency may enable us to fight the better against them; at least it will make it possible to estimate their strength and to judge how best we can overcome them.

The time for greatness does not mean the time for great thoughts and high ideals only; it means much more than that—the time for self-sacrificing acts, for bold policies fearlessly carried through, for taking chances against apparently heavy odds. But such action can only come from inspired individuals or groups; it cannot come from the apathetic, careless and ignorant. There must exist some power beyond ourselves which can lead us, despite our own selfish wishes and fears, to take action for the salvation of humanity.

Just as in the war we are taken out of ourselves, and are cleansed of our selfish desires and enjoyments, by the higher call of our community to sacrifice our personal interests in the blood and sweat and tears to which we are summoned, so in the years that lie ahead, when it is possible for us to influence the world towards a new state of peace and happiness, we must be prepared to follow the call of Christ at least as faithfully and with as great a measure of sacrifice as we have followed our human leaders in the time of war. We are called by Christ to help in building His Kingdom here on earth. We must, then, spread the Gospel of His inspiration if we are to make any headway against the difficulties that lie before us. We have the promise of His help if we ourselves will try. We know the prize of happiness and peace that can be won for the world; and we know, too, or we should know, the dangers, the reverses, the tragedy and the suffering that lie in the path of our attempt.

How then should we act, as Christians hoping to inspire the peoples of the world to new hopes, in this time of great ideals and great actions? One thing I beg of you: do not allow yourselves to be carried away by your own utopianism. It is so much easier to build wonderful castles in the air than it is to think out and place the hard and much more humdrum buildings of actual international relations. If only our wishes could come true to-morrow, we should find no difficulty in wishing for the perfection of friendship, equality, justice and peace in the world by the miraculous transformation of human nature. But we know that that cannot be. What the people of the world have so ruthlessly destroyed they must build up again slowly and with suffering. Not only has there been a vast material destruction throughout the world, but there has been an equally and even more devastating moral destruction.

Practically the whole peoples of the world have thrown themselves into methods of mutual destruction which have, most naturally, led to a deterioration of that slowly forming and sometimes superficial desire for brotherhood and friendship which we saw before the war. In great parts of the world bestialities and abominations have been practised which have not only brutalized those responsible for them but also those to whom they have been

done, while the constant spectacle of these foul deeds has made all of us less sensitive and more oblivious to their practice. Where at one time we should have raised our voices loud in clamour against the torture or death of one innocent victim, now we hardly notice the destruction of hundreds and thousands.

It is in a world still torn by the fears, the sorrow, the pain, the agony of the history of the last five years that we have to start upon the process—the slow and gradual process—of building the New Jerusalem. There is no short cut to Utopia in such an environment. We shall find a new generation grown up that has never known what we would regard as normal times in the world, times when we had hopes that compacts and treaties would be honoured, when neighbour nations could trust one another for a time at least, and where some kind of rules of decency were observed in international dealings, even in war itself. That new generation knows only the rule of violence, of starvation and hatred, of slavery and murder, and we must remember this very potent and discouraging fact when we come to plan our new policies.

Further than that, a new range of fears has been created in the world. The fear of the new weapons, each more ghastly and terrible than the last, each carrying its destruction further and further into the territories of other nations. No one knows—or ever can—the climax of the terrors of this unending exhibition of human ingenuity or how frightful will be the weapon of another war if it should come. You may think that that is in itself an argument for safety. So it may be when once the neighbour nations have been persuaded to some way of destroying or vastly diminishing the danger of future wars. Till then, the greater the terror the more violent will be the fear complexes within which we must settle our new international policies, and the more difficult will it be to get agreement upon such matters as disarmament or any concerted international action for diminishing the risk of war. If the terror is so great, then every country will at least want to reinsure itself by its own armed might until the strength of a peace-keeping international organization has been amply proved in action.

How tense and unsettled the whole world has become as a result of the strains and stresses of war has been shown in a small way by events in the once-occupied countries now freed from the Nazis, such as Greece and Belgium. Add to all this the physical destruction with its sequel of lack of food, clothing and housing, and above all of mass unemployment, and you will get some sort of picture of the world in which we must exercise our greatness. I emphasize these points not to depress or to discourage you, but

that you may not have any false picture of what it is we have got to do, if we are to succeed.

There is at least one factor on the other side, or a factor which might be made effective on the other side. The peoples of the world are vastly weary of war and slaughter and want only to be left alone to follow out their own vocations in peace. This may mean one of two things: either a violent and helpful reaction against war and all that has been responsible for war, or a dull and leaden apathy once the war is over, the apathy that leads to disillusionment and frustration in the long run.

These difficulties that exist, once they are known and realized, should in themselves create a challenging determination in men and women of goodwill to work together that they may overcome all obstacles to their faith. The greater the hazards and the tougher the obstacles, the more determined must be our effort. That is all to the good; there is no doubt that we in our generation have been given a chance of service to Christ as has been given to no other generation before us in the world. It is indeed a time for greatness. There is another lesson that we must learn from the discouraging facts that I have mentioned.

We have to persuade others to act; we cannot ourselves in this room, nor can we in our churches, lay down the policies which will rule the post-war world. That is for others; we can only act as part of the machinery of persuasion. We shall certainly fail in that persuasion unless we are as realistic in our outlook as those we try to persuade.

Though Christians have rightly shown themselves as idealists, it is an unfortunate fact — and this again we must face fearlessly and in all humility — that their idealism has not been a practical idealism as it might have been. As Christians we have thus earned a reputation for 'pie in the sky by-and-bye' rather than for practical measures to produce the best we can here and now. We are met so often with the arguments 'That's all very well, but . . .' and 'Yes, but it's no good thinking in terms which assume that all men are Christians or perfect.' We must adapt our thinking to the facts of the situation and we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by our own emotional hopes.

How then are we to bring the greatness of our Christian faith and teaching into the hard practical realities of the international situation, some of which I have tried to point out already? Perhaps the best way to examine the problem is to take the most difficult of all the questions that will arise after the war and see how we can get our idealism into a practical answer. Let us take the problem of the treatment of Germany and the Germans after the war.

The first problem is to make up our minds as to whether we are entitled to judge of the merits of the situation as between Germany and the United Nations. 'Judge not that ye be not judged' is a sound Christian principle, but it does not mean that we are not to form any opinion as to right or wrong. What it does mean, I think, is that it is not for us to condemn others because we can certainly never be free from guilt ourselves. 'Let him who is without guilt cast the first stone.' We are entitled and indeed bound to say that we believe the aggressive brutality of Germany is wrong and that her neighbours have suffered innocently.

Having arrived at that decision, we must beware of exercising our Christianity in one direction only, and that towards the evil-doer. There is always a liability for Christians to force themselves to exercise restraint and even friendship towards a wrong-doer while perhaps overlooking the plight of the victim. While we pay due regard to the brotherhood between the Germans and ourselves, do not let us forget that there is equally a brotherhood between the Russians, Danes, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, French, Czecho-slovakians, Poles, Greeks, Yugoslavs and ourselves. These wronged peoples are as much or more entitled to our friendship, sympathy and support in the future as are our defeated enemies.

Then, too, we must take into account the state of mind of these different peoples as it will emerge at the end of the war. It was once truly said by a very eminent British Judge that the state of a man's mind is as much a matter of fact as the state of his stomach. This is true, and one of the most material facts in the post-war situation will be the national states of mind that will exist in Europe. Certainly they will be antagonistic, bitter, revengeful and full of fear and hatred. It will be of no avail for us to say that these attitudes are un-Christian; they will be facts with which we shall have to deal.

It is certainly not for us to be revengeful in our action. 'Revenge is mine,' saith the Lord, 'I will repay.' But we must as practical Christians take into account the fact that the spirit of revenge will be latent throughout Europe, and perhaps in our own country too, though that has not been overrun by the enemy. As Christians we must try to assuage those feelings of fear and hatred so as to create an environment in which they will gradually and by stages disappear altogether. It would be quite idle to proceed upon the basis that by some miracle of conversion we could wipe them all out in a day.

We must also be quite realistic as to the situation that is likely to exist in Germany itself. The whole of the younger generation that survives, and many of the older ones too, will have been imbued with a fanatical materialistic nationalism that is very strong and deep-seated. The end of the war will not destroy that spirit

in the Nazis. They will continue working, as their predecessors did after the last war, to revenge their defeat. That too is an undoubted fact that we must take into account. We must, therefore, while doing our utmost to persuade them to a more Christian outlook, also devise methods by which we can offer protection to their innocent neighbours against a recurrence of their experiences during this century which, although we are not yet half way through it, has already brought two world wars in Europe.

Now none of these considerations need affect our ultimate objectives of a peaceful structure for international society, but what they must determine is the steps which we shall try to take immediately after the war by which to arrive at our ultimate objective. If we try to advance too rapidly we shall miss our goal entirely, because the existing fears and hatreds will destroy blindly any peaceful international structure before it has the time to become consolidated. We must found our permanent building upon the true Christian principles of equality, justice and brotherhood, but we must in the initial stages shore up those foundations with buttresses against the immediate impact of those widespread feelings of revenge and fear that will pervade Europe. We shall not succeed if we try to build a flimsy, showy and elaborate structure with all the speed we can, but rather by a slow and patient construction which will be able to stand against all the evil storms that are sure to beset it from the very beginning.

By trying to make our idealism fit the practical circumstances in which we shall have to work we arrive, then, at some such plan as the following. No revenge against the people of Germany but protection for their frightened neighbours. The Germans are to be regarded as human beings like ourselves, equally brothers in the human family and sharing the fatherhood of God.

But in the light of past experiences, if we are to have any hope of assuaging the passions of hatred and revenge in Europe, we must make certain decisions as to the future of Germany which will remove or diminish the understandable fears of a recurrence of what has already happened twice in this century. We must, therefore, demonstrably put it outside the limits of likelihood that the Germans, whatever their leadership, shall again engulf Europe and the world in war. To do this they must be disarmed effectively and prevented from re-arming, especially in the air. The exact measures that are necessary to accomplish this must of course be concerted amongst the United Nations. We must, too, try and recast the boundaries of Europe on a safer pattern — one more likely to bring peace and happiness to the people.

We must attempt to wean the Germans from Nazi leadership and ideals, though we can do little in this direction from outside except perhaps by our example. We must by dignified and just

methods bring the worst wrong-doers to account, not because they fought against us, but because of the inhuman cruelties they have unnecessarily committed in the course of the war. We must vindicate the decencies of human relations both to destroy the desire for indiscriminate revenge and to establish standards of international behaviour.

To the German people we, as Christians, would say: 'We desire to treat you as brothers and with friendship, but we must insist upon taking measures to protect and comfort our other European brothers upon whom you and your leaders have inflicted such untold suffering. Our desire to help you and to bring you back into the comity of nations cannot override our duty to protect for the future those others who have suffered so much in the past. We are not your judges — God alone can judge of human actions and motives — but we shall take what practical steps we can to provide for a safe period of absence of war, during which we can start to build the more permanent structure of human peace.

Such steps will inevitably affect you and your country because we must secure your neighbours against the fears they feel as regards a recurrence of aggressions from your territory. When the time comes that the passions generated by the war have died down, and you have been able to convince your neighbours of your true desire for friendly and peaceful co-operation, you will be able to join with all the other nations in the elaboration of such an international order as will obviate the danger of future wars.'

That seems to me to be the very difficult and painful path of practical idealism so far as Germany is concerned. Above all we must not act in a spirit of revenge or so as to advantage ourselves at the cost of others.

There is one more word I would like to add. Our Christian faith must be implicit in our whole lives and in all our relationships if we are to succeed in the task of greatness. We cannot be Christians in international politics unless we are also Christians in our more intimate and personal relationships, and above all in our relationship to God. Do not let us lecture others on how they should behave, because none of us have yet learnt to be wholly Christian ourselves. Christianity not only means love, but humility too.

If we are to give an example, if we are to preach the Gospel of Peace, then we must live Christianity as individuals. In our personal life, in our family life, with our friends and fellow-countrymen we must show the truth of our faith. If we do that, then we can, I believe, accomplish something real in the sphere of international politics. We, as humble Christians, can show the world the greatness which our times demand.

# THE THEOLOGY OF C. S. LEWIS

By E. L. Allen, M.A., Ph.D.

ON entering a local bookshop the other day I found in the theological section, among other authors who were represented at most by two or three volumes, one who had a score or so to his credit. Evidently here was a best-seller, the kind of book which was not likely to remain on the shelves for long The author in question was Mr. C. S. Lewis, a dozen or more of whose *Beyond Personality* accompanied a similar number of *Broadcast Talks*. What better evidence of his popularity could one wish for? The fact that he has been brought to the microphone so many times as an exponent of the Christian faith shows what a hearing he can command. A friend of mine remarked the other day that he had bought a number of copies of *Broadcast Talks* to present to lay-preachers; but when I asked him whether he had read the book himself, he replied that he had not. The name, it would seem, was guarantee enough of the soundness of the contents. We have seen in some countries how a generation can grow up accustomed to take its politics from the wireless. Are we to have our theology in future from the same source?

It is worth asking what is the secret of Mr. Lewis's appeal. The main factor in it is perhaps that he is a layman and was formerly an atheist. The latter consideration lends spice to what he has to say now as a believer, while the former seems to guarantee him against professionalism. It is strange how difficult people still find it to understand that the man who is, as they put it, 'paid to talk religion,' does not talk it because he is paid to do so but because he personally holds to it. But to hear one who acknowledges himself to have been an atheist now speaking as an advocate of that which he once sought to destroy is an attraction which explains a great deal. One must take into account also the speaker's command of language, his power to fling in metaphor after metaphor, to sparkle with an effortless brilliance and vivacity, and to exploit striking, though not always felicitous, images. His easy adoption of the conversational mode of speech for the most complex and intricate subjects shows, too, that he has a talent for the new art of persuasion by radio.

Yet whom does he in fact persuade? I suspect that his preaching is mainly to the converted, that those who are already convinced rejoice at his demolition of structures in which they have never spent a minute. It is difficult to believe that his arguments would ever win those whom we should be most concerned to

win, men and women of serious thought and a strong sense of responsibility who seek guidance both for their own lives and for that of society, but who are dissatisfied with traditional presentations of Christianity. His 'Take it or leave it' attitude shows a lack of sympathy for such genuine seekers, as the deliberate crudity which he employs so often is more likely to repel them than to attract. Granted that his presentation is unquestionably 'clever,' we may still ask whether an apologist who delights in playing to the gallery is the kind of defender we need to-day, and whether a return to the Middle Ages in its most superstitious phases is the best that can be done to commend Chritianity to our time.

In what Mr. Lewis has to offer us, his *dogmatism* may well command attention first. That this is the bent of his mind is clear, and is not difficult to explain. Atheism once appealed to him as a dogmatic system, and when he went over to Christianity he saw in it something of the same kind. Thus when he discusses the interpretation of *Genesis* iii which was once customary in the Church, it is significant that his first criticism of it is that it is not literalistic enough. But he is prepared to accept that. 'I assume,' he writes, 'that the Holy Spirit would not have allowed' this 'to grow up in the Church and win the assent of great doctors unless it also was true and useful as far as it went' (*Problem of Pain*, p. 60). Christianity is thus a deposit of doctrine arrived at under the guidance of an influence which ensures against error. We who come afterwards must accept this on authority. So faith is defined elsewhere as — at one level — 'accepting or regarding as true the doctrines of Christianity,' and as such it is to be regarded as a virtue (*Christian Behaviour*, p. 54).

There is another passage which is of such importance that it deserves to be quoted at length :

> 'Don't be scared by the word authority. Believing things on authority only means believing them because you've been told them by someone you think trustworthy. Ninety-nine per cent. of the things you believe are believed on authority. I believe there is such a place as New York. I haven't seen it myself. I couldn't prove by abstract reasoning that there must be such a place. I believe it because reliable people have told me so. . . . A man who jibbed at authority in other things as some people do in religion would have to be content to know nothing all his life' (*Broadcast Talks*, p. 58).

The immediate reference is to the authority of Jesus : because one believes Him to be God, one must accept what He says as true. The serious objection that there is no evidence that the historical Jesus ever did ask anyone to believe anything on the ground that He was God, and so knew more about it than we do, receives no consideration from Mr. Lewis.

Surely there is something wrong here. Is not this just the sort f thing to which Freud points as evidence that religion is ood enough for the childhood of the race but must be discarded nce we have reached maturity? The illustration used is one of ose which come easily but will not bear examination. I accept n authority the existence of New York because it is not in my ower to test the truth of what is told me, but also because its xistence or non-existence is of no personal moment whatsoever. f I have been deceived on this, my life will go on precisely s before; no one had a broken heart because a text-book of geo- raphy was found faulty on a point! The kind of faith of which e New Testament speaks is quite different; it springs from the ersonality as a whole and should it prove false the personality of e believer would be imperilled: Moreover, faith is the means by hich one verifies for oneself what one has received from others; t is the venture of the total self by which we see for ourselves hat the saints and prophets tell us they have seen. A much better lustration of the only authority we can recognize in religion would e provided by Mr. Lewis himself lecturing on an English poet: e might be able so to communicate his enthusiasm to his students hat they come to share it. Would he be satisfied, I wonder, with student who merely repeated in his essays the critical judgments hich he had taken over from his teacher — on the ground that he latter knew so much more about it than he did?

Of course, Mr. Lewis assures us that he merely sets forth what s the 'central tradition' in Christianity, or those items of Christian doctrine on which there is general agreement. He tells us that hen he uses the term 'Christian belief' he uses it 'to describe the doctrines officially held by organized Christianity at nearly all imes and in nearly all countries' (*Beyond Personality*, p. 5). But s there such a 'central tradition,' and if so, is this the slightly nodified Augustinianism which Mr. Lewis himself adopts? No ess a scholar than N. P. Williams in his Bampton Lectures dis- inguishes between the 'once-born' and the 'twice-born' types of Christian thinking, the Hellenic and the African as he calls them, nd holds definitely that the Vincentian canon decides in favour of he former. I should myself say that there is no 'central tradition' t all, but that Christianity has from the first existed in two forms, he Johannine and the Pauline, with Origen and Augustine as heir greatest exponents in the history of the Church. In any case, s not the appeal to tradition here one to a majority-judgment? Would Mr. Lewis accept as a standard of literary excellence any such reference to mass-opinion? Is not the Master Himself to be eard in this matter? What if the final test of what is and is not Christian is in the mind of Christ rather than in His followers?

That, of course, Mr. Lewis would not accept, because he i contemptuous of any appeal to history. This *flight from histor* I would select as the second noticeable feature of his thought The 'quest of the historical Jesus' is something which *Screw-tap* is most anxious to encourage,

> 'for the real presence of the Enemy, otherwise experienced by men i prayer and sacrament, we substitute a merely probable, remote, shadowy and uncouth figure, one who spoke a strange language and died a long time ago.'

No biography of Jesus is either possible or necessary.

> 'The earliest converts were converted by a single historical fact (the Resurrection) and a single theological doctrine (the Redemption) operating on a sense of sin which they already had' (*The Screw-Tape Letters*, *pp.* 117*ff.*).

Here Mr. Lewis joins the band of scholars who base faith on scepticism: Jesus is known to us only through the witness of the Apostles and, if He is to be received at all, must be received on their authority. He uses language at times which suggests that the Sermon on the Mount is quite unacceptable to him: he would probably call it 'Christianity-and-water' on the ground that it leaves out 'all the difficult and terrible doctrines about sin and the devil and hell, and the redemption' (*Broadcast Talks*, p. 41).

For himself, he seems content to take the Pauline epistles in their traditional interpretation as the norm of Christianity and to regard any other view as reducing Christ to the level of a mere moral teacher. He has apparently no understanding for the gospel embedded in the parable of the prodigal son or the message of God as our Father who seeks to make us His children. He shuts his eyes to all that we have gained in the last century and a half by a closer acquaintance with Jesus as He spoke in Galilee: what historical research has given us is no shadowy, uncouth figure but a man who spoke and acted for God and who has power to enter into our life to-day and mould it afresh. Was it not his 'quest of the historical Jesus' which gave to Albert Schweitzer that deep human sympathy and that sense of responsibility for others which sent him out into the heart of the African jungle? And was it not the work of Schweitzer which fired C. F. Andrews to his heroic life of service and atonement in India? But these men do not think in terms of the devil and hell: do they represent Chirstianity-and-water?

Had he been dealing with any other book than the New Testament, Mr. Lewis would have taken pains to acquaint himself with recent work on the subject, and even had he decided to differ from this, would have felt under an obligation to give his reasons for so doing. Of course, in a short series of talks one cannot go into questions of criticism very deeply, but surely no one has a right to

dismiss altogether these matters when the whole argument turns upon such points. Mr. Lewis, however, shuts his eyes to the differences between the Four Gospels, and not only treats the Fourth as historical in the same sense as the first three, but seems indisposed to pay attention to the first three. The Lord who spoke and healed in Galilee has to yield place to the Son of God of the Athanasian Creed, for even the Johannine Christ is not allowed to do otherwise than act as support for the ancient formularies. Here again we come to the same all-important question: Is Christianity the acceptance on authority of a certain body of dogmas which have come down from the past or is it the personal discipleship to Christ in the situation which confronts us to-day? No doubt one very good reason for not opening the Synoptic Gospels is because they might be used in favour of the latter view.

Time was when Christianity was a religion with its roots in history; to-day it is spoken of rather as one which is not accessible to the historian. It would seem as though the theologians have surrendered to the 'ideological' strain in present-day political thinking. Truth has for many people ceased to be an object of earnest search and has become rather a set of weapons with which to defend one's group-interests. In a world smitten with the rival madnesses of Fascism and Marxism, the temptation to go mad oneself as the only hope of survival is to all appearances a powerful one: I mean by that, of course, the temptation to oppose dogmatism with dogmatism rather than with freedom. But the contention that we either accept the traditional position or surrender to historical scepticism — as is urged, for example, by the Bishop of Derby in his latest book — means that we have no longer any criterion by which to judge tradition. With the impossibility of any appeal from our thoughts about the Master to the Master himself goes the loss of that power which Christianity surely possesses in a peculiar degree, the power to find renewal and regeneration by constantly going back to its sources.

The third feature of Mr. Lewis's thought which I would single out for notice is its *crudity*. This is not something incidental to his presentation of Christianity, but rather a method deliberately chosen, it would seem. He delights in making what he has to commend as offensive as possible. No doubt there is such a thing as 'the offence of the Cross,' and of this we can never be rid; but if the Cross is in itself a stone of stumbling, that is surely the best of reasons why we should not go out of our way to make it even more objectionable than necessary.

It is particularly when he touches upon Christology that Mr. Lewis uses language which only charity forbids us to stigmatize as irreverent.

> 'A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said wouldn't be a great moral teacher. He'd either be a lunatic — on a level with the man who says he's a poached egg — or else he'd be the Devil of Hell. You must take your choice. Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse. You can shut Him up for a fool, you can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at His feet and call Him Lord and God' (*Broadcast Talks*, pp. 50 *f.*).

And elsewhere:

> 'There was a man born among those Jews who claimed to be, or to be the son of, or to be "one with," the Something which is at once the awful haunter of nature and the giver of the moral law. The claim is so shocking — a paradox, and even a horror, which we may easily be lulled into taking too lightly — that only two views of this man are possible. Either he was a raving lunatic of an unusually abominable type, or else He was, and is, precisely what He said. There is no middle way' (*Problem of Pain*, p. 11 *f.*).

Here is medievalism with a vengeance! And we had thought that no reputable Christian apologist would any longer use such an argument! I well remember one of my colleagues remarking, on the morning after the particular talk quoted above was given, that he suspected that a good many who found themselves faced with this disjunctive would choose the alternative which was not to the speaker's liking. There is of course one possibility which Mr. Lewis has not considered, and modern study of the New Testament has given it, to my mind, quite a high degree of probability. It is that our Lord did think of Himself as the Son of God, but that He exercised in this matter a reticence which rebukes the clumsy rhetoric of his advocate, and that He did not mean by that term just what Mr. Lewis does. In which case, what happens to the argument? It simply falls to the ground, having perhaps done a good deal of harm before collapsing.

In *Beyond Personality* Mr. Lewis is no more successful in his account of the Trinity than a good many others have been before him; he is perhaps not to be blamed for that. But his ability to illustrate everything of which he has to speak leads him astray here also.

> 'On the Divine level you still find personalities; but up there you find them combined in new ways which we, who don't live on that level, can't imagine. In God's dimension, so to speak, you find a Being who is three Persons while remaining one Being, just as a cube is six squares while remaining one cube' (p. 16).

There is a difficulty here, however. The cube is 'beyond' the square in the sense that it is quite another figure and must not be treated as a square: is God then 'beyond personality' in the sense that He is quite other than personal, so that prayer to Him, or trust in Him, would be out of place, would be treating Him as a 'Person' when He is really a 'Being'? This is what the analogy

would suggest, but such a position clearly makes nonsense of what follows, when God is spoken of as one with whom we can have personal relations.

When he comes to speak of the Church, Mr. Lewis shows us plainly what his method is. He takes the thought-forms of an earlier period and insists on interpreting them in a grossly literal fashion. In his *Problem of Pain* he is not at all happy about giving up the apple of *Genesis* iii, and his so-called 'Socratic myth' is an attempt to salvage as much as he can of Hebrew myth and folk-lore. What in the New Testament is metaphor and poetry, the inspired language of men and women who have been swept off their feet by the Spirit of Christ, becomes in Mr. Lewis's pages so much repellent prose. Hence he can write of the Church as the Body of Christ:

> 'This isn't simply a way of saying that we are thinking about Christ or copying Him. They mean that Christ is actually operating through them; that the whole mass of Christians are literally the physical organism through which Christ acts — that we are His fingers and muscles, the cells of His body' (*Broadcast Talks*, p. 60).

It is rash, no doubt, to challenge Mr. Lewis on a point of English, but the temptation to do so is irresistible. Is the word 'literally' in this sentence to be taken literally? Or is it perhaps a mere rhetorical flourish? When Paul writes, 'Ye are God's husbandry,' should we comment on it thus: 'You are literally the field which God ploughs'?

But everything else pales into insignificance beside the demonology which Mr. Lewis employs and also, it would seem, enjoys. *The Screw-Tape Letters* themselves might indeed be regarded as a mere *jeu d'ésprit*, morality enlivened by wit. But there is much more to it than that. He speaks elsewhere of the possibility that certain desires might be 'pumped into me by other men's thoughts or even suggested by devils' (*Beyond Personality*, p. 63) with no indication that the second alternative is to be taken any less literally than the first. His demonology is that of the Middle Ages rather than that of the New Testament: the unseen world is peopled by a hierarchy of spirits as clever as they are evil, and all organized under their monarch, Satan. The conception of history as the contest between God and Satan, moving and valuable as it is when taken as poetry and myth, is accepted here as a plain chronicle of events. The confusion and frustration of history are carried back to a supernatural will which plotted our undoing:

> 'That's what Satan has done to us humans' (*Broadcast Talks*, p. 49).

Against this background the Christology of Mr. Lewis becomes more intelligible. It is frankly docetic. The Jesus of the Synop-

tists is swallowed up in the God who lands in disguise in this world to start a revolt against its lord, the devil. It is as though he has read the Gospels and has decided to preserve intact what they have in common with the ideas current in Palestine at the time, while leaving on one side their supreme ethical insights and their persuasive revelation of God as Father. One of the talks in *Beyond Personality* makes God's arrival on the earth something like a blood-transfusion performed on the human race *en masse* (pp. 28-31). In the same talk he appears to accept without hesitation the patristic theory of seminal identity, the presence of all human beings in Adam their progenitor.

At any rate we know where we are in all this. Mr. Lewis has asked the question, 'What is Christianity?' and has given it a definite answer. It is a body of doctrines to be received on authority, the authority ostensibly of our Lord, but in reality of tradition. That the New Testament came into existence because one arose in Palestine who challenged tradition and a few men were found who dared to follow Him—this is not mentioned. That Christianity goes back to the prophets of Israel, men who stood alone against their time and proclaimed a new truth—this again is not mentioned. That God is the living God and that our task is to hear what He has to say to our day and generation, that God is not bound to the past but goes before us into the future—this surely was the faith of His greatest servants in the past and should be our faith to-day.

# FORGIVENESS ANALYZED

By the Rev. C. F. Russell, M.A., B.D.

FEW sentences are more familiar to Christian people than the petition in the Lord's Prayer, 'Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us'; and to assert that any of the words which it contains are ambiguous may cause surprise. It is the purpose of this paper to point out that it does in fact contain an ambiguity—an ambiguity of a kind that is not likely to be noticed until the idea of forgiveness is subjected to careful examination. Moreover, the question involved is not one of words merely: I believe that it is connected with a matter which often gives rise to controversy in discussions of the Atonement. At the same time, the meaning of the word 'forgiveness' seems at first sight to be so simple and obvious that it is not surprising that the ambiguity with which I propose to deal should generally go unperceived.

Before proceeding with the argument, we may note in passing that the petition quoted above from the Lord's Prayer does not occur in the New Testament in this precise form. In the first gospel we have, 'Forgive us our debts, as we forgive (R.V., as we also have forgiven) our debtors'; and in the third, 'Forgive us our sins: for we (R.V., we ourselves) also forgive every one that is indebted to us.' The differences do not seriously affect the point raised in this article; in so far as they have any bearing upon it, they will be considered later. In *Matthew* the Lord's Prayer is followed immediately by the two explanatory sentences: 'For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.' It is these sentences, no doubt, from which has been derived the shape in which we now habitually use the petition.

One other preliminary matter must be disposed of at the outset. There has always been a tendency in the popular mind to conceive forgiveness as equivalent to the mere remission of penalty. The language about debts and debtors, as well as that of the parable of the Unmerciful Servant, may on the face of it suggest this restricted interpretation. The words which Dr. Primrose addresses to Mr. Thornhill in *The Vicar of Wakefield*, 'Though thou hast my forgiveness, thou shalt ever have my contempt,' do not appear self-contradictory to the average reader, who accepts them as reasonable and may even regard them as Christian. For that forgiveness should co-exist with contempt is likely enough if by forgiveness is meant no more than a decision not to exact a legal remedy. To any thoughtful person, however, such a conception of forgiveness is a travesty, and no forgiveness is worth the name which does not look beyond remission of punishment to reconciliation and restoration of friendship. But this misunderstanding of the meaning of forgiveness, profoundly important as it is, is not the question with which I am dealing here, and I shall assume throughout that my readers agree with me that forgiveness is concerned with reconciliation and not merely with the remission of punishment. In forgiveness, reconciliation is achieved or at least aimed at; the man who forgives an injury desires, and to the utmost of his power endeavours, to re-establish the happy relations which existed before the injury was committed.

Reconciliation achieved or at least aimed at — this is the point at which the ambiguity comes into view, and in order to make it clearer let us follow the process as it may occur in actual experience. *A* and *B* are friends. But the friendship is broken by an act of deliberate unkindness on the part of *B*, which makes the old relationship impossible. *A* may be resentful and bitter, and as long

as that is the case no question of forgiveness arises. But suppose that *A* is not resentful or bitter; that, on the contrary, he is deeply grieved at what has occurred, has no thought for his own injury or suffering, and desires above all else that *B* should see his action in its true light and become his friend again. We may speak of *A* at this stage as 'desiring to be reconciled,' as 'willing to forgive,' as 'adopting a forgiving attitude,' as 'showing a forgiving spirit.' For *B*, there are broadly speaking two alternatives: he may respond to *A's* attitude and advances by genuine repentance, apology, and (so far as is possible) restitution; or he may harden his heart, persist in his attitude of hostility, and reject *A's* offer of forgiveness. In the former case reconciliation is achieved, in the latter it is not. For reconciliation is a two-sided transaction; *A* cannot accomplish it by himself, but the response of *B* is necessary.

So far, nothing has been said that would not be acknowledged by every thoughtful person. But now an important question has to be put. How is the word 'forgiveness' to be used in such circumstances as have been described? Are we to say that *A* forgives *B* whether the friendship between them is actually restored or not, or ought we instead to say that *A* forgives *B* only if the reconciliation is completed, and that if it is not he should be described not as 'forgiving' but as 'being ready to forgive'? Can we say that forgiveness has taken place if *B's* response has not been made? Reconciliation, we have seen, is a two-sided thing; is forgiveness two-sided also or merely one-sided? In other words, does *A's* forgiveness of *B* depend on *A* alone, or does it depend on *A* and *B* jointly?

To some people these questions will seem hair-splitting and absurd. They will say that it does not matter in which sense one uses the word 'forgiveness' so long as he is clear in his own mind and makes his meaning clear to others. They will allow, of course, that the two meanings are different, and they will probably agree after a little reflexion that both uses are common in ordinary speech; but they will urge that it is extremely unlikely that difficulty or misunderstanding could ever arise in consequence, for the context would show in which sense the word was being used in any particular case.

I cannot agree with this view. The difference of meaning is important in itself; and at the same time it is subtle and easily overlooked, as I hope to show by examples. Sometimes the one meaning seems to merge into the other, so that it is difficult to realise, even when it has been pointed out, that with a second use of the word its meaning has been altered. It is therefore exceedingly easy to be led, by a parallelism of phraseology, to assume a parallelism of meaning which in fact does not exist.

We are concerned with the question whether forgiveness means the two-sided transaction of completed reconciliation, or the one-sided attitude of desire for reconciliation on the part of the injured person; and, with this question in mind, let us examine the fifth petition in the Lord's Prayer. The parallelism of the two parts, 'Forgive us . . . as we forgive . . . ,' naturally leads us to expect that *the same meaning, whichever it may be*, will be appropriate to both parts. Let us try each of the alternatives in turn, taking first the two-sided meaning of forgiveness—the idea of reconciliation not merely desired but achieved.

'Forgive us our trespasses'—a prayer that God may be reconciled to us, and we to Him; that we may once again be His beloved children and conscious of our sonship; that our trespasses and sins may no longer form a barrier between us and Him, but that communion and friendship may be restored. There can be no doubt that this interpretation gives good sense. So we proceed to the second half of the petition, 'As we forgive them that trespass against us,' and try it again. Reconciliation? A two-sided transaction? Can that possibly be what is meant here? Surely, we may be willing to forgive all who have trespassed against us, eager and ready to be friends once more, unresentful, loving; and yet our reconciliation with them may fail of achievement just because it depends on them as well as on us and they may refuse it. Can we possibly suppose that *their* refusal makes it impossible for God to forgive *us*? that His forgiveness of us must wait until not only our hearts but theirs also are changed? that however Christ-like and loving may be a man's attitude towards his persecutors, God cannot forgive *him* (in the sense of completed reconciliation) until *they* have repented and so have made possible his forgiveness of them (in the sense, again, of completed reconciliation)? Such a conclusion is plainly unthinkable. If the two-sided interpretation was appropriate to the first half of the petition, it is clear that it does not fit the second.

Let us try the other meaning, in which 'forgiveness' means a one-sided attitude of love and desire for reconciliation in the injured person, whether the injurer responds to it or not. 'As we forgive them that trespass against us'—that would mean, in this case, 'as we are ready and eager to be reconciled'; it is our attitude that is all-important, and on it God's forgiveness of us depends. We cannot help the rejection of our offer of love, and if we have made it genuinely and sincerely we are not responsible for its being refused. It must be in this way that the words are to be understood: our forgiving can only mean our having a forgiving spirit.

But what then? If that is what forgiving means, if the word refers not to the completed, two-sided reconciliation but to the

one-sided attitude of *A* in which he is willing to be friends with *B* as soon as *B* desires it and is ready for it, what has become of the first half of the petition, 'Forgive us our trespasses'? Is that, after all, not a prayer for a completed, two-sided reconciliation, but only a prayer for the one-sided attitude of God in which He is willing to be friends with us as soon as we desire it and are ready for it? If so, we are merely asking God to be what He eternally is; it is His nature and property ever to have mercy and to forgive. If it is correct to say that *A* forgives *B* when he is ready to be reconciled with *B* even though *B* does not *as yet* desire it on his side, then in the same sense we must say that God forgives us when He is ready to be reconciled with us even though we do not *as yet* desire it on our side; and however hardened we may be in sin, God's attitude towards us is always one of love and *willingness* to restore to us His friendship as soon as we really desire it too. It is impossible, however, to suppose that when we pray, 'Forgive us our trespasses,' we mean no more than this. It is plain that the one-sided interpretation of forgiveness is as inappropriate to the first half of the petition as the two-sided interpretation is to the second.

It is not, of course, my purpose to empty the petition in the Lord's prayer of its meaning, but on the contrary to make as clear as I can what that meaning is. The conclusion which we have reached is that in the first four words forgiveness signifies a completed two-sided transaction, while in the last eight words it expresses the one-sided attitude which may or may not meet with a response. The distinction is often not perceived; and the reason is probably that in each case the correct interpretation is so obvious, and the alternative one is so unsuitable, that no thought of a choice between the two can occupy us even for a moment. Imagine a conversation between a priest and a repentant sinner. They speak of the forgiveness of God; have they any doubt as to what they mean? But the man has long cherished resentment against someone who has injured him, and they speak of the necessity of his forgiving this enemy: again, have they any doubt as to what they mean? And yet it is highly probable that neither the priest nor the penitent is aware of the fact that they are using the word 'forgiveness' to mean two different things in the two cases, and that neither of the two different meanings would make sense if it was used to replace the other. Just because each meaning is used in a familiar context and is completely appropriate to it, and because the two meanings have a common element, the differences are not consciously recognised.

The explanatory verses which follow the Prayer in *Matthew* are of course open to the same criticism. What they say is intel-

ligible and true so long as we keep swinging backwards and forwards between the two meanings of forgiveness; but if we try to maintain a single meaning throughout, we are in difficulties. This is particularly evident in the second clause, 'If ye forgive not . . . neither will your Father forgive.' This cannot possibly mean, 'If you do not, on your part, *desire* reconciliation, then God will not, on His part, *desire* reconciliation'; nor can it mean, 'If your reconciliation with *B* cannot be completed, then God's reconciliation with you cannot be completed.'

It is worth while to consider whether the same difficulty arises when we use the petition in the form, 'Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.' It is obvious that the cancelling of a debt differs from the re-establishing of a friendship in being essentially a one-sided thing. I can do it, if I choose, without waiting for the debtor to repent. To this extent, then, there is no longer a choice between a one-sided and a two-sided interpretation. But does this help us in regard to the petition in the Lord's Prayer? If my forgiving others is to be taken to mean my cancelling their debt to me by a one-sided action which takes no account of their attitude, can we suppose that we ask God to cancel our debt to Him by a one-sided action which takes no account of our attitude? Think, too, of the explanatory verses which follow. Can they mean that if we cancel the debt of others to us without inquiring whether they have repented or not, our Heavenly Father will cancel our debt to Him without inquiring whether we have repented or not? Again, does not the Parable of the Unmerciful Servant show that the cancelling of the debt, though one-sided in the sense that has been stated, is yet not unconditional? The propriety of the cancellation of the servant's debt is shown to depend upon something in him, namely, his willingness to act in a similar way to his own debtors. And what, precisely, is that *similar* way? If his cancelling of the debt of others to him is without any conditions, he is certainly not acting in a similar way to his master; on the other hand, if his cancelling is similarly conditional, we are back in the old difficulty, for the master now forgives his servant's debt (in the sense of *actually* cancelling it) if that servant forgives the debts of others to him (in the sense of *being willing* to cancel them). The two meanings of forgiveness have reappeared, and the two halves of the petition have fallen apart again.

I have said that the difference of meaning is easily overlooked. That this is so can be verified by referring to the relevant passages in standard commentaries. Such a sentence as 'The divine forgiveness is represented as conditional upon the forgiveness by men of their fellows' is typical of what we find: it simply preserves and repeats the old ambiguity. In one case a note on the word 'as'

(in 'as we forgive') might have provided the opportunity for dealing with the matter, but we find it used merely to point out that human forgiveness at its best falls short of the fulness of the divine forgiveness; and that therefore one must not be taken to be the measure of the other. This is quite true, but it is another point altogether. The fact is that we read all such passages without feeling the need for any careful scrutiny of their meaning, and we consider them to be simple and obvious statements of truth; it is not until we examine them closely that we perceive the continual oscillation in the sense.[1]

In conclusion, I wish to suggest that it is this ambiguity which is responsible for much of the controversy about the 'freedom' of forgiveness. The man who is being exhorted to forgive those who have injured him is concerned with something which is regarded as spontaneous, voluntary, unconditioned by their response. Whatever may be their attitude towards him, his attitude towards them ought to be one of love and of willingness to friendship. His forgiveness ought to be free. In saying this, we are not denying that complete reconciliation cannot come to pass through him

[1] The following quotations will show into what strange inconsistencies and contradictions our ablest expositors can fall in dealing with this subject, and I take them deliberately from the writings of men to whom the Christian Church of our day is deeply indebted.

*A*. In his sermon on the Parable of the Unmerciful Servant (*Expositions*, St. Matthew, Vol. III), Dr. Alexander Maclaren has the following three passages. What can we make of them when they are set side by side?

1. '[Peter's] question betrays that he does not understand what forgiveness means; for it is not real, if the "forgiven" sin is stowed away safely in the memory. . . . We are not to take the pardoned offence, and carry it to a kind of "suspense account," to be revived if another is committed, but we are to blot it out altogether' (p. 38).

(2) '. . . the principle that God's mercy to us is to set the example to which our dealings with others is to be conformed' (p. 44).

(3) '. . . the solemn truth . . . that there may be things in the hearts and conduct of forgiven Christians which may cancel the cancelling of their debt, and bring it all back again' (p. 45).

*B*. In his Commentary on St. Matthew, Dr. Alfred Plummer (apparently following Dr. Maclaren) writes:

(1) 'The man who asks such a question does not really know what forgiveness means. When an injury is forgiven, it is absolutely cancelled so far as the injured person is concerned. It is not to be kept in abeyance, to be reckoned against the offender, if he offends again' (p. 255).

(2) 'An unforgiving spirit is sure to provoke the anger of God; so much so, that His free forgiveness of sinners ceases to flow to them, when in this way they offend. So to speak, it revives the guilt of their otherwise forgiven sins. This is a truth of tremendous import' (p. 257).

alone, because we are not now talking about complete reconciliation but only about his disposition; the word has got its one-sided meaning. But when, having perceived this, we transfer the idea of freedom to Divine forgiveness, we are failing to notice that we are now applying it to something which, unlike the other, is being conceived as two-sided. So long as we adhere carefully to the one-sided meaning, and so preserve the analogy with the freedom of human forgiveness, we can certainly speak of the freedom of Divine forgiveness, thereby asserting our belief that God is loving to all men and desires their reconciliation with Himself. Therein we are not dealing with the problem of Atonement, but with something which is prior to it. On the other hand, the reconciliation itself cannot, from its very nature, be effected by either side without the co-operation of the other, and so in this sense we cannot speak of God's forgiveness as free if by that we mean that it is unconditional.

The Parable of the Prodigal Son is often appealed to by those who emphasize the freedom of the Divine forgiveness, and it is suggested that if the father in the parable is a true representation of God there is no need to take our sins too seriously, for He will always be willing to 'let by-gones be by-gones.' But the willingness of the father to forgive is by no means all that the parable teaches. Some readers have their interest focussed on the son in the far country, until at last as he returns (and they in thought return with him) they look towards the old home and see, as he saw, the father running to meet him with outstretched arms. But as I read it, I see something else. I see the home, while the son is absent. I see the father going about from day to day with bowed head, with agony in his eyes, with a breaking heart. I see him sitting by the fire on winter nights, when work is done, with his thoughts far away; he is hardly aware of what is passing around him; his heart is in 'the far country.' He is waiting. What is he waiting for? He knows well enough that if he were to send for his son, or have him brought home, the trouble would not be cured, nor the evil rooted out: sooner or later he would run away again. And so, though no doubt he gets messages from friends who keep him informed of what is going on, and every message brings a fresh stab to his heart, he must wait, and go on waiting until his son comes home of his own free will. He must go on waiting *until not only he wants his son but his son wants him.* That is the teaching of the parable which to me is the most impressive, as well as the most poignant and the most profound.

# THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF EDDINGTON

MY qualifications for writing of Eddington are philosophic rather than scientific. So, one would say, was the average person's interest in him. It is one of the striking things about our age that the typical interests of awakened minds outside any special field of their own have been cosmic and social much more than scientific, whatever their own religious or philosophical position. When the spectacular discoveries of scientific experiment and observation were new, interest in scientific detail (as evidenced by scientific hobbies) was more common in proportion to the number of people to whom it was available than it has been in the last twenty or thirty years. No doubt this was partly due to the wide and as yet uncrowded field of opportunity the new knowledge was laying open, but it is also as if the intellect of the last century, not yet undermined by the seeming consequences of human discoveries — both their logical, intellectual consequences and their direct physical and social ones — had the leisure, confidence, and courage to pursue science for its own sake, where a later age, jaded, disillusioned, alarmed, has needed more than anything else the reassurance that man has at least a tenable even if provisional place in the universe. Consequently, where it has been interested in theoretical science at all, as against its profitable, comfortable, or exciting applications, it has been more interested in the sort of place the universe is as a whole and the prospects in it for the human race than in the wonders it may contain in this part and that.

It even came as something of an awakening to be reminded how nearly supreme Eddington was in his own strictly scientific territory. To many of us it has been sufficient to know that his philosophic suggestions and conclusions which were so welcome were those of a man of at least unchallenged scientific status and competence. How far is anyone not deeply learned in astronomy and physics capable of forming any respectable judgment on what Eddington was telling us with increasing confidence and conviction about the probable nature of the universe and of ultimate reality? There are, one suspects, scientific students who would answer 'Scarcely at all.' Absorption in science does not make for democratic attitudes unless it is corrected by a broader mental and spiritual experience and the habit of frequent wide reflection. One of the Section Presidents of the British Association in 1938 included in his opening address a passage which it is not unfair to

call an 'attack' on philosophers. He almost taunted philosophers with having made little contribution by their speculations to the sum of knowledge. The advances, he claimed, had come entirely from experimental science. And whereas any man of intelligence with a reflective habit and some experience of life can and ought to be a philosopher and get to close and effective grips with the real issues without much formal scholarship, the intricacies of experimental science are essentially a matter for the specialist.

I do not think Eddington would have agreed with this expert exclusiveness. His own approach was philosophical perhaps from the first. He was tempted by a classical or literary career before science irrevocably claimed him. He was profoundly a humanist, and was so interested in man as man, to whom science must be servant and not master, that it was natural he should defend (as he did in *Science and the Unseen World*) the right of every man to make up his mind about the great cosmic issues as they affect human life and destiny and that he should be eager to help the ordinary person to do so.

Thus, in claiming the freedom to discuss Eddington's philosophical conclusions without much physical knowledge, one feels oneself to be acting in the spirit of Eddington's own position.

Only a few of Eddington's co-workers in experimental science were able to follow him in what they called his 'mysticism.' They wrote and spoke of it with the pitying note we reserve for the foibles of the great. The writer of one daily-paper obituary traced it all back (no doubt to his own satisfaction) to Eddington's Quaker boyhood. (A more logical materialist would not have admitted so much influence for mere ideas, and would have looked for the clue in the child's relationship with his father or his endocrine constitution!) Speaking of Eddington's idealist philosophy, this writer remarked blandly:

> 'The trouble is that his elaborate arguments do not seem to be necessary. The conclusions are such as a man like Eddington *would* come to.'

As if men and women always developed in a straight line continuing that in which they begin, and there were no significance in this great and penetrating mind of admitted scientific pre-eminence having found the results of his own and others' physical investigations confirming and not destroying a reasonable religious faith! Will these materialists — self-styled realists — never come to see that the materialism that explains away the conclusions of the intelligently religious by reference to supposed origins is equally fatal to the judgments of their own matter-ridden minds so that the total result is self-destructive — an intellectual nihilism hacking away in denial even its own foundation?

This is not to say that Eddington gave to the truth he saw any infallible formulation, or subscribed abjectly to any formulation already existing. A balanced survey of his arguments provides a corrective to such an extreme statement of his philosophical idealist conception of the nature of reality as that which the Astronomer Royal, in a highly sympathetic article, quoted without comment—the statement that

> 'an intelligence unacquainted with our universe, but acquainted with a system of thought by which the human mind interprets to itself the content of its sensory experience, should be able to attain all the knowledge of physics that we have attained by experience. He would not deduce the particular events and objects of our experience, but he would deduce the generalization we have based on them.'

It was this view, perhaps without the qualification being sufficiently considered, that roused the opposition of his more important critics. At least two monographs have been written in the last year or two to rebut it. And if it meant all it would seem to mean without the qualification, even a philosophical idealist would be right to be critical of it. Idealism and realism are not necessarily in contradiction: the question is the nature of the reality with which the true realist must be concerned. The idealist must indeed recognize that while there can be no reality that is not rooted (that has not its substance) in Mind and Spirit, our mental and spiritual experience also leads us to believe that Mind and Spirit are inextricably associated with forms in which the experience is cast, and could have no existence if such forms never existed. These forms are the manifestations that the materialist sets apart for himself as Matter, and which he mistakenly conceives to be more substantial than consciousness. The materialists have been right in their insistence on the orderly patterns in which Reality manifests itself, though wrong in failing to perceive the ultimate mental and spiritual nature of matter and, many of them, in their refusal to acknowledge the widely different and equally real modes of experience that emerge from or are associated with particular combinations of 'material' manifestation.

Idealism must freely recognize this truth in materialism if it is not to land in a solipsism as barren and horrifying as the intellectual nihilism of the materialists. These forms and manifestations can only have their existence in a Mind and their value for a Spirit, and it is as they are transmuted into the experience of *our* minds and spirits that they have *effective* being for us. But we—creatures—should not have experience of them if they had not their Being outside us—Christian idealists say in the Mind and Spirit of God the Creator and Sustainer of all things.

It is because they resist or cannot grasp this Christian-Platonist conception that many scientists are so critical of Eddington's philosophy. They see him as destroying the manifestations that are the raw material of their work when in fact he is pointing the way to the only conception we can have of the reality and nature behind the manifestations and suggesting that our experience of them may be not an illusion but a partaking of the essence of a true and utlimate reality. How far Eddington and Whitehead were in communication, how far they have been conscious of their essential unity, one does not know, but the unity is there. Both have emphasized that the only reality we know is the 'stuff' of our own consciousness. Both have agreed that in our intellectual and experimental explorations we find — no, not necessarily what we are looking for, unless our preconceptions and predilections master our devotion to the truth, but at any rate little we are *not* looking for, and that while we must all the time be open to the surprises of experience, the 'special facts' that only experience can teach us, we can and must be guided to look for the right things by our systematized experience — by what we have learned before. Moreover, the fact that this is so is of profound significance for our general view of Reality. The outside observer could see the broad lines of our universe from our thoughts about one part of it. And, of course, one of the things our past experience teaches us, one of our ways of looking at the universe that the outside observer of our minds would perceive, is the need to be alert for the inevitable limitations — the strict boundaries of application — of any theory we with our partial knowledge can formulate.

Our formulations of natural law, as Eddington insists in *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, are the product of subjective experience — the description of reality in terms of the way we have approached it, or the shape and order in which aspects have appeared to us. Eddington does not deny that reality external to our little selves is there, and he does not regard this subjectiveness as a flaw or handicap that impairs our possession of reality. Instead he sees in the internal necessities of the human mind a clue to the structure and not merely the substance of the universe. In this perhaps he goes a step even beyond Whitehead — by his inspired faith in analogy. Even the somewhat critical notice of Eddington already quoted here from the *Manchester Guardian* had to acknowledge his imaginative insight and his gift of making complex matters intelligible by the use of simple images as symbols.

This strong awareness of analogy is the secret of all great imaginative penetration. The perception of unities among things that are different is the foundation of truth. The leap of a scientist to a hypothesis, no less than the images with which the

poet or inspired teacher exhibits the underlying unity of complex manifestations, is a creative cognition inexplicable by any mechanical description of the laws of thought — the fundamental experience of which the describable 'processes' of thought are an elaboration. All human analogies break down, because they represent only parts of the truth, but the inspired souls whose vision has lighted our path are right nevertheless in clinging to analogy as yielding fragments that have their own validity and if used with scrupulous discrimination, accepted often as suggestion rather than firm and detailed truth, can be built at last into an abiding whole. In every part, though there are differences of form and condition, there is fundamental unity that relates it with the whole and, in varying degree, with every other part.

It is the perception of the more ultimate of these principles that gives us our 'methods' and 'laws' of thought which Eddington believed to be so revealing of the character of the 'objects' of thought. Our laws and methods are not arbitrary: they are a summary of our own and our progenitors' conscious and unconscious observation of the nature of things with which we have to deal. We think as we do because we live in the universe we do and, more than that, are in some sense and degree the 'product' of that universe — or its inevitable accompaniments.

Some of the far-reaching assumptions which we build on our experience, and then build upon in turn, may be unprovable — for instance, the assumption that we do live in a *uni*verse—that multitudinous phenomena that seem to behave on diverse principles, to 'obey' differing 'laws,' are yet in the final analysis or consummation manifesting the *same* principles, 'obeying' the same laws, if only in the sense that their different existences are somehow compatible with each other's. There is also (or as part of what we have just seen) the obstinate conviction that nothing emerges in the universe that is higher or more complex than that from which ultimately it springs. If we are to give *any* reality to our experience, we are bound to accept *one* eternal miracle of self-existence, and we might not find it impossible to believe in a series of unrelated unities each simple, unchanging, and totally unlike every other; but that there should be the kind of change that yet implies continuity, and that there should be such large similarities persisting through the vast variety and ceaseless flux, requires us to believe in a whole host of miracles unless we can trace them to a common source — a 'First Cause.' And this host of miracles is as incredible to us as it was to Bacon.

It was essentially this that he found harder to believe than 'all the fables of the Alcoran.' To-day, with our more explicit awareness of the metaphysical problem of time, we may hesitate to use

words like 'design,' 'purpose,' believing them to apply only to partial, human reflections in the temporal process of the Eternal Fact of which we have evidence here. What we can say is that our inescapable demand for ultimate, all-embracing unity requires that we should see in the partial unities of the pattern of temporal phenomena the reflection of the unity of the eternal Being. It permits us to believe that this multitudinous phenomena, which includes all the poignancy and richness of human experience and history, with its moral, emotional, and spiritual drama, springs from a Source not less aware of these values than is the spirit of man, and that the spirit of man both 'comes from God and goes to God.' As in our daily experience we do not find unities without a uniting factor, and where two different things or entities have similarity we find always some other factor in common as its 'cause,' so in the Cosmos — if unities, then an ultimate unity that is the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. If we say the demand for unity is a mere human accident, a presumptuous attempt to subdue the infinite chaos to the needs of our own limitations, we can answer that we did not *choose* our limitations and that these are not the *cause* of the unities we find in the cosmic pattern, but part of what we find in eternal necessity. This we affirm the more confidently when we find that human virtues which we value instinctively and without analysis or deep sociological or anthropological enquiry are yet the necessary conditions of man's universal prosperity and survival.

These later reflections on the validity and implications of analogy are not offered here as anything the thought of Eddington makes fully explicit. One does not know of any place where he had worked out exactly in this way the connection between his philosophy of science and his religious faith. Nevertheless it is significant that Eddington's religious faith as a convinced and consistent Quaker was of the kind that this reasoning awakes or strengthens. The Christian poets and mystics have always emphasized this intimate relationship between the transcendent God who yet is immanent and every particle in the cosmic whole that is His body or His garment. The thought is familiar in the lines about the 'flower in the crannied wall' and about 'a world in a grain of sand,' and it is present in older and greater English Christian poetry that is not so generally known, such as Vaughan's and Traherne's. If such poetry suggests to us a Pantheism that falls short of the Christian faith, it is because we ourselves press the principle too far. 'The Whole of God in everything' the Pantheist has said, but the true principle is 'the Whole of God in intimate relation with everything and essential to its existence,' so

that we may (in proportion to our perception) deduce the Whole from the part. No part can exist in separation from the whole, any more than the branch apart from the tree or the limb from the body. And it is the essence of a 'thing' to be a part, and of the whole to contain and transcend all parts.

The thought is, of course, much older than any English poet. It is in St. Paul. 'In Him we live and move and have our being . . . So we, being many, are one body in Christ.' It is at the heart of the Johannine writings, embodied supremely in the Parable of the Vine. 'Without Me ye can do nothing'—literally nothing. It is no less the keynote of the Synoptics—the inspired use of analogy in all the parables, and the continued insistence of Jesus on the Gospel as the fulfilment and not the denial of the law in which it had found partial expression, on fitting the message to all the facts and not binding burdens of preconceived theory that were grievous because they were not sufficiently adjusted to nature, on the possibility of the simple and humble having a vital knowledge of God without wide learning, and on the uselessness of any kind of accumulation, mental or physical, that is not made creative within the self by being rightly oriented towards God. It is in his confident faith in the leading that is to be found in man's honest, humble, active judgment, in man's highest desires—the things he thinks beautiful—and in God as containing in perfection all that is best in man.

In *Science and the Unseen World* Eddington's brief, typical analysis of the nature of human knowledge is crowned with an unhesitating confession of the full Christian faith—of the possibility of friendship with God. Is not this view of the universe the completion of the gospel of the Incarnation, with Christ Jesus as its supreme manifestation and the 'first-born of many brethren' foreshadowed by all men's previous religious and philosophical gropings? Even the basis of all human thought, all logic, all mathematics, bear testimony to this fact of aspects of the larger truth embodied in the lesser. Our need is to be able to possess in the warp and woof of our mind and spirit the truth presented in little and yet not lose the correspondence with the larger whole.

> 'All truth is a shadow, except the last, except the ultimate. It is substance in its own place, though it be but a shadow in another place, for it is a shadow from an intenser substance. And the shadow is a true shadow as the substance is a true substance.'[1]
>
> 'For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.'

But no, not done away. 'Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfil.'

[1] Isaac Penington (1617—1679).

To many of us there is an assurance deeper than our poor arguments that makes it impossible for us to doubt not only that God is but even that in our measure we know Him. The Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirits that we are the Lord's. In spite of all the discouragements of partial experience and our arguments therefrom, there is a tenaciousness in the human spirit that makes man press forward even when with his intellect he doubts or denies a goal. In his body and his spirit are necessities that, at least in health, will accept no refusal. The simple are often led by these without doubt or question. Many of us who have been led through much travail to an *intellectual* assurance have known also a stage in which the confusion and contradictions seemed to destroy even the likelihood that human knowledge had any correspondence with reality. At that stage our foundations have often been secured by the acceptance, as a hypothesis. of a faith that seemed supremely desirable—often with alternative hypotheses as lines of retreat. Then more and more the evidence has reinforced the glorious fullness of the faith and relegated the subsidiary hypotheses to the status of academic exercises. To our limited minds there are still many perplexities, but they no longer make us frantic. We are certain that truth lies ahead of us and is not less glorious than the hopes that come to us when with open minds and eager spirits (St. Paul's 'open face'?) we 'mind that which is *pure* in us' (eliminating internal contradictions) to guide us to God. What God has in store for us is abundantly more than we can ask or think.

But there is still another possession to be had here and now. We can not only have intellectual assurance of God and all the hope that that gives us for our lives and the universe: we can not only know Him in His manifestations in nature and in His children: we can also, by dwelling on His love in our thoughts, and finding the content of our thought of it in the projection of what human love means in rejoicing and sorrowing, turn our hearts in love towards His Very Self, rejoicing in His joy and sorrowing where He sorrows, lost in increasing wonder as the perfection of the pattern laid up in Him is unfolded to us more and more, rejoicing that He, so wonderful, yet finds joy in us. For that is part of love.

REGINALD A. SMITH.

# MORALITY AND RELIGION IN EDUCATION

By S. R. Woods, M.A., Headmaster, Cotham School, Bristol.

A STRONG emphasis on the importance of moral training is part of the educational tradition of this country, but the difficulty at the present day is that it is as strongly denied as it is vehemently asserted that morality and religion are inseparable and that religion provides the only possible basis for moral training. Also, as so often happens, a problem difficult enough in itself is rendered more difficult by lack of verbal precision. I suggest that at least three problems are raised when the question is asked, 'Is morality possible without religion?'

1. Can morality without religion be effective in controlling conduct?

It is a fact of our experience that moral behaviour demands effort and self-control. It is action 'in the line of greatest resistance,' and therefore knowledge of good and evil does not in itself guarantee right action. Something is required to make a moral code effective in controlling conduct.

The psychological explanation of the fact of right conduct is that the weaker stimulus to right action overcomes the stronger stimulus to action that is immediately more pleasant because it is reinforced by the 'will'—'the organized self in function, the self in movement.'[1] That is to say, the clash ceases to be a struggle between two impulses, in which case the victory would inevitably go to the stronger and more primitive, and becomes a conflict between a single impulse and the whole self in so far as it is organized and unified. But the 'will' requires stimulus, and that which stimulates the 'will' is the 'ideal,' the individual's conception of his own nature, to attain which appears to him as the highest good.

If, therefore, we were willing to define religion as 'force of belief cleansing the inward parts,'[2] then any 'ideal' could be described as a 'religion,' and it could not be denied that morality to be effective requires a religious backing. But it is more usual to limit the use of the word 'religion' to include an 'ideal' only when the essential element in that 'ideal' is belief in the existence of a supreme Being who is in relationship with man.

[1] J. A. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 70.

[2] A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 5.

Using the word 'religion' in this more restricted though more usual sense, I do not think it can be maintained that morality cannot be effective without religion. Any ideal can be effective in controlling conduct, at any rate for a limited period, provided that it be sincerely held and/or the existence of external sanctions be vividly apprehended. The potency is not challenged of a belief in some after-life reward or punishment, but ideals can be equally effective which are purely secular in their nature. It is a commonplace of our experience that we often find men acting with a persistence and a strength of will 'worthy of a better cause,' and Nazi fanaticism provides an example of the controlling power of sincere belief when coupled with ruthless social sanctions.

I would argue, however, that in the long run only an ideal that is true can be permanently effective in controlling conduct. In the first place an ideal that is based upon a false or incomplete conception of the nature of man cannot, by definition, lead to the unification of personality. Mental conflict, resulting in indecision, is inevitable. Again, if the moral qualities which the society demands from the individual member are admirable but the moral behaviour of the society is despicable, sooner or later the individual will become conscious of the clash and contradiction and will be faced with a conflict of moral allegiance which, once realized, will tend to paralyse action in spite of social sanctions. Finally—and I am now thinking of an ideal which by reason of its theistic content we would call a religion—if there are elements in the doctrinal statements of this religion which are untrue, ultimately these elements will be challenged and the resultant doubt and loss of faith will weaken the religion's effectiveness. Thus if the truth about the nature of man is that he is made in the image of God, then no ideal which excludes this belief can be permanently and universally effective. But, as the atheist would add, if man is not made in the image of God, no ideal which includes this belief can be permanently and universally effective.

There is, however, one highly controversial problem which I have omitted. I think that many Christians would deny the sufficiency of a purely psychological explanation of the power of Christianity to transform character. They would assert that the power to overcome temptation comes from without and not from within the man; it is grace from on high and not simply some co-ordination of personality. Thus Christianity has an effectiveness peculiar to itself, incapable of psychological analysis. Other Christians would prefer to say that psychology, like any other science, can describe but not explain. They would accept the psychological description of volition but still affirm that it can be explained only if it is regarded as the way in which God enables

man to fulfill His will. And to accept this view does not necessarily involve any loss of belief in the peculiar effectiveness of the Christian faith in controlling conduct. Christianity is most effective because it is most true. It operates in a way which psychology can faithfully describe, but, because it is based upon a complete conception of the nature of man, it can achieve that which other religions, because to varying extents they are false or incomplete, are unable to do.

2. Can any moral code be valid without religion?

It is sometimes said that without religion no valid distinction can be drawn between right and wrong; secular morality is purely conventional.

This is an opinion which I regard as untenable, for the secular moralist, starting from his belief that morality is that type of conduct which leads to social and psychological harmony, can and does formulate general principles of morality, based upon human experience. Each single moral judgment is an attempt to apply a general principle to a particular case and there is therefore always the possibility of error. The general principle may be based upon a too limited range of experience; it may take into account the needs of a single society but ignore the fact of relationships between that society and humanity at large. An act which may benefit the family may be harmful to the tribe; that which is helpful to the tribe may be injurious to the nation. It is this fact which, in my opinion, largely explains the variations and contradictions in moral codes of which the student of comparative religion has made us familiar.

> 'The same situation which the tribesman welcomes as good, (the civilized observer) calls evil. The two judgments upon the same concrete situation contradict one another. But this contradiction may not apply to the underlying grounds of the judgment. They may, indeed, be largely identical and differ only in degrees of comprehensiveness.' [3]

There is also the possibility of error arising from the fact that to apply even a valid general principle to a given situation demands a complete knowledge of the situation, its present elements, its past causes and its future consequences, and this no human being can possess. Yet I think that any attempt to invalidate moral judgments on the grounds of human fallibility must apply also to all other types of judgments. Absolute knowledge may escape us, but there are degrees of probability, and even in moral and aesthetic judgments there are occasions when we approach to what Dr. Tennant would call 'certitude'—'the sanguine or complete

[3] W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 97.

onvincedness to which one gives expression in saying "I am ertain that . . ."'[4]

It will be noted that such a theory of morality, though not emanding theism, is not incompatible with theistic belief. If we elieve that man is created of God, then any way of human know- ng, so called, also springs from God and must be regarded as His ethod of revealing His will. The distinction between natural nd revealed knowledge disappears; what is left is, on the one and, knowledge that can stand every intellectual test and, on the ther, knowledge which collapses when it is critically examined.

But there are those, Anglo-Catholics and Fundamentalists, to whom the distinction between natural and revealed knowledge is essential and who assert that in the Bible, interpreted either by the Church or by the individual, there is an inerrant record of God's nature and will, incapable of proof or refutation by knowledge drawn from human experience. From such a standpoint alone would it be true to say that morality is valid only when it is 'revealed' and that without such 'revelation' there is no guarantee or criterion of moral validity.

3. Is it possible without religion to justify the obligatory nature of morality?

The problem which faces even the secular moralist is to find some explanation of the world order he describes which does not in its moral aspect fall below the level of the morality he seeks to justify.

It may, for example, be argued that morality is social in origin. Every organism is compelled by its own nature to seek completion and perfection. But man is a social animal; only in contact with his fellows can he realize his own nature, and therefore to achieve this necessary co-operation some restriction is essential on the individual's free choice of activity. It is not necessary for this argument to attribute real personality to groups nor to speak of a clash of interest between the individual and society. The argument is simply that, even from the standpoint of the individual, co-operation with other individuals is a natural necessity, demanding that control of individual activity which we call morality.

This may be admitted, but the difficulty remains that whereas 'Life' is continuous, each generation of men disappearing and in its turn being replaced by another, yet each individual life is brief and cut short by death. The play goes on though each actor on the stage of life makes but a brief appearance before his final exit. He may contribute to the plot, but the ending he cannot stay to

[4] F. R. Tennant, *The Nature of Belief*, p. 5.

see or share. It may be agreed that individual life is impossible without social life and that social life demands morality, but it cannot be claimed that in the case of each individual there is always a nice and just balance between sacrifice and reward. It is not certain that the individual's share in any future benefit will equal his present loss, nor even that he will live to gain advantage from his present sacrifice. In what sense can a man be said to gain who gives his life for his fellows?

The conclusion, I suggest, is inescapable. Either we are grievously at fault in attributing reality to individual personality and must regard it as an illusory abstraction from some unity which alone is real, so that there can be no such thing as individual sacrifice. Or, if within the biological life of the individual right action, though sometimes painful, does not bring its due reward, then the world order falls below the moral standards of the human beings who form part of it. Alternatively, biological death cannot be the end of life. For me personally the imperative character of morality can be justified only by belief in the existence of God and the essential spiritual nature of man. The Christian view, so I would claim, meets the difficulty I have tried to describe. This world is but a preparation for the next. The purpose of morality is not to achieve either social or mental harmony, though these are results which can be obtained only by moral endeavour, but to develop through effort and sacrifice 'souls' for some future and eternal existence. The value of morality lies not in its effects upon the course of this world, but primarily in its influence upon the 'soul' of the moral agent. Whether by life or by death is immaterial.

'Do you not see,' wrote Keats, 'how necessary a World of Pain and Trouble is to school an Intelligence and make it a Soul?'[5]

It is impossible in a brief concluding paragraph to attempt to draw any detailed practical conclusions for effective moral training in schools from this examination of the relationships between religion and morality, though at the risk of dogmatism one statement I would venture. It is true that moral training which is purely intellectual cannot be effective; it must have an emotional content. Yet I think we tend to lack confidence in the power of that lofty emotion — love of truth. If we who teach could generate in our pupils by precept and example a love of truth and could train them to distinguish between truth and falsehood, then we need have little fear of the efficacy of our moral, and also of our religious, training.

[5] Quoted by K. Walker, *The Circle of Life*, p. 155.

# THE NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS AND THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE

By the Rev. F. H. Hilliard, B.D., Ph.D., Precentor of Ely Cathedral and Headmaster of the Choir School.

IN a suggestive passage in his Pelican Book entitled *Comparative Religion*, Dr. A. C. Bouquet says :

> 'The position in fact with regard to religions will soon tend to resemble that prevailing in the world of science, *i.e.* the initiative will pass from the memorising to the analytical part of the intelligence' (p 29).

There have indeed been several signs within the last few years that the change of which Dr. Bouquet speaks has not only begun but has already passed through its preliminary stages. With the closer international relationships that are likely to follow upon the end of the war, the question of the true relationship between the greater religions will assume a much more urgent aspect than it has done even hitherto, and upon the answer that the Christian Churches make to the question a great deal must inevitably depend. It is not that the fate of the religions separately must be largely affected, but that religion as a whole must either keep pace with the new demands which will certainly be made upon it, or else men will turn to some other basis for the construction of a wider and more hopeful order. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to a few of the most patent problems involved.

So great has been the mass of information about the non-Christian religions, accumulated during the last fifty years, that the student of religions is in a strong position for estimating their comparative worth. Nevertheless the difficulties which face the student who attempts to make this comparison are very serious. The first and most immediate of them is the discovery of the most satisfactory basis for building up the process of comparison. It is in fact this particular problem which has called forth of recent years two important works : Dr. Kraemer's *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World* (1938) and, more recently, Prof. W. E. Hocking's *Living Religions and a World Faith* (1940, The Hibbert Lectures).

Dr. Kraemer's book has been discussed at some length since its publication,[1] and it will suffice here to draw attention only to one or two salient points in it. It extends, into the sphere of the comparative study of religions, the main Barthian contentions. In

[1] See the *Modern Churchman* for November, 1938.

only slightly different guise it re-asserts the old distinction between the 'true' and the 'false' religions. For it makes no real difference whether the alleged uniqueness and absoluteness of Christianity is stated baldly, as in former days, or in more refined fashion, as when the modern missionary is urged to concentrate upon one task only, that of pointing men to 'God's revelational acts in Christ.' The cleavage between what is thought of as 'Revealed' religion and the mere humanistic approaches of man to God which are found in the non-Christian religions, is as pronounced in this 20th century attitude as in that of a century ago. In both instances the student of religions is asked to accept, before he begins, a premiss — the uniqueness of Christianity — which it is his purpose among others to investigate. Thus Dr. Kraemer maintains that no argument can be allowed to enter where the absoluteness of Christianity is concerned :

> 'Ultimate convictions never rest on a universally lucid and valid argument. To adhere to a certain view of life has always meant a choice and a decision' (p. 107).

Quite apart from the fundamental difficulties which are raised by the Barthian view of the relation between man and God, there are two outstanding difficulties in the domain of the study of religions which such an attitude as Dr. Kraemer's leaves unsolved. Dr. Cave has reminded us how unwise it is to ignore the fact that until comparatively recent times the contact between the Western and Eastern systems of thought has been of the scantiest kind.[2] Very briefly it may be said that Christianity exercised some sort of formative influence, as did Judaism, upon the thought of Muhammad, and in later years some intercourse took place at the Muslim court at Bagdad between Islamic and Christian theologians under the tolerant Abbasid Caliphs. The latter was, however, of short duration. There are indications of an early attempt to establish Christianity in China, while a recent writer has sought to reveal the opposite side of the picture by finding traces of Buddhist influence in pre-Christian Britain.[3] There have been hints that the thought of the Far East may have found its way at certain times to the Middle East, and it is well known that Clement of Alexandria refers in his *Stromata* to the followers of 'Boutta.'[4] It would indeed be surprising if, following the conquests of Alexander, some of the more intrepid among the Oriental travellers had not made their way to the West. On the whole, however, it must be said that

[2] *Christianity and Some Living Religions of the East,* pp. 14-15.

[3] *Buddhism in pre-Christian Britain,* by D. A. Mackenzie, 1928.

[4] See for details Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism,* Vol. III, pp. 433 *ff.*; *Stromata,* i, 15; and Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan,* ch. vii.

these scanty hints of an exchange of ideas between East and West in former times are so rare and uncertain that they serve only to emphasize the gulf that has separated the two sets of peoples. Any intercourse that did take place was neither deep nor lasting enough to permit of real development and mutual appreciation at the time when in both the Far and the Middle East powerful faiths were laying hold upon men's minds. Even about the extent of Iranian influence upon Judaism scholars are not agreed. So it comes about that in the main the great Eastern and Western religions and systems of thought have grown up largely independently of one another. And in the light of this fact it is manifestly distasteful to the careful and impartial student — however highly he may value his own Christian convictions — to insist *a priori* that the Western Christian tradition as it has come down to us embodies a complete and supreme revelation of the truth. To make such an assertion is, at the present stage of knowledge of the non-Christian religions, either to ignore altogether the religious faith of several large and ancient civilizations, or else to suggest that they have no real contribution to make to man's view of life.

There is also another factor to be taken into account, namely, that at least three of the world's great religions make the claim to be universal faiths — Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. Again, it would clearly be uncritical and partial for the student of religions to recognize the claim of one and deny it to the other two *before* he had investigated the relative merits of them all. There is no *a priori* reason why the claim of each of them should not rest on equally good grounds unless it can be shown by comparison that one is better able to fulfil the functions of universality than the other two, or that one only is in fact capable of fulfilling them at all. We have hardly yet reached the position where such a statement could be made, for the process of comparison is only now beginning.

As far back as the beginning of the present century Ernst Troeltsch perceived the difficulties and set out to establish the Christian claim to uniqueness and universality upon a surer critical basis. In his *Absoluteness of Christianity*, first published in 1902, he asserted that the customary claim for the absoluteness of Christianity is mere *naïveté*, but attempted to show that its claim may be upheld — at any rate at the present stage of its development — upon the basis of its intrinsic worth. He regarded it as the converging-point of the two great types of historical religions, illuminative and redemptive, though he was careful to insist that the future could not be judged by the past: Christianity would have to be judged by the extent to which it showed itself capable of meeting the claims made upon it.

Troeltsch's far-sighted attempt to face the real issues involved is carried a stage further by the thought revealed in Professor Hocking's work. He too is essentially a realist and is not prepared to attempt any solution which ignores the facts of human life and history in the widest sense. Especially is he at pains to take account of the highest achievements of the non-Christian religions and also of the failures of Christianity in the Orient.

It may be doubted whether many people appreciate how great a change has come over the attitude of the non-Christian religions to Christianity. There are unmistakable signs of the growth of a new spirit of independence and self-appreciation which have led both to criticism of Christianity and to attempts to establish centres of non-Christian culture and religious propaganda in the West. As an illustration of the former tendency, it will be sufficient to quote the recent statements of two distinguished Indian scholars. In 1927 Prof. Radhakrishnan could maintain at Oxford that not only is Hinduism in no way inferior to any other religion but that in its teaching is to be found the nearest approach to the truth. (See his Manchester College Lectures, published as *The Hindu View of Life*.)

Dr. Dasgupta in the preface to his massive *History of Indian Philosophy* similarly gives expression to a new appreciation of the intrinsic value of much of Indian philosophy and religious experience when he declares :

> 'The discovery of the important features of Indian philosophical thought and a due appreciation of their full significance may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as the investigation of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern philological researches' (Vol. I, Preface, p. viii ; Camb., 1932).

In both these quotations there is to be discerned the awakening consciousness in the adherents of the non-Christian religions of the right to assert their own value-judgments not simply as of importance for people of their own national and cultural tradition and environment, but also for the world as a whole. In much the same strain was the statement made to the writer by an Indian graduate of Cambridge University, that although he had been educated in a Christian Mission School and had at one time been a Christian, he had come to believe that Hinduism could provide him with a fuller answer to life's questions and problems.

As to the fact of non-Christian missions and culture-centres in the West, it is well known that a Moslem mosque and culture-centre exists at Woking, but it may not be so widely known that similar institutions, though often on a smaller scale, exist in this country to spread the knowledge and appreciation in the West of Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and Neo-Zoroastrianism. For a

fuller account of these various institutions and a list of their headquarters the reader may refer to Leslie Belton's *Creeds in Conflict* (London, 1938; chs. x and xi, and Appendix I).

Of the manner in which Christianity itself shows signs of failure to meet the needs of the peoples both of the Far and the Middle East there is a full account in Prof. Hocking's book. The chief objection is that the *present form* of Christianity cuts away the roots of the local culture and leaves the convert neither a Westerner nor an Easterner (*cf.* Hocking, pp. 147-163).

These then are some of the problems which have to be solved before the work of comparison may proceed. Nor must the mistake be made of looking upon any of the great religions purely from an historical point of view. There are plenty of signs that as Christianity has itself passed through periods of stagnation which have later given way to new heights of inspiration and achievement, so it is in large measure with other great religions. Hinduism and Islam at the present time seem to be capable of producing new sources of vision and energy which may in time transform the old forms and make of them faiths which will exercise an even greater power over men's hearts and minds than they possess. No religion which is a living religion may be judged purely as an historical phenomenon, but so far as is possible its latent possibilities must be taken into consideration.

Clearly we must dismiss the solution that the goal is a synthesis of all the great religions, just as we have had to dismiss the other extreme of 'radical displacement,' to give it Prof. Hocking's title. For if the latter is based upon an unsound *a priori* claim which makes the rest of its reasoning false, so those who would see all religions as leading to the same goal but from different directions, would in the end reduce nearly all religious convictions to well-meant illusions. It is not enough to say that the great religions agree in fundamentals: even a glance at their main tenets reveals that they differ considerably in their views of man and his place in the world. It is enough to point out that there is a wide divergence of view-point between the Oriental and the Western attitude to the whole life-process. We in the West think teleologically, and with a fairly clear conception of the supreme importance of the individual. The East thinks on the whole cyclically, and regards life from the standpoint of the world-process into which human life fits as one small part. It is not enough to shut our eyes to such fundamentally different view-points and to suggest that we all mean the same thing if we did but know it.

As Prof. Hocking points out, however, neither extreme represents the best method of approach to the problem. He sets forward a third view which he prefers to call the 'Way of Reconcep-

tion,' by which he means that as a result of its deeper understanding of the other great faiths of mankind, Christianity would come to a clearer perception of its own essence, and so enrich itself that in its reconceived state it would be in a stronger position to play the part of a truly universal religion. It is certain that Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam — to mention only three of the greatest of the living religions — all have something to teach us of truths which they have grasped more plainly than we have in the West. Hinduism can teach us much about the timelessness and the impersonal nature of truth; Buddhism about the limitations inherent in the idea of individuality; Islam about the essential dignity of God. None of these truths is, of course, foreign to us in the West, but they seem to have been more clearly perceived and more persistently maintained in the East than in the West. In short, then, if Christianity is to play the part of a truly universal religion, it must be ready not only to teach but to learn, not only to enrich but itself to be enriched. There is, moreover, the strongest traditional justification for such an enhancement of Christian theology, since in the Christian view revelation is ever unfinished and always progressive. In this respect indeed, Christianity seems to stand alone, a fact which constitutes one of its strongest claims to an ultimate universality.

# RABISU AND RETRIBUTION*

'If thou doest not well sin coucheth at the door.'—*Gen.* iv, 7.

OUR text, taken from the story of Cain, as it stands in the English version, is difficult and somewhat obscure. Indeed, the Hebrew text itself is one of the most controversial passages in the book of *Genesis*. Modern archaeological research has, however, thrown some light upon it, and there seems little doubt that originally there was here a reference to the Semitic monster *Rabisu*, a demon god associated particularly with the threshold, where he sat ever ready to pounce upon the unwary coming in or going out of house or tent.

This figure of *Rabisu* is common to all Semitic religions both ancient and modern. He appears prominently in Sumerian and Assyrian texts of great antiquity, and is to be identified as the god of the threshold in that classic on modern Arab life and custom, Doughty's *Arabia Deserta.*

* A sermon preached in Ripon Hall Chapel by the Rev. L. B. Cross, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

In the Old Testament the primitive Passover ritual of smearing the lintels of the doors with blood had no doubt as its original object the exorcising of *Rabisu*, referred to as the Angel of Death. The reason why the cleansed leper was required to sit for seven days at the door of his tent was undoubtedly that this same demon could claim him if the disease was yet upon him.

There are many other examples both in the Old Testament and outside it of the persistence of this belief. I have no doubt that the custom of hanging an inverted horseshoe over the cottage door is a Christianized survival, associated as it is with the struggle of St. Dunstan and the Devil.

Though originally the demon god *Rabisu* was portrayed as waiting at the door, the substitution of sin as the crouching monster ready to devour its victim has not greatly lessened the vividness of the primitive picture. It is still fresh and suggestive to-day, for sin in some form or other, of one kind or another, is ever at our side.

When we rise in the morning and go forth to meet the new day, we put on with our clothes another garment, the garment of our relations with others, our life's difficulties and entanglements. This robe is of our own weaving. At the loom of life we busy ourselves all day long weaving this garment of our souls. Good and ill are in the weft of it, sin's dark threads intermingle in and through it all; as Keble says,

> 'The deeds we do, the words we say
> Into still air they seem to fleet;
> We count them ever past; but they shall last,
> In the dread judgment they and we shall meet.'

We meet them much sooner; they wait us at our very door.

We pawn our freedom when we do ill: our sins are bills drawn on the future, bills demanded from us, sometimes, most inconveniently. The malicious word whispered in the ear of some candid friend makes our relations with a neighbour difficult and sore, fruitful of dispeace and annoyance. We are unjust in some matter; our own interest, or our irritable dislike of someone has made us strike the wavering balance unfairly. To-day's idleness makes the work of to-morrow harder: a lie brings wearisome entanglements. Life is largely what we make it: our trials and temptations rise out of those relations with others which we have ourselves created. Our sins have made their nest in all the circumstances of our life, that wider self which we cannot throw aside: they hinder our freedom and mock our self-respect. Happy are they who give few hostages to sin.

Pilate found the sins of the past, acts done in the arrogance of power and as arrogantly forgotten, when he confronted those hot for vengeance upon Jesus. These sins of the past gave our Lord's

accusers the power they used against Pilate. Why did he yield at the critical moment? It was because of the weakness which self-will and pride had wrought within him. Unselfish heroism is impossible to the proud and the worldly. Pilate found sin not only crouching at the door of his life; it had entered and made its lair within his soul.

Bacon tells us that there is a lie which passes through the mind and a lie which sinks in. It is the lie which sinks in which is the worse, for it falsifies the character. The downright falsehood which is the ready refuge of the weak is instantly condemned. But lack of candour and openness, the conduct which does not flow from simple motives but conceals iself behind a mask, has a more insidious power of corruption. There are those who are never quite frank nor simple, who never speak straight out, but seek their ends by indirect and winding courses, by insinuation and misleading inferences. As years go by the lie sinks in and spreads through the whole inner being. Such men are subdued by falsehood, and lose all touch with truth. Sin has become part of character.

Another story told in the childhood of the world comes to us still with all its early power. The Greeks tell how Hercules, the friend of men, was brought to his end. An enemy sent him a poisoned shirt: this clave to his skin, and its poison passed in to the source of life. Even our pleasant vices, which seem at first only to affect the outer circumstances of life, gradually eat into our very souls. They corrupt our thoughts and activities, and at last the garment of poison we have woven for ourselves in careless hours does its deadly work.

The last tragedy of sin is when it infects with its blight the divine element in us, the vital centre of our spiritual being, the life-stream of our character. Shakespeare has shown us such tragedy in *Macbeth*. An American critic has said that this play shows us how one sin inevitably leads on to another till it finds accomplishment in the death of Macbeth. But that is a very superficial reading of the play. Shakespeare had looked too deeply into the human heart to see the full tragedy there. He shows us a deeper and a more tragic end. When Lady Macbeth is murdered and he faces the inevitable end, Macbeth utters his mind, a mind diseased by crime.

> 'To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow
> Creeps on this petty pace from day to day
> To the last syllable of recorded time;
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death.

Out, out brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.'

hat is his outlook upon life. It shows the eclipse of faith, the nse of a mocking unreason at the heart of things, the soul passing o the hopeless dark — tragedy in high relief.

It is this type of tragedy which has brooded over Europe ring the past five years and longer, a generation of German ople which has come to say, 'Evil be thou my Good.' But to-y's tragedy is the greater, the more complete example of the vages of sin than that of Pilate, of Hercules' enemies, or of acbeth, for it represents not the depravity of one man, but the pravity of a whole nation. As the Prime Minister of Belgium esh returned to his native soil said, 'Hitler did not produce ermany, but Germany produced Hitler.' We should do well to member and ponder over those words. Germany has hailed itler as the incarnation of its national spirit. Sin no longer ouches at the door; it is in the soul of Germany. Not only has hristianity been challenged by this evil, and by Christianity I do ot mean organized religion alone, this same evil has challenged so the virtues of Greece and Rome, and all the foundations of me thousand years of culture and of progress in social order. his is a sin which neither Christianity nor the civilizations before er had ever known, nor did they contemplate its possibility. hristian ideals of forgiveness surely pale into futility and mean-glessness before such heinous sin; theirs is the sin against the oly Spirit for which there is no forgiveness, for it is deliberate, hearsed, repeated, revelled in, a challenge to the reign of God imself.

It is sheer mockery to ask us, our allies, and especially the nquered and oppressed peoples of Europe to love these enemies; at surely would be tantamount to asking us to love evil, for it is ot possible to separate evil of this kind from those who have done and are still doing it. We English are a forgiving and a forget-ul people, easygoing excepting in crises, but if we forgive or rget our own, and more particularly the experiences of the occu-ied countries over the past five years, those of Poland, of Greece, f Russia, of the Netherlands, if we forgive or forget the massacre f hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children in old blood, we shall be failing in our Christian duty. Indeed, we ave neither the right nor the authority to forgive or to forget.

And what is to happen to Germany? There is much dangerous talk and teaching, especially among the leaders of the Churches—many of whom, I fear, are as soft-headed as they are soft-hearted—and all this masquerading under the cloak of Christianity. I do not ask that we should be vindictive, nor is it for me to suggest methods of dealing with a defeated Germany—when she is defeated—but I do not think the panacea 're-education' will be of much avail. Germany is incapable of re-education as the educationalists use that word. The only re-education she is capable of understanding is that which might come through long years of suffering. Actually the setting of our text suggests one line of approach, that of banishment from human society—social, economic and international ostracization. That was the punishment meted out to Cain, the first murderer, according to Hebrew tradition, and to whom the words of our text are addressed. This ostracization will have to be accompanied by strong international disciplinary action. It may be answered that this or any other form of retributive punishment will lead to resentment and bitterness on the part of Germany. Of course it will, and so it should; that is part, a very valuable part—if used properly—of the punishment. Not until resentment becomes true repentance should Germany be allowed to take her place again within the Christian family of nations. All this on the negative side.

On the positive side, and of far greater importance, there is much we must do among ourselves—'If thou doest not good sin coucheth at the door.' We as a nation, the centre of a world-wide commonwealth of nations, must do good, must be good. There are many things within our national and commonwealth life which are not good; these must be eradicated, for they are opportunities for *Rabisu* to snatch at. They are fruitful of evil—ignorance, vested interests, selfish rivalries, class, party and national prejudices, suspicion, all form a part of the weft of the garment of our national and commonwealth soul. These changes, too, can only come through our effort, our self-sacrifice, our suffering. When the cease-fire is sounded a new era of peace, prosperity and happiness will not dawn automatically; it will have to be fought for, and fought hard for by a tired people. We have all been to some extent in the front line in this war, some much more so than others; we must all really be in the front line in the days to come, remembering always that if we do not good sin croucheth at our door.

# PROBLEMS OF CHURCH AUTHORITY AND CHURCH DISCIPLINE

By The Editor.

## I.

WHEN the rulers of the Jewish people asked Jesus 'By what *kind* of authority (ἐν ποιᾳ ἐξουσίᾳ) doest thou these things, and who gave thee this authority?' Jesus asked them 'Was the baptism of John from heaven or from men?' Jesus plainly recognized two kinds of authority, or two sources of authority — Divine and human; and it is clear that He regarded the authority of His mission as Divine. The Christian Church, of which He was not the Founder but the Foundation, derives all rightful authority from Christ, His Gospel, His Example, His Spirit. The Church of Christ, which came into existence to promote the Kingdom of God on earth, ought, if it be a true Church, to have the same moral and spiritual quality as the Kingdom of God. Of that kingdom, Jesus in His dialogue with Pilate in the Fourth Gospel says: 'My kingdom is not from this world.' Bishop Lightfoot in a magnificent opening of his essay, *The Christian Ministry*, writes:

> 'The Kingdom of Christ, not being a kingdom of this world, is not limited by the restrictions which fetter other societies, political or religious. It is in the fullest sense free, comprehensive, universal.'

But the Bishop, after having developed and illustrated this statement, adds:

> 'It must be evident that no society of men could hold together without officers, without rules, without institutions of any kind; and the Church of Christ is not exempt from this universal law. The conception, in short, is strictly an *ideal*, which we must ever hold before our eyes, which should inspire and interpret ecclesiastical polity, but which nevertheless cannot supersede the necessary wants of human society.'

So, at the very outset, we are faced with a dilemma. In its *ideal* the Church is spiritual, free, comprehensive: but the members of this society are human beings, not one of whom as an individual is entirely spiritual or free or the embodiment of universal divine love. On the contrary, he is in some degree carnal, enslaved by ignorance, selfishness, and pride.

Bishop Creighton, in his practical English way, stated the problem tersely: 'There is the claim of the individual to be free, and the right of the society to be something.' Hence there is a situation of tension between the individual and the society, unless the character and conduct of the individual members of the society are united in their common loyalty to the ideal which brought the society into being and which the society exists to maintain. In some

cases it is the society, represented by its institutions, regulations and officials, which becomes disloyal to the ideal to maintain which the society was founded: in other cases it is the individual members of the society who, by their conduct and character, fail to attain the level which loyal fellowship in the society demands. Usually it is both parties — a fallible society and fallible members — who come grievously short of the society's ideal.

Hence we Churchmen are faced with a practical problem. How are the fallible authorities of a fallible Church to administer that Church of fallible members, so as to promote the ideal for which that Church exists — the extension of the Kingdom of God upon earth? The New Testament is very clear in its answer. Both parties must possess the spirit of Christ. That undoubtedly is the primary lesson of the *Acts of the Apostles*. The Christian Church is born at Pentecost. The spirit of Christ, for the coming of which the disciples of Jesus had been waiting, creates that spiritual fellowship of witnesses to Jesus, whose work begins in Jerusalem but is destined to extend to the ends of the earth.

The author of the Fourth Gospel differs in his account of Pentecost from that given in *Acts*. He dates it on the evening of Christ's Resurrection, which was also the day of His Ascension. Pentecost assumes (in the Fourth Gospel) the form of Insufflation. The Risen Lord breathed on the Ten Apostles in the Upper Room and said to them:

> 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosesoever sins ye remit they are remitted unto them. Whosesoever sins ye retain they are retained.'
>
> (*John* xx, 22, 23.)

The whole message of the New Testament is the Church's need of the Holy Spirit if it is to fufil its duty and serve its aim. This possession of the Holy Spirit was needful not only for the Apostles, but also for the humblest members of the community. Without the Holy Spirit the Church can have neither power nor knowledge nor unity, nor effective influence.

The late Dr. Temple said on one occasion, 'The bishops are organs of the Holy Ghost or they are nothing.' This is true of all the members of the Christian Church; and the gift of the Holy Spirit needs no human mediation to descend into hearts open and desirous of receiving the Divine gift — whether the hearts be the hearts of Popes and Primates or the hearts of the humblest laymen and laywomen. Without the possession of this Holy Spirit there can be no effective Church unity, no effective Church order, no effective Church life. This may sound like platitudinous rhetoric; but, hard as it may be to realize this ideal in action, unless we realize it as foundation Truth, we can have no right Church authority. Without it, we shall have 'lords over Christ's heritage, but not 'ensamples unto the flock' (*I Peter* v, 3).

## II.

This conclusion leads to further questions. Who are to exercise authority in the Christian Church? What would our Lord have replied? When the Apostles disputed who should be first, Jesus set a little child in their midst. When the Apostles desired great offices in the Kingdom, Jesus replied: 'He that would be great among you, let him be your servant.' In the Johanine account of the Last Supper, Jesus washed the feet of the Apostles in order to teach them the obligation of humility realized in mutual service. Plainly in the Christian Church there is no place for lordship or for the exercise of authority of the mundane kind. All will agree with that, from the Pope downwards, who describes himself as *Servus Servorum Dei*—the Slave of the Slaves of God.

Church authority—all will agree—must not be mundane authority, but spiritual authority. When, however, we turn to the history of the Christian Church we find again and again that this spiritual authority which is identified with ecclesiastical authority —whatever be the phraseology it uses—has been more tyrannical than mundane authority and has shown an extraordinary tendency to imitate mundane authority in its methods. What ought to be the spiritual methods of exercising authority? The first step in the exercise of spiritual methods must be by appeals addressed directly to the spiritual, moral and rational consciousness of the members of the Christian Church. Enlightenment, persuasion, example, united prayer must be the primary means of exercising authority where it is faced with opposition and misunderstanding. In short, the methods of authority must be primarily educational, not penal. In the Church of Christ there must, I think, be no resort made to the use of material force and fear. Political measures, penal punishment, economic and pecuniary pressure, social ostracism and humiliation ought not to be the instruments of ecclesiastical authority if that authority be spiritual.

It will be objected, 'You seem to have forgotten those words of Jesus about the unrepentant, offending brother who is to be treated as a pagan and a publican.' I am myself convinced that that was not the command of the Friend of Publicans and Sinners, but a piece of primitive Church discipline. It will be objected, 'What about St. Paul's action in the Corinthian Church when he delivered over the incestuous Christian to Satan for the destruction of the flesh that his spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord?' (*I Cor.* v, 3-5). Here I dare to think that St. Paul was acting in the spirit of the Jewish Synagogue, not in the spirit of Him who said, 'He that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out.' I know that the excommunication of grievous offenders was exercised from very early times in the Christian Church, but I very

much doubt whether Jesus would have approved of this practice. 'Woman, neither do I condemn thee. Go, sin no more' (*Jn.* viii, 11) suggests a different spirit. I have grave doubts as to whether the Christian Church in its administration of spiritual discipline is justified in practising excommunication. The teaching of the Christian Church with its moral and spiritual appeals to its members, the level of Christian practice, the development of Christian character, which are embodied in the Christian fellowship, may be trusted to lead to the self-excommunication of unworthy members.

> 'They went out from us because they were not of us. If they had been of us, they would have continued with us' (*I John,* ii, 19).

This seems to me to be the only permissible kind of excommunication, and the infliction of it by the offender on himself may certainly produce moral and spiritual effects in him which the Church's public excommunication of him would not produce.

This I believe to be the attitude towards ecclesiastical discipline which our English Communion has developed. Forty years ago, coming away from the Commination Service on Ash Wednesday in Exeter College Chapel, Oxford, my tutor—Willoughby Charles Allen, afterwards Archdeacon of Manchester—asked me, 'Do you desire to have restored in the Church of England the "godly discipline" to which the Commination Service refers?' I replied, 'I hardly know.' He answered tartly, 'I know quite well: I desire nothing of the sort.' There he spoke like the typical English clergyman and the typical English layman of those days. Ecclesiastical discipline exercised over the English laity either by the mediaeval methods of 'Bell, Book and Candle,' or the later methods of Archbishop Laud and the Star Chamber, have hopelessly broken down; and the future revival of such methods is incredible. As a consequence the Church of England has become—so the Roman Catholics tell us—the 'Mother of Confusion,' a society in which every man does that which is right in his own eyes. 'That is as may be.' It is better, however, to have a spiritual society in which there is much variety of belief and practice, provided there be freedom, than to have an enslaved laity disciplined by a sacerdotal order. Moreover, it will become increasingly anomalous that a Christian community which stands for the democratic ideal in political and social life, should stand for an entirely different system in its Church life.

'But,' it will be insisted, 'you must have order and decency in your church worship. How are you going to get it without disciplinary measures and methods exercised by the higher clergy over the lower, and by the lower clergy over the laity?' My answer is simply this: 'If you cannot get order in the Church of England by educational methods, and by the exercise of personal influence

in undisciplined individuals, you cannot get it at all.' But I would add that the educational methods, to be really effective, must have the approbation of the fellowship and that these methods must be sufficiently and patiently pursued, and last, but not least, they ought to be begun early.'

## III.

So much for ecclesiastical authority exercised over the laity by the Church's officials. We turn now to another problem of ecclesiastical authority. Whence is derived the authority to appoint Church officials? Do the Church's officials derive their authority from the officials who appointed them, or do they derive their authority from the *Plebs Dei* or body of Church people whom it is claimed the appointing officials represent? This is a much vexed question. It is not, however, as some would have us believe, a question of whether the authority is derived 'from heaven' or 'from men'; for both the claimants to authority in this matter are Christians and Christian priests; since, according to the Christian ideal, the laity are no less priests than are the officials who minister to the laity. According to Bishop Lightfoot the Christian ministry is no separate sacerdotal caste, but a *representative* ministry in which Christian priests minister for Christian priests and to Christian priests, and the priesthood of both parties is derived from above.

As to the method of appointing the ministry, and the various degrees and functions of this ministry, our Lord does not seem to have given any instructions. He sent forth His Apostles to preach the Kingdom of God and to have authority over demons. The Apostles were to feel that in their mission they had Christ's authority and that of His Divine Father behind them. Nothing is said to the Apostles of their appointing successors or other ministers of lower degree, or what the functions of such were to be. It is clear that the Church's needs for the advancement of the Kingdom would give a practical answer to these recurring problems. Any method which secured the best ministers and the most efficient means for the advancement of the Kingdom must be held to receive the Divine approval and testify to it. Many Anglo-Catholics, while admitting that our present method of appointing bishops gives us an excellent body of bishops, yet protest that the method of appointing them cannot be held to have the Divine sanction. This seems to us to be entirely contrary to our Lord's standard of judgement: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' If the best argument for the episcopacy be a good bishop, then the method by which the good bishop is elected or appointed must be good also. Any method of appointing ministers which gives the

Church the best ministers procurable is the Divine method for their appointment and has the Divine sanction and approval. If the Church of to-day is to be restricted to Apostolic example in the appointment of its ministers, then the highest ministers ought to be selected by lot (*Acts* i, 21) and the lowest ministers selected by the 'whole multitude' of the laity (*Acts* vi, 3-5).

Archbishop Benson declared that a weakness of the Church of England ministry was that in so many cases the clergy possessing the *exousia* (administrative authority) did not possess the *dunamis* (moral and spiritual force), while so many of the clergy possessing the *dunamis* (moral and spiritual force) did not possess the *exousia* (administrative authority). We feel that a method of selecting and appointing clergymen which produces such results is not the Divine method, even though all such appointments be made by bishops possessed of Apostolic succession. We can easily discover the cause of this defect to which Dr. Benson referred: it is due to English Churchmen preferring pastors to prophets in responsible posts, cautious and conventional men rather than enterprising and original men. When Eldad and Medad prophesied in the camp, Moses expressed the desire that all the Lord's people might prophesy. This is hardly the feeling of our bishops when Church Assemblies and the correspondence columns of the newspapers resound with the prophetic utterances of Churchmen protesting against the conditions of Church life and the ineffectiveness of Church methods.

Prophetic utterances, claiming the authority of Christ as their justification, have been a constant cause of difficulty to Church authorities from the earliest times. St. Paul himself found the Christian prophets in Corinth a menace to Church order and harmony, and that because the spirit of the prophets was not subject unto the prophets. This undisciplined spirit of the prophets led ultimately to the suppression of the order of prophets in the primitive Church. As the Church itself becomes increasingly the servant of the creative Spirit of Christ, so will it be the more ready to hear what the Spirit saith unto the Churches through the prophets. Those whom the Church needs most to lead and minister are not primarily either priests or prophets, but wise, holy and humble men of God; and where Church offices are occupied by such men, problems of ecclesiastical authority and Church discipline will be solved in accordance with the Spirit and methods of Christ. However perfect the system, it always proves inadequate unless there be the right kind of personality to operate it.

There is one more problem of ecclesiastical discipline very much in the foreground of Church Assemblies to-day. That is how to remove ministerial failures from the posts which they so in-

effectively occupy. Do we sin against love by removing such? No, not if we remove them in the right way, and that is with a sincere regard for their own welfare as well as for the welfare of the congregation to which they minister. The problem here is a problem of the rival claims of Christian love, compassion for the unsatisfactory Christian minister and compassion for the suffering Christian congregation. We are sure that love for the suffering Christian congregation must take precedence over love for the ineffective Christian minister. Here again we are convinced that personal persuasion, and not the use of legal machinery, is the right method. The administrative authority must be willing to pay its full share of the cost of the mistake entailed by the appointment of such ineffective ministers, and not take the view that the whole cost ought to be borne by the man who has failed. It is probably a sound Christian axiom that it takes two to make a mistake in such cases.

Perhaps we can end our reflections on Church authority and Church discipline in no better way than by recalling the concluding words of Dr. Streeter's great essay on the *Primitive Church*:

> '. . . The first Christians achieved what they did because the spirit with which they were inspired was one favourable to experiment. In this — and, perhaps, in some other respects — it may be that the line of advance for the Church to-day is not to imitate the forms, but to recapture the spirit, of the Primitive Church.'

# 'GOD IS LOVE:' A MEDITATION

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

THIS statement by the Johannine author is attractive, but nevertheless somewhat enigmatic. Is it to be regarded as an intellectual statement, to be taken literally? Or is it a hint thrown out? Or is it rather of the nature of a poetic, metaphorical utterance, the product of mystical insight, the sort of truth that can only be 'spiritually discerned,' and consequently only to be spiritually verified?

One possible meaning of the statement might be, 'Love is divine — the highest thing we know.' This would be a 'judgment of value,' a moral judgment. In this case it would be no more a metaphysical statement than the proposition 'Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is beautiful.' Would such a proposition serve as a satisfactory credal basis? This would involve the view that religious truths are primarily 'value judgments,' a view which has seemed satisfactory to some distinguished philosophers, *e.g.* to Höffding.

Or might the proposition have some more definite significance, and stand for something more concrete? For example, 'Love is all-powerful,' or 'Love makes the world go round'? Something, in short, along the lines of Dante's theory about the cosmic significance of love. Expressed in 'physical' terms the theory would be one of 'attractions' and 'repulsions' and the interplay between them. Expressed in biological terms it would be concerned with reproduction through the coming together of opposites. Possibly the Hegelian or Marxian dialectic might come into the picture, though it seems a far cry, one must admit. Anyway, love would be regarded as a 'creative' force (if 'force' is the right word), and 'creativity' is certainly one of the attributes, perhaps the chief attribute, of deity.

For the Johannine writer love was a 'giver of life.' 'We have passed,' he says, 'out of death into life because we love the brethren.' Here, we may presume, he was only expressing what he, and his fellow-members of some primitive Christian community, had actually experienced. The warmth of mutual love within the community had made pre-community life look like death by comparison.

Love seems to be the strongest of human emotions; it is 'strong as death.' Certainly it is a stimulus for action, and a generator of new vitality. It is the positive motive, *par excellence*. If human beings could be rendered immune both to love and to its correlative hate, a completely soporific apathy would ensue. Life would cease; we should expire out of sheer inactivity. Our pulses would stop.

To call hate the correlative of love may be distasteful to some, but hate and love are as indissolubly united as the 'heads' and 'tails' of a penny.

> 'No man can serve two masters; for either *he will hate the one and love the other*; or he will cleave to the one and despise the other.'

That is perfectly sound psychology; as also is

> 'If a man hate not his father and mother, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.'

To the emotionally enfeebled this language seems exaggerated. Yet when we do succeed in loving anything, *e.g.* natural beauty, we do hate its wanton destruction. If a man did not hate the torturer of his child, we should rightly conclude that strong love for his child was lacking.

The truth is that love is 'ambivalent,' as is illustrated in the New Testament; for the obverse of the love of *John* is the hate which finds expression in *Revelation*. To be a good lover is to be potentially a good hater, so it would appear.

To proceed. 'God is love' might mean 'God is always giving what is dearest to Him.' 'God so loved the world that He *gave* . . .' Without giving there can be no creation. Unless the pair give themselves to one another, no child will be born. A woman literally gives herself to the foetus growing within her. Because Jesus is divine 'He gave himself for us.' *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* The new cannot come out of nothing; something must be given, to supply the new with a beginning. Love means giving, which is what God is already doing, which indeed is why He is God. 'Freely ye have received, freely give,' said Jesus to those whose object it should be to be 'perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect.' Unless there is free giving there can be no free 'flow' of life. The refusal to give creates a block in the supply system — a 'bottle-neck.' Where love is frustrated activity cannot function and things come to a stop.

It follows that no relationship which is 'unilateral' can be creative; the love must be mutual, or nothing comes of it. 'We love Him because He first loved us.' And if love is mutual, if there is 'give' as well as 'take,' then and then only can love be fruitful. If one party only is 'benefactor' or 'superior,' then love is sterile. To withhold love, not to 'reciprocate,' is to deny creation its chance.

> 'Unless a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone. But if it die, it beareth much fruit.'

Dr. Ian D. Suttie, in his *The Origins of Love and Hate* (Kegan Paul, 1935), makes the point that the Last Supper 'dramatized and illustrated *free giving*.' 'Even the body is given as food, as the mother gives it.' Yet in the mother-child relationship, which is in reality a true and balanced 'symbiosis,' the *need to give* is as vital and essential as the *need to get*. 'Our adult, grudging, materialistic minds have decided that the baby gets the best of the partnership with the mother, and we talk of the mother's sacrifice.' But perhaps the mother does not herself so regard it, and perhaps God's 'giving' is free and willing in the same way. 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' said Jesus. Actually, both ends of this two-way relationship are blessed, and the relationship can be spoiled both by grudging giving and by unwilling receiving.

Closely connected with 'giving' is 'forgiving.' God is a free giver and a 'forgiver'; not 'a withholder and rewarder, compellor and punisher.' He 'giveth unto all men liberally and upbraideth not.' Jesus condemned the Pharisaic limitation of God's favour to a few choice, selected souls, and extended it to 'publicans and harlots.' That Pharisaism should have raised its head again in the form of Calvinism only shows how people, not excepting religious

people, hanker after 'privilege.' They prefer to be saved with the few; if the majority find salvation it becomes distasteful to them, and not worth while.

That giving and forgiving are related is obvious, not only etymologically, but also because to forgive a debt is to *give* to the debtor the sum owing. Likewise to forgive an injury is to cancel a debt, for the injured person is, so to speak, 'in credit' with the doer of the wrong. The forgiver, too, is the generous individual. The miserly man forgives neither debt nor injury, but cherishes both as precious possessions. He gloats over grievances just as he eagerly reckons up the money owing to him.

'The earth is the Lord's', and the fulness thereof,' says the Psalmist. But 'possessiveness' cannot be the quality of a divine being, that is to say of a creative being. It is true that the earth and its fulness are products of the divine creative activity; but a creative artist does not wish exclusively to keep his creations; the more people who can enjoy them the better he is pleased. Thucydides said of his History that it would be 'a possession for ever,' meaning thereby a possession for generations of mankind. He did not write his History to hoard its pages in a box. Had he so desired he could have kept his knowledge to himself; but he put himself into his History and gave it (and consequently himself) to the world. The statement that God is love, means, among other things, that this is what God is always doing, because it is His nature to do so. God never keeps, but always gives. To keep is to block the flow of creative activity.

It has been said that love is the only thing that is perfectly fearless and yet perfectly kind. Indeed, kindness is only possible when fear is absent, and perhaps this is why kindness is to be regarded as a divine attribute, for it is impossible to attribute fear to God. If human beings, who have so much to fear, can be brave, a god who feared would be less divine than a man. The Johannine writer assures us that 'perfect love casteth out fear.'

Most writers on religious topics take it for granted that we know what we mean by the term 'God.' It should be remembered that the term is a religious and not primarily a philosophical or metaphysical one. The Apostles' Creed with its 'God the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth,' is stressing the *qualities* of God, primarily. 'Father' connotes certain qualities, as does the term 'creator.' And the meaning of 'Jesus Christ, his unique son,' would be affected by the meaning we apply to the term 'God.'

For most people, perhaps, 'God' is just the unknown quantity X. They realize that things as a whole are inexplicable, and 'God' is the formula which explains them — reduces the irrational to the rational. Official religion does not help much, for the God it pre-

ents us with, a pseudo-philosophical conception, appeals neither to the emotions nor to the mind. The whole thing should be tackled from the other end. We should ask what qualities we regard as divine, and then seek an embodiment for them. Perhaps they are inherent in the nature of things. If so, you may say your God exists. To demonstrate that they are thus inherent in the nature of things seems not altogether impossible, and would be to provide religion with a more secure intellectual basis than it seems to have at present.

# SYNESIUS ON THE IMAGINATION

By the Rev. Sydney H. Spode, Methodist Minister, Anfield and St. Domingo Circuit, Liverpool.

A SURPRISING thing about books written upon religious matters is the almost complete neglect of the significance of the imagination. Imagination is used but rarely recognized. This creative faculty of the soul is the Cinderella of theology as it is of philosophy. It was not so with Synesius, for with him the imagination was a central factor. We do not intend here to describe his life and activities, interesting though they are, for that was admirably done by Mr. Gardner-Smith in the *Modern Churchman* for March 1941. Here we are concerned with the theory of the imagination as stressed by Synesius

What he has to say is largely contained in his treatise *Concerning Dreams*. We must not let the strangeness of some things he has to say hide the genuine grain found in it. It is a short essay of considerable psychological importance, as Dr. G. C. Jung has pointed out in his *Psychological Types*.

> 'Imagination,' says Synesius, 'seems to be a sort of life in itself, a little lower down in the scale and having its basis in a peculiar property of Nature. . . . It is the perception of perceptions, inasmuch as the imaginative spirit (*pneuma*) is the more widely shared organ of sensation and directs the government of the living being as from a citadel; for about it Nature has constructed all the functions of the brain. . . . Imagination is like a mirror in which things are reflected which have their root in the soul. . . . We have no consiousness of the acts of intelligence unless the imagination reveals such consciousness to us. . . . Nor is it sense-perception at all before it comes in contact with the chief perception, *i.e.* imagination.'

Through the imagination the soul comes to know God.

> 'If to look upon the good with one's own eye is a happy thing, the approach to Him by the imagination comes of a gaze more magnificent still. . . .'

Dr. Augustine Fitzgerald in the introduction to his translation of

Synesius, *Essays and Hymns*, from which the above quotation is taken, comments thus :

> 'His conception is that the imagination is the collective sense-perception in which the lower sense-perceptions are united and which in the lower animals serves the end of reason. . . . In man, in association with the intellect, it becomes the higher reasoning faculty, for, he says, we cannot form thoughts at all without the imaginative element coming in. . . . He distinctly says that even the higher forms and processes of the intellect can scarcely be attained without the faculty of the imagination entering in.'

So we can say the imagination is the link between mind and body; it is the creative power of the soul, and by it the soul comes to know God. Man's imagination is a gift of the Holy Spirit. 'The Imaginative Spirit,' wrote Synesius, 'comes between the eternal and the temporal in which Spirit we are also made alive.' This theory of the meaning and importance of the imagination is one which has in it a large measure of truth and one which throws light upon many problems, both human and divine.

The problem of the percept. There are three mental factors involved, sensibility, imagination and thought. Through sensibility we become aware of the temporal and spatial order; but this awareness is accompanied by the activity of the imagination which synthesizes what is given and presents it to thought as objects. External 'objects' are in strictness presented to the imagination, for what is given is merely sensory. Without imagination there could be no percept or perception.

Here we get an answer to that crude materialism which has played such a great part in the thought of the last few generations. It is seen to be, at its best, but an imaginative *scheme* of practical importance to the scientist, and, at its worst, a crude dogma built upon a literal understanding of the scientific method. Modern science has moved on from that position, and its conception of 'matter' is now a more refined imaginative working hypothesis. Hence we say it is through the imagination, which is the creative synthesizing power of the whole personality, that we 'perceive' and come to know 'objects,' and by it we reason and construct our hypotheses.

The imagination is the creative power of the soul. The soul, says Synesius, descends from heaven in obedience to the law of Providence to perform its appointed service in the world. It receives the imagination as a loan to enable it to travel on its earthward voyage. He sometimes figuratively calls the imagination a boat or a chariot. In other words, by the gift of the imagination the soul is creative and by its means it does its work in the world. What we now know about inspiration and about the various steps by which the soul comes to know the Divine Reality

s but a commentary on the vital importance of the imagination in he spiritual life.

Nevertheless the practical results of this have not been realized o any great extent. It is rarely seen that the vital centre for art, eligion and science is in the imagination. There is the root of the natter and from it they draw their sustenance. Without imagination science is sterile, art imitative, and religion mere dogmatic radition.

Does this view of the imagination throw any light upon the nystery of iniquity? Here we have one of the crucial issues of eligious thought. Synesius attributes the corruption of the soul o the demonic, seductive influence of matter. The good imagination becomes the evil imagination, and what should be the very neans to the good life becomes the means of evil. We cannot agree with Synesius in his Gnostic estimate of Matter and say that 'Matter' is evil, but we can see that he has hold of a very important fact regarding the nature of iniquity. We all observe how he imagination, captured by the wrong values, can bring corruption and misery upon peoples and societies. 'The imagination is he man,' said Blake, and when the imagination is corrupted the man is corrupted. Out of the imagination of men evil things proceed. 'The soul is dyed the colour of its leisure thoughts.'

This is the Rabbinical doctrine of the *Yeçer ha-ra* (the evil imagination). Perhaps we see a reference to it in *Mk.* vii, 21-23 :

> 'For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, covetings, wickednesses, deceit, laciviousness, an evil eye, railing, pride, foolishness : all these evil things proceed from within, and defile the man.'

The depraving power of the corrupted imagination deserves more attention from Christian teachers than it receives. To give the right place to the imagination would save Christendom from that bugbear and barrier to all vital faith and practice — the view that Christianity is a matter of rigid dogma and authoritative beliefs.

Christianity was not for Synesius a fixed dogmatic system but a way of life that should be understood in the light of the Divine Imagination. The wise words of Santayana in his *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* should be taken to heart :

> '. . . What overcame the world was what Paul said he would preach : Christ and Him crucified. Therein was the new poetry, a new ideal, a new God. Therein was the transcript of the real experiences of humanity as men found it in their innermost souls, and as they were dimly aware of it in universal history. . . . It was a whole world of poetry descending upon man. . . . The whole of Christianity is thus religious and efficacious only when it becomes poetry, because only then is it the felt counterpart of personal experience and a genuine expansion of human life.'

# BOOK REVIEWS

## THE PLIGHT OF THE UNIVERSITIES

To hear the ancient Bidding Prayer, which would specify a University as a 'seminary of sound learning and religious education,' is to be reminded at once of an ideal and of a failure: the ideal — the pursuit of learning as an activity consecrated to God's purposes; the failure — that we do not set contemporary thought within a Christian synthesis. It is around this failure and this ideal that Mr. Nash's book, *The University and the Modern World*,[1] is written. As to our ability to amend our ways, he is a little suspicious—'Perhaps it is foolish to expect the new intellectual reformation to take place from within the universities' (p. 16); but we need not be committed to his disarming helplessness because we greatly sympathise with his attempts to analyse the present situation, and to express more precisely the ideal which should inspire university education. Indeed, it is with these latter tasks that the book is most chiefly concerned, and to a more detailed examination of these we will now pass.

In Part I of the book, Mr. Nash discusses what he calls 'The Plight of the Liberal Democratic University.' What does he suppose this plight to be? 'The whole of scholarship has reached a turning-point, for the individual and rationalistic assumptions which have served men of knowledge so well since the dawn of the modern era, must now be replaced by those more capable of ordering experience in the new world being born' (p. 11). 'The modern mind . . . fashioned its model of thinking on the natural sciences, and we now have to reckon with the fact that this model in its classical form is no better fitted to explain (let alone change) the contemporary world than the scholastic scheme was adequate for the intellectual demands of a world built on expanding capitalism' (p. 12). The plight, that is, is two-fold: (1) it is the legacy of people who have studied with 'individualistic and rationalistic assumptions'; (2) such assumptions are, for political reasons, not adequate to meet the demands of the contemporary world. His solution is that we must seek for other more adequate 'assumptions' which, while including 'scientific knowledge,' transcend it. That neither of the Totalitarian brands of 'assumptions' is adequate is the argument in Part II — the Totalitarian (Fascist or Marxist) University is, he believes, based on a 'true diagnosis' of our present plight, but offers a 'false remedy.' The stage is thus set for Part III, where there are outlined certain features of, and means for attaining, a Christian synthesis —in which, it is claimed, justice is done to 'man's sinfulness and inadequacy' and where quite consistently only a qualified enthusiasm for 'Reason' is preserved. Not for nothing had Mr. Nash urged at the start that 'I do not want for one moment to give the impression that I am at all in sympathy with those who, in these days of irrational movements in politics, religion, art and education, take any opportunity which comes their way to disparage science and the use of the human intellect' (pp. 12, 13) — and the reader must decide whether or not Mr. Nash is committed to more than he would wish.

So much for the general perspective of the book, and now to return again to his diagnosis of the plight in which Universities find themselves. It is certainly very varied in analysis, and we should have to be given considerable verbal and mental elasticity to pretend that it was all the result of naughty scientific assumptions. On pp. 20, 21 the Universities are, on the one hand, criticized for failing to give a sense of purpose to their students, but the students themselves earn a rebuke: 'That all is not well in English Universities

[1] *The University and the Modern World*, by Arnold S. Nash. (S.C.M. 12/6. 1945.)

is evident, too, from the tendency to hit out at one's elders and at established customs, loyalties and practices, as illustrated by the famous Oxford "King and Country" resolution.' Really, did anyone ever expect or hope undergraduates to be otherwise? And if the Christian Faith is to preclude criticism of either customs or loyalties, a goodly number of its professional adherents will find themselves with the Appointments Section of the Ministry of Labour. It is no argument to point to the misleading influence of Oxford undergraduates on international politics (p. 21); even if that were true, it is not so much an occasion for suppressing all undergraduate fervour as for replacing it Diplomatic Service which is apparently impotent against the influences of undergraduate politicians. It is somewhat harder after this to have great faith in the writer's perspective, especially when the diagnosis now moves to the political tack: 'to examine the crisis in the world of learning is to examine the crisis in liberal capitalist democracy' (p. 22). As we might expect, the usual variety of sweeping generalizations, as erroneous as they are exciting, now manifest themselves, *e.g.* 'It is because the English universities are so much nearer, historically speaking, to the feudalistic age' (*i.e.* than the American) 'that publication too often or too early by university teachers is frowned upon' (p. 23). By whom? There are much less exciting reasons why such people refrain from publishing too often and too early—and Mr. Nash's contact with American text-books may suggest some of them.

More serious is Mr. Nash's contention that the contact of the Universities with ordinary life is inadequate; but when he goes on to speak of 'aristocratic' Universities, meaning presumably Oxford and Cambridge, he is on less happy ground. That they have ancient customs in their 'mode of conferment of degrees' is true enough, but I do not see that they would be closer to ordinary life' if their Vice-Chancellors gave each new graduate a hearty slap on the back. Indeed, it could very well be argued, on the contrary, that at a college of an ancient University there will be found a juxta-position of classes hardly found in any society outside the Church Universal. I do not pretend that this mixing is without difficulties or a perfect synthesis, but the hard fact is that folk of very differing classes *have*, there, to live and think together, which at any rate is the necessary forerunner of that mutual knowledge without which attempts at reform in society are merely wishful thinking.

After all Mr. Nash has said in this connection, it is not a little surprising to read (p. 29) 'This conviction that learning must be related to social need was (and is) reflected, with the curious exception of theology, throughout the whole Oxford curriculum'—even if this needs to be toned down with the writer's assertion that the interest in social work on the part of the Universities was, and is, rather 'to moralize the players than to change the rules of the game' (p. 32). Why, however, should the two be incompatible pursuits—the first being all the time the more obvious, because the easiest to tackle rather than to talk about?

Even Mr. Nash recognizes, though, the noble army of scientists who in recent years have 'reacted against the traditional notion that the university must stand aloof from the tensions within modern society' (p. 34)—and so he passes once again to the need of the Universities to teach a 'unified concept of life.'

He now argues that behind all the University approach either to intellectual problems or to problems of the social order, there has been lurking the dogma of 'liberalism.' 'According to liberalism, man is fundamentally good, and his inherent goodness is indicated in his increasing capacity, by using his intelligence, to solve all the problems that come his way' (p. 37). It is this 'faith' of the 'typical university teacher' which has been 'shaken far more rudely by events than it ever could be by argument' (p. 37), and it is this faith that

has led to an unquestioned worship of 'science.' 'Throughout the whole realm of human knowledge, from literary criticism to theological speculation there is a well-nigh unrestrained adoration at the shrine of "science" as the model of virtue' (p. 49). But is there, in fact, a *necessary* connexion between 'liberalism' and 'science' (whatever the sense of those words may be, and there are difficulties about Mr. Nash's uses)? And why should the present world-wide distress be any greater an argument *against* liberalism than the Victorian stability would have been an argument *for* liberalism? Arguments from the present need to reckon with both past and future.

This completes the general approach and we may well ask ourselves what precisely Mr. Nash has done. He has certainly suggested various features of University life and habits, not all of which it seems to me are really signs of the 'plight' of our Universities, and none of which it seems to me is the most important. That feature, which he does not mention until p. 183, is surely the tendency for specialists to be isolated even from other specialists within their own subject, so that the prospect of a unified outlook seems very remote. True, Mr. Nash did speak of the need of the University to teach a 'unified life,' but, in its context here, it was only to have reference to the relation of a university to the social order. So far, then, he has been entertaining and suggestive, but hardly convincing.

In the next two chapters he claims to give a historical diagnosis of the present position — to set out 'the rise and fall of scientific individualism.' He claims that its origin is to be found in 'Protestantism,' which prepared the way in three main directions: in asserting man's authority; in suggesting man's ignorance, and in giving a dignified place to manual labour — so that the 'stink' of a chemical experiment need not be frowned upon. Man's ignorance saved him from *a priori* speculation and directed him to experiment; his authority saved him from the clutches of externally imposed systems. 'Herein we see why it was Protestantism and not the Renaissance which made the scientific movement possible' (p. 64). There may be a truth in attributing *some* function to Protestantism in this connexion — I myself would think that the stressing of individual authority was its chief contribution — but to give no place to the Renaissance seems utterly mistaken. The one thing which rid science of the fabulous 'natural history' of the medievals was, I should have thought, the reading of Greek descriptions of original observations in, for example, the Aristotle of the 'new learning.' If that be allowed, and I should have thought it a commonplace, the remark of p. 55 is at least misleading, even if it contains a truth: 'Aristotle . . . deprecated any appeal to experiment on the ground that it was vulgar.' Further, while it is universally admitted that the Catholic position of Descartes became in the end fairly strained, nevertheless Descartes was a loyal Roman Catholic to the end, and no man did more to set science in the thought-background it now has. Yet Mr. Nash never even mentions Descartes except in a much later reference (p. 79), where he makes the stock blunder of supposing that the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum* argument is deductive in character. Ichabod!

With such blunders in mind, we may be reasonably sceptical about his claiming to relate the scientific method with capitalism (p. 67) and about his grand conclusion (pp. 76-77): 'Science developed in a *bourgeois* society, based on a capitalist economy, *and so* this body of dogma . . . stands *in the same relations to* the doctrines of orthodox economic theory as it does to the doctrines of experimental science.' (Italics mine. Can Mr. Nash really believe this?)

So much for 'the rise of scientific individualism.' What now of its decline? There are, thinks Mr. Nash, three reasons for its display of inadequacy: it claimed to be without presuppositions; it claimed to be independent of all

hilosophical systems; and it trusted in Reason as a neutral arbiter. But, he ys, it has refuted itself. Now, all that would be very true of any 'science' hich claimed at the same time to be a philosophy—which may be true about e remarks of some 'scientists' but is certainly not true about all. And to gue that Reason has been hurled from its neutrality by the rise of psychology id the social sciences is at least to suppose that everyone would agree that ese are sciences: but are they, even on his own definition? One of the best ortions of Mr. Nash's book is his tabulation of the three principles of science p. 72). The three convictions are these:

'(1) There is in Nature an ordered regularity such that apparently isolated facts are also instances of general laws.

(2) That these facts are to be obtained from deliberate and conscious experiment or observation; neither experiment nor observation is just trial and error; experiment in particular can be defined as trial and error according to plan.

(3) That these facts are to be derived by a process of abstraction such that for each particular science only certain aspects of the subject under examination are deemed relevant.'

If the rest of the book were like this it would be first-rate: but let us otice that it is a long way from these three principles to the more exciting enets of 'scientific individualism.' There *may* be a psychological if not logical onnexion, but Mr. Nash has done nothing to indicate it.

Having thus surveyed the plight of the University, and queried the 'scientific-liberal' presuppositions on which he thinks it is based, Mr. Nash urns to examine other Universities with a totalitarian background philosophy. His argument is that:

'As against the liberal-scientific-individualistic *Weltanschauung* the Nazi rightly claims that

(*a*) Knowledge is not presuppositionless;

(*b*) Knowledge serves a purpose other than itself;

(*c*) Knowledge is not ultimately objective but conditioned;

(*d*) Knowledge in the last resort is not atomic but is a unity' (p. 128).

But the Nazi is wrong when he puts, for that background philosophy, Nazi metaphysics, when he takes facts 'with a Nazi evaluation,' and considers history 'according to the dictates of Nazi propaganda.' All that may be very well from our point of view, but I hardly think that Mr. Nash gives any *argument* against the Nazi position. *Why*, in fact, is the Nazi wrong?

Marx, he gives better run for his money. But his reasons for that more generous treatment are very strange: 'Excluding mathematics and the natural sciences, Marx's imprint has been made on the whole of modern scholarship. Sociology, literature, philosophy, political theory and law are all different because Marx lived and wrote. That is why we must take seriously the Soviet universities, since, based as they are on Marxism, they offer, unlike the Nazi universities, a live option as a possible solution to the dilemma in which the liberal democratic university finds itself' (p. 140). Even if that wide judgment were true, I doubt very much whether it would give the Marxist university any priority over the Nazi. For is it not true that Hegel was the spiritual father of both politico-philosophical systems? So that the popularity of each is much more connected with the other than Mr. Nash would have us believe. Rather more to the point is his remark (p. 140): 'Like Nazism, Marxism maintains that knowledge must serve a social purpose and that knowledge is socially conditioned; but, like liberalism, Marxism believes in the possibility

of the universalisation of knowledge through the development of science. Again, we may applaud his judgment that 'Like the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, the Scholasticism of the typical Communist has no place for new facts, for, come what may, "the party line" must be vindicated' (p. 146). But all this is *stated,* rather than *argued.*

What now of the solution, with which Part III is concerned? The first point that Mr. Nash makes is that in looking round for a non-totalitarian background philosophy we must nevertheless remember the 'sociology of knowledge': 'Knowledge can only be understood in terms of its social origins' (p. 167). To those who would argue that this is 'to substitute the pathology of thought for epistemology' (p. 169), he would answer that all the social context of thought is necessary for an understanding of it — 'fashions of thought cannot be understood as long as their social origins are obscure' (p. 170). Faced, however, with the scepticism that often accompanies the social analysis of knowledge, he retorts that 'God' gives us a measure of absoluteness, and the very lack of certainty reminds man of his ontological status. That may be very well for the Christian, but it might just as well lead people to cast doubt on the ontological implications, if they rejected the epistemological position. Which is what many philosophers would do. And are they wrong? Why?

So to the concluding chapter, the need for 'Christian thought in the University world of to-day.' Mr. Nash urges the Universities to work out a Christian 'map of knowledge' (p. 184) — 'a Weltanschauung which steers a middle path between the Charybdis of liberal atomism and the Scylla of totalitarian dogmatism.' 'The crying need is for Christian thinkers from the specialized fields of the natural and social sciences, history, engineering, architecture, and medicine, who while rejecting the right of theologians to dictate their conclusions, can yet unite them in the common task of relating these conclusions to a theological understanding of human destiny' (p. 185). In short, the need is for Christian philosophers: 'the Christian Churches need a fellowship of lay theologians or Christian scholars, who would view it as part of their vocation, as a Christian *intelligentsia,* to create a Christian world view within which the conclusions of the specialized subjects of the university curriculum could be given their ultimate meaning, in terms of a specifically Christian philosophy of man and his relation to the historical process. . . . It is nothing less than the creation of a Christian *speculum mentis*' (p. 202). With that conclusion we may very well agree, and so, for ourselves, despair of the recent proposed scheme for clergy training which entirely overlooks the philosophy of religion.

What now do we think of the whole matter? We may agree with Mr. Nash that the Universities are in a plight. But the plight seems to me to be much more concerned with a prevalent despair in regard to the exercise of reason, and with a lack of synthesis between the different subjects, than with any failure on the part of the Universities to have contact with the 'outside world.' Indeed, is not this very contact becoming increasingly common—and, some may think, more embarrassing — as large business houses are moved to finance university research? We may agree that 'the plight' may only be solved by the production of a Christian background philosophy. But rather more than Mr. Nash, we may have an expectation to preserve within it more of what I believe he sometimes means by 'scientific individualism,' and to order it by that Reason which, far from separating subjects (as he would seem to suggest), could indeed be their one integrating factor. It is true we need Christian philosophers, but it is also true that they will need to have made up their minds rather more than Mr. Nash, about philosophical method. They will then be able to distinguish, where I am sure Mr. Nash would find it diffi-

lt, between 'conditioned knowledge' and prejudice, and yet to agree with n that the proper issue of a philosophical system, as of a university educa-n, is an ordered and unified life.

The reader will put the book down, not a little provoked by the innumer-le quotations, but marvelling at Mr. Nash's breadth of reading and very nscious of having been greatly stimulated by one whose university experi-ce has been so diverse, and now has extended to another continent. It is a mulating theme, provocatively debated, which both Mr. Nash and the viewer could gladly, in memory, set in the context of Ripon Hall Common oom or dining-table, for it is concerned with the relation between sound arning and true religion, and with the endeavour to unite both.

Christ's College, Cambridge. IAN RAMSEY.

## A NEW LIBERALISM IN THEOLOGY*

W. B. Selbie was for many years a distinguished Principal of Mansfield ollege, Oxford, and a most inspiring preacher in the University. His last ook, *Freedom in the Faith,* published after his death, is a plea for the beral theology which guided his studies and underlay his preaching. 'A ew liberalism in theology is our most clamant need.'

> 'What is needed now is . . . the application of the great principles for which liberalism stands, its love of truth and freedom, its use of experience and its readiness to face all the facts so far as they can be ascertained' (p. 11).

t the moment Christian theology may be said to be in the melting-pot. Some esire a revival of traditional conservatism. But Selbie is clear that such a evival is neither possible nor desirable.

> 'Crisis theologies with their return to traditionalism and their revival of dogma are merely a form of escapism and offer no foundation for the positive reconstruction that is needed, nor are "fearful saints" the right kind of men to undertake it' (p. 12).

> 'The besetting sin of theological conservatism is the failure to believe in the Holy Spirit, and the practical refusal to trust His guidance' (p. 14).

The right course to follow is that laid down by the great liberal theo-gians of the last hundred years. Christian theology owes them a great debt. ut Christianity lost as well as gained from their studies. They were ioneers; and pioneers always make mistakes. In the discovery of new truths ey overlooked some old ones. Selbie is just in his estimate of these gains nd losses.

> 'Liberal theology provided a much-needed protest against a too rigid bibliolatry and a mechanical view of revelation, and it had no use for a Christianity which insisted on orthodoxy of opinion and tended to neglect the weightier matters of goodness, charity and truth. We owe a great debt therefore to those liberal thinkers who stood for freedom of thought, made the right of private judgment a reality, and delivered Christians from bondage to the letter. In so far then as liberalism means love of liberty and truth, and readiness to follow the guidance of the Spirit of God, it will always be essential to a living Christianity.
>
> Where was it that theological liberalism most obviously went astray? Speaking in the most general terms, it was because liberals generally yielded too easily to the *Zeitgeist* or spirit of the time revealed in the

* *Freedom in the Faith,* by W. B. Selbie, M.A., D.D. (The Independent Press. 3/6. 1944.)

predominance of the physical sciences and of the scientific method and outlook. The mastery of Nature which this had achieved went to men's heads like new wine and for the time threw them off their balance. It not only seemed to justify a purely materialistic view of the universe, but led also to a very exaggerated estimate of the worth and capabilities of human nature. The doctrine of evolution was popularly misinterpreted to mean automatic and inevitable progress from bad to good and from good to better. It was within the power of men to put themselves in line with this advancing process, and by means of education and various measures of social and economic reform work their own way towards perfection. This implied, further, a kind of humanism which had immediate and disastrous theological consequences, though these were neither intended nor foreseen. To all intents and purposes it made man independent of God and the potential author of his own salvation. It minimised sin, soft-pedalled the need for forgiveness, and advocated reform rather than regeneration. The more critical view of the Bible and the higher criticism of the Old Testament, in particular, greatly reduced the value of the Scriptures as Revelation, and seemed to favour the idea of a progressive development of religion of a mainly subjective kind. In the New Testament field, books like Seeley's *Ecce Homo*, Harnack's *What is Christianity?* and the more theological works of Matthew Arnold had a very wide vogue and produced for a waiting world a picture of a humanitarian Christ, a teacher and reformer, rather than a Saviour and Lord' (p. 11).

Selbie's purpose is to sketch the outline of a new liberal theology in which these errors are corrected. The subjects of his chapters are Authority, God, Man, Jesus Christ, Divine Forgiveness, Freedom, Toleration and Reunion. He handles great subjects in a small space, and he succeeds admirably in sketching a theology which is liberal and expresses the essentials of Christianity. Here are some quotations.

On Authority:

'The use of authority is not to save a man the trouble of thinking for himself, but to obtain assent to truth and to recognize its obligation' (p. 17).

'If ever they are to become grown men and strong in the faith, they must make the message of authority their own and be able to say "We know and are persuaded" because we have seen for ourselves' (p. 20).

On Man:

'A realistic theology is one that faces all the facts of our human predicament, stresses the reality of sin and evil, and insists on the need of a religion of redemption rather than of education' (p. 36).

'(Jesus) showed, not merely charity, but a respect for human personality which His followers would do well to emulate' (p. 37).

'We must have a theology which finds the divine in nature and in man as well as in God' (p. 39).

On Jesus Christ:

'The quest of the historical Jesus is an obligation which still holds good for every student of Christianity' (p. 40).

'We must not allow ourselves to be influenced by any dogmatic interpretations of the person of Christ when we are dealing with the story of His life' (p. 41).

On Divine Forgiveness:

'(Many people) are in an unnatural condition of alienation from God,

though they do not know it, and in many cases would not acknowledge it. They are restless because they cannot rest in God, distracted because they are always torn between what they do and what they ought to do, frustrated because they are without fixed aim or focus in their lives' (p. 52).

'Sin is not something that can be overcome by education, discipline or wishful thinking. . . . Apart from the help and initiative of God the position is quite hopeless' (p. 52).

'The effort to live without God, to be self-sufficient and a law to oneself, puts upon us a strain that we were never meant to bear and may issue in a total disintegration of our personality' (p. 53).

'God has done His part and we have to do ours by responding in a life let both grow together until the harvest' (p. 61).

On Toleration:

'It is when men are not too sure of their own ground that they are anxious to prohibit all expressions of opinion contrary to their own. They would do well to remember the parable of the tares and the wheat and let both grow together until the harvest '(p. 61).

On Freedom:

'(The right of private judgment) rests on that sense of individual responsibility which is a fundamental assumption of the Christian gospel. And this responsibility means freedom, freedom to think and worship and serve and to use all the mental and spiritual resources available to us. It is right that a man should put himself under tutelage and learn from those who are wiser and more experienced. But the end of it all is that he should have a mind of his own and be able to stand on his own feet' (p. 62).

On Reunion:

'What then is the alternative if we abandon the quest for uniformity? It is surely that true unity can only be attained by the recognition and acceptance of differences. But this points straight to a federal rather than to an organic union. Unity is after all a matter of spirit and intention rather than of organization. There is nothing unhappy about our divisions *per se*. The unhappiness is in ourselves when we make them occasions of malice, envy and intolerance' (p. 63).

J.K.N.

## GOD, FREEDOM AND HAPPINESS*

The late Professor James Ward used to impress upon us in his lectures on metaphysics at Cambridge that the problem of the One and the Many promised to be *the* philosophical problem of the twentieth century. His famous Gifford Lectures, *The Realm of Ends 1911*, were wholly concerned with this very problem, and we can only regret that he did not add to the two lectures on Hegel a similar treatment of Kant's philosophy, as was indeed at first his intention, in order to substantiate his contention that, avowedly or not, pluralism is the starting point of speculation. The question, as Ward put it, is, 'Will a plurality of interacting subjects account for itself and for the unity which interaction implies?' From this further questions naturally arise, *viz.* 'What is its constitution, how is its harmony secured, is it, so to say, a more or less orderly democracy, is it a limited monarchy, or is it possibly an absolute one?' Ward saw no hope in the speculative method, which began

* *Happiness, Freedom and God*, by C. A. Richardson. (Harrap. pp. 221. 7/6. 1944.)

with the One as absolute, and, if I remember rightly, he used to designate such a method as 'the high *a priori*.' There was always a certain whimsical humour about Ward which made him very attractive at home as well as in the lecture room.

Eighteen years after the publication of *The Realm of Ends,* H. Wildon Carr in his monograph on Leibniz claimed that the facts on which the modern principle of relativity is founded are rationalized by Leibniz's metaphysical principles and cannot be rationalized in any other way. Modern science has itself come to recognize increasingly that the physical reality with which it attempts to deal requires an active work of ideal construction under subjective conditions of observation. It is with this problem that Mr. Richardson is concerned in his book, which brings Leibniz up to date in the light of recent mathematical investigations. It is an important contribution to a difficult problem. The mathematically trained reader will find it stimulating in so far as it sets him in a larger philosophical frame-work than he usually considers; the non-mathematically inclined will find it in part heavy going, but he will be amply repaid if he goes on to the end; both will find it a useful cathartic in its challenge to their unexamined assumptions as they follow its closely knit argument, which forbids skipping. Each chapter has a helpful summary.

Mr. Richardson begins with a statement of the inquiry and of the complications of analytical philosophy. From this he passes on to a consideration of the theory of value and ethics, of time and causality, immortality, freedom, moral responsibility, the existence and the nature of God. His last chapter is a resumé of the whole book and is called 'Reality in an Intelligible Universe.' An appendix on Causality, Time, and Probability gives further light to the mathematically darkened. The question he would answer is, 'What beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality are most satisfying to the human mind because they render the observed facts, *described* in such theories as that of Natural Selection, most intelligible to it?' His answer is that of spiritual pluralism, which takes subjective existence as the essential type of substantial being, since experience as we know it is organized in unitary individual structures called 'monads.' Reality is thus a plurality of interacting (not independent, as with Leibniz) monads, with God the supreme monad, immanent in the plurality yet transcending it, forming the ground of the organic unity of the world. Since the monads are unique and partially free beings, their activities which result in events can be deduced only with probability and not with certainty. There is, however, a tendency for monads to develop from lower to higher levels, from routine response to increasing spontaneity, from what we call matter to personality which we know in ourselves. The implication is obvious that there may be a progressive 'decay' of the 'material' Universe with a progressive development of the 'mental' or 'spiritual' Universe. At this latter level experience would be in the nature of pure imagination and intellection with a creative *rapport* between personal beings producing harmonious patterns enjoyable for their own sake. Conflict and harmony would be experienced as misery and happiness, and it is here, Mr. Richardson urges, that we have the ground of the occurrence of what we call 'evil' and 'good.'

In a universe devoid of conscious individuals value could not exist, for value is a quality of states of mind and is dependent on what we call 'happiness.' This is characterized by a sense of inner harmony and peace and of outer adjustment to the whole environment; it has two sides, one active and creative, the other contemplative and appreciative; both are closely interrelated and well balanced. Pleasure, joy, and contentment enter into happiness, but they are not happiness, and to it alone we should apply the term

value.' According to this theory, therefore, 'beautiful' objects, 'good' acts, 'true' beliefs have no special intrinsic, independent characteristic termed 'value,' but rather a functional effectiveness in helping towards the production of the one value, happiness; value is thus a derived concept.

> 'It is difficult,' writes Mr. Richardson, 'to see how it is nobler to try to persuade a man to follow a certain course of action because he "ought" to do it, the "ought" being determined by a hypothetical transcendent scale of values or by the will of a hypothetical God, than to persuade him by assuring him that, if he *does* act in the way suggested, he will in fact become a *happier* individual—a statement which can be based on previous direct experience and tested by future direct experience. The latter procedure is certainly likely to be by far the most effective.'

In this way good experienced as happiness derives from harmony between God the dominant Monad and the Many, God exercising a kind of 'statistical' control over the development of the world. Any attempt to define 'good' in terms of God alone is circular, and the term is significant only in relations between God and the Many. Similarly with evil. For Mr. Richardson ethics in the last analysis is seen to be a derivative of metaphysics and logic. Given a reality which is a unity-in-plurality and the experiencing subjects its constituents, it follows that happiness comes only through the harmonious interaction of all individuals, and this indeed is the metaphysical ground of what is experienced as love between persons and of God. In love there is emphasis on unity in plurality, in which each finds fulfilment, and love thus provides the pattern of the structure of reality itself in its essence dynamic and creative.

We do not always keep to the path of pure logic, and it is good to be reminded that the logical deduction of ultimate truth from immediately given facts is not possible in spite of all our advances; but whatever our system of beliefs we cannot ignore the given, and the truth and usefulness of any philosophy will be tested by its faithfulness in the interpretation of facts, as well as by its ability to make intelligible the disharmonies which play so large a part in human experience. This book is more than a modest contribution towards that desirable end.

T. Wigley.

## THE NATURE OF BELIEF*

'There are signs of a reviving interest in Religion in this country.' The reason for this is the conviction that without a basis in religious belief our civilization cannot prosper or even perhaps endure. But however desirable or necessary religious faith may be, it cannot be either lasting or effective unless it is believed to be true. Before seeking to give a religious basis to our civilization one must answer the fundamental question, can religion maintain a reasonable claim to teach the truth about God, the world and man?

It is the purpose of Dr. Tennant's latest book, *The Nature of Belief*, to answer this question. In order to do so satisfactorily he examines a larger subject; he inquires not only into religious belief, but into belief in general. He handles his subject from two standpoints, the philosophical and the psychological. His first distinction is between certainty and certitude.

> 'In order to avoid serious confusions "certainty" will be used throughout this book exclusively as a logical, and "certitude" as a psychological term. "Certainty" will then denote an objective character ascribable to any proposition as to which we are justified in saying "it

* *The Nature of Belief*, by F. R. Tennant, D.D., B.Sc., Hon. D.D. (Oxon.), F.B.A. (Christian Challenge Series. Centenary Press. 3/6. 1943.)

is certain" . . . "Certitude" will apply to a state of mind, namely, the sanguine or complete convincedness to which one gives expression in saying "I am certain that . . . ."' (p. 5).

What sorts of proposition possess certainty, and what sorts certitude?

'Propositions as to which logicians could affirm that there is certainty belong almost entirely to the provinces of the pure or formal sciences, which deal with abstract principles such as the fundamental laws of thought presupposed in all reasoning, the self-evident relation of implication, and the rigid demonstrations which are possible in sciences such as mathematics, in which the entities dealt with belong to the realm of the ideal. Between thought which is merely consistent with itself, and thought which is applicable to things and valid of actuality there is a great gulf . . . Within the field of the sciences of the actual world, built upon brute facts which are posited *for* us, as distinguished from the pure sciences in which the foundation-elements are posited *by* us, there are but few kinds of proposition whose claim to certainty is allowed by logic. The whole body of what usually passes for knowledge, such as the facts of history and science, and well-established generalisations and theories, lies between the two poles of certainty, namely, the immediate impressions of sense, and the self-evident relations between ideas, and is accounted a mass of probabilities by most logicians' (p. 7).

In order to understand the nature of belief it is important to realize that there

'is at least one instance of necessary correlation and concomitance between certainty and certitude . . . the class of sense-judgments which assert the deliverances of sense-impression when that is overlaid with no more than the irreducible minimum of implicit understanding or thought . . . Certitude as to these sense-judgments is complete: convincedness is at its maximum and is literally "being overwhelmed." And they are also characterized by certainty, because in their case assent is forced upon us by something objective and "external to the self," in the sense that it is posited for us not by us. Our assent is willy-nilly: there is no option accorded us, and no room for doubt or reflective hesitation' (p. 9).

To return to the sciences of the actual world, since modern knowledge is largely the result of their work. The raw material they use is sense-impressions; but in order to convert these into knowledge the sciences apply to them principles for which there is no certainty in the logical sense. For instance, they use the principle of the uniformity of nature. But it

'does not admit of inductive proving, because it is presupposed in all inductive reasoning; it is far from being a self-evident proposition comparable with "the whole is greater than the part"; and it is not deductively demonstrable because there is no other proposition from which it might be deduced. The only verification it can receive is experimental; and that of course is limited to spans of time and tracts of space such as are but infinitesimal in comparison with the duration and magnitude of the universe. We are thus led to the inevitable conclusion that the general principle underlying all the inductive processes used by science and common-sense is but probable Belief' (p. 41).

'Every man of science would regard these postulates (which give precision to the principle of the uniformity of nature) as "likely to be true" with certitude so sanguine that he would base his life's work upon them' (p. 45).

But

'Probability, in the last resort, is alogical. The probable is founded on Beliefs which are not logically certifiable, but which compel convincedness because of the success which attends action upon them' (p. 45).

Hence the conclusion.

'Inductive science is founded on an act of faith, and belief in its deliverance has a subjective cause. It has sometimes been said that "where reason ends, faith begins"; but the truth turns out to be that where faith ends reason begins, so far as generalized knowledge of the world is concerned. The probability of the foundations of this knowledge consists in their capacity to evoke certitude and trust in human subjects' (p. 46).

The mention of faith leads to the consideration of religious belief. Belief and faith are sometimes used as synonyms. But to distinguish them will help clear thinking.

'Belief is more or less constrained by fact of actuality, which already exists in complete independence of any desiring or striving on our part, and which in some degree compels assent. Faith, as it is conceived here, is on the other hand not concerned with actuality that is or was, but with the possible which may or may not prove to be actual. Belief is assent to data; faith, in the first instance, is not confronted with data, but creates its objects which are ideas. By practical activity, or living as if its ideal creations were also true, faith may go on to discover their actuality. Though not knowledge, it is possibly and often actually, a step towards knowledge' (p. 62).

Faith, in this sense, has been defined in the *Epistle to the Hebrews* as 'the assurance of things hoped for, the proving or putting to the test of things unseen.'

'Faith thus extends our intellectual horizon, so that it includes the unknown Beyond and brings it within reach of experiment . . . Successful faith is defined (in the Epistle) with psychological accuracy, and is illustrated by numerous examples of the gaining of material and moral advantages, the surmounting of trials and afflictions, and the attainment of heroic life, by men of old who were inspired by faith. It is thus that faith is pragmatically verified and that certitude as to the unseen is established. It should be observed, however, that such verification is only for certitude, not a proving of certainty as to external reality. The fruitfulness of a belief or of faith for the moral and religious life is one thing, and the reality or existence of what is ideated or assumed is another. There are instances in which a belief that is not true, in the sense of corresponding with fact, may inspire one with lofty ideals and stimulate one to strive to be a a more worthy person. And though the foundations of science are matters of faith, and Science's verification of them is also merely pragmatic, it is of a different kind from that which is illustrated in the Epistle. Verification of a scientific postulate or theory does not consist in disciplining the scientific researcher, either as a lover of truth or as a moral citizen, and consequently cannot be likened to the pragmatic verification of religious faith. It consists in finding that the postulate or theory is borne out by appeal to external fact and tallies with them. It is true that this latter kind of verification also falls short of being logical certification; for to be *the* explanation of facts, a theory

must not only fit and be exemplified by the facts, but must be the only one that does so; and that scarcely admits of proof. Still, such verification has probability of a higher order than the other . . . ' (p. 70).

'There is nothing unique in religious faith if it be such as is described in the Epistle to the Hebrews: religious faith is psychologically of the same nature as that which underlies inductive science, and the only difference lies in the objects to which the faith refers' (p. 71).

It is time to consider these objects more closely, for by defining them accurately it may be possible to discover that there are some which are reasonable and legitimate. The *Epistle to the Hebrews* gives no satisfactory definition. All it says of the unseen things that are the objects of faith is this, 'he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek after Him' (Heb. xi, 6). But what we are looking for is to be found in the philosopher Kant.

'Thus he wrote, "all human knowledge begins with intuitions, advances to concepts, and ends with ideas." Reason begins where understanding ends. The three ideas which it supplies for the transcending and unifying knowledge are those of the soul (the unity underlying all mental operations), the world (the unity of the whole series of natural phenomena), and God (the unity of all objects of thought). The soul, the world as a whole, and God are not entities that can be rigidly demonstrated or known; they are regulative, but not constitutive of knowledge. The ideas of them are suggested by knowledge, and in order to unify our knowledge reason or faith postulates them. They belong to the realm of things hoped for and unseen: they are postulates . . . .

'The idea of God as the world ground, Kant declared to be "a flawless ideal," and "a conception which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge." The idea of the soul includes that of its freedom, and Kant says of it that this is consequently the only one of the three ideas of reason whose object is matter of fact and can be counted among things known. And it is in virtue of this fact of human freedom that Kant was led to find a further use than that of unifying knowledge for postulating by faith the existence of the Deity.

'He was shrewd enough to see — what so many others have not been able to see — that doctrine as to theological matter cannot logically be extracted from pure judgments of value. Even if ethical principles and ideals were absolute, or independent of all cognition and human interests, we should need to be assured that the universe respects our ideals and aspirations before we could argue from their present existence to their perpetuation beyond this life and their fulfilment hereafter. The value of goodness is one thing, the permanent existence of the good is another thing . . . Knowing all this, Kant did not profess to provide a moral demonstration of theism; he merely argued that the idea of God is a postulate — a venture of faith — required by the practical reason (*i.e.* will and conscience) as well as a regulative idea for the theoretical reason which supplements the understanding. He taught that *if* the moral order is to stand permanently, and *if* the highest good, which ought to be realized, is to be realized, then God must exist in order to secure the requisite conditions. God and immortality are apprehended by faith. They are postulates which justify themselves because they are bound up with the facts of moral life, which cannot be unified into knowledge of a meaningful or a reasonable world without them. They can produce conviction or certitude — indeed they were for Kant the

only legitimate ground of religious belief — but they are not demonstrated certainties.

'In these ways Kant insisted on man's right to believe or to exercise faith. Belief and faith cannot be entertained if they are in opposition to known truths; but science knows of no truths to which the fundamental articles of religion are in contradiction. The assertion of faith, that there is a God and a super-sensible world, can no more be disproved than it can be proved, he might say; for the things that are seen and are temporal depend for their existence on real but unseen conditions which are beyond the ken of all the sciences' (p. 76).

The above passage gives, from the standpoint of Natural Religion, a definition of the legitimate objects of faith. It also includes the refutation of attempts to prove the existence of God by any theory of values. It is now time to pass on to revealed religion. Concerning religious experience, Dr. Tennant considers that its testimony is unconvincing, because the information it brings comes probably not from the experience itself, but is the result of prior religious instruction.

'. . . Religious experience presupposes the theological conception of the numinous or the divine agent, and owes its distinctness from other kinds of experience to saturation with that conception. That which it is sought to derive from the data of religious experience has been previously fashioned and is read into what is genuinely immediate, thereby transmuting it from profane into religious matter of experience. The data which are generally supposed to be pure data are really data *plus* an interpretative factor which is not intrinsic to them but is brought to them' (p. 86).

And again:

'No one doubts that religious experiences are actual: they are observable mental occurrences. But their mere occurrence does not vouch for any causal explanation, or for any interpretation, which their experients may put upon them. A Belief is not necessarily true as to which a believer entertains certitude; it is true only if it accords with fact or reality. In the case of religious belief, the object belongs to the realm of the unseen; and that what is invisible to the physical eye is, in religious experience, immediately apprehensible by insight as direct as sense-perception but otherwise different from it, is rendered doubtful by the fact that such an explanation of religious experience is not the only one possible' (p. 89).

The Revealed Religions are historical religions. Dr. Tennant therefore considers the amount of trust that may reasonably be placed in the accuracy of historical records, and the proper authority to be given to dogma and its development. His conclusions as to the Christian Religion are most wise and far-seeing.

'Among the various loyalties that are comprised in what many are apt to call their religion, a pre-eminent place should be given to the truth-loyalty. The genuinely religious man should love truth with a love like the love of home. It is the demand for truth and nothing but truth that motivates the desire in many persons to see a larger measure of attention bestowed by religious instructors on the most indubitable part of what they are commissioned to preach: namely, Christ's teaching, as profound and universal as it is simple, concerning God's personal relations with human persons . . . It implies that in Christ we can see a manifestation of God's purpose for the world, of His will for mankind,

and of the response which God seeks from all men. By His teaching and His earthly life Christ made explicit what is implicit in the ethical theism which is independent of personal experiences and their interpretations, and is based on knowledge, in all its breadth and depth, concerning the world and man. If a larger proportion of attention had been given to this part of the Christian gospel, we should have perhaps heard less of the "failure of Christianity" and should see less of the aloofness of the Briton, with his common-sense, his earnestness, his religious aptitude, his respect for proven fact and his reverence for truth, from the institutional religion of his land' (p. 108).

Dr. Tennant's guiding principle in this book is the same he quotes as Tillotson's, 'that nothing ought to be received as a divine doctrine and matter of revelation without good evidence sufficient to satisfy a prudent and considerate man.' In conclusion here is his sketch of an order of knowledge, in which natural theology explicates what is implicit in the sciences, and the whole is crowned by revealed religion, Christianity purified and simplified; Dr. Tennant has himself made notable contributions to this order, with his *Philosophical Theology* and other works.

'. . . If reason implies no more than reasonableness, there is no hard and fast line to be drawn between belief and what we account as knowledge, between philosophy and natural theology, and between theology and natural science. Inductive science is founded on faith, and theology explicates what the sciences suggest. Natural theology apart from the sciences is baseless; and natural science, stopping short of its culmination in theism, has the appearance of an arbitrarily arrested growth. The sciences lead intellectual curiosity on to philosophy, and when philosophy finds its culmination in the supposition that the world and man constitute an organic whole whose ground is God and whose *raison d'être* is realization of the good, it passes into natural theology. From that to revealed theology and belief based on authority it is indeed a further step. But if revealed religion is from the point of view of science and philosophy of the nature of an over-Belief, belief in it is not unreasonable. For tradition and authority are only irrational causes of belief when they are blindly swallowed. When the acceptance of them is reasoned, and the credentials of authority are submitted to the individual's judgment, belief has reasonable grounds as well as causes' (p. 117).

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

## BISHOP HEADLAM *VERSUS* PROFESSOR JOAD*

*Why I am Satisfied* is an Open Letter by Bishop Headlam to Professor Joad. In his pamphlet of 34 pages, the Bishop of Gloucester criticizes Dr. Joad's recent book, *God and Evil*. The subject is too vast and complex to be treated adequately in so brief a space, unless the apologist possesses Alexander Pope's gifts of epigram and satire preserved for us in his *Essay on Man*, whose argument satisfied educated Englishmen for the best part of a century. Voltaire's satire, *Candide*, is the most effective criticism of Pope's apology and of Leibniz's *Theodicy* on which Pope's Essay is based.

If it were necessary to reply to Dr. Joad's *God and Evil*, we imagine it could be done most effectively by A. P. Herbert in a quatrain. We remember a Chief Justice of New Zealand publishing an essay on *Mistakes in Creation*,

* *Why I am Satisfied*, by the Rt. Rev. A. C. Headlam, D.D. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 2/-. 1944.)

f which he sent a copy to the Governor. The Governor thanked the Chief ustice for his interesting essay, but was concerned to observe that the Chief ustice had failed to enumerate the most important of the Creator's mistakes —that, in undertaking the work of creation, he had not at the outset created he Chief Justice in order to have the benefit of his advice.

Dr. Headlam is much incensed by a good story told by Dr. Joad. The rofessor wrote :

> 'It was largely because of [the Church of England's] failure to take the obviously revolutionary aspects of Jesus' teaching seriously that I condemned the Church. "For God's sake don't touch the Church of England," said a House of Commons' wit at the time of the celebrated debate on the revised Prayer Book. "It is the only thing that stands between us and Christianity!"'

ould we have a better example of the effective use of satire in religious ontroversy?

Dr. Headlam's essay contains a curious instance of tendentious memory. he Bishop cites as the words of 'our Lord' the well-known words of St. aul : 'If any man thinketh that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing et as he ought to know' (*I Cor.* vii, 2). Can this lapse be due to the influence f Karl Barth?

H.D.A.M.

# CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

## THE TRANSFIGURATION

SIR,

In the December issue of the *Modern Churchman* you publish a review f a book, *The Transfiguration and its Interpretation*, by Dr. Boobyer, which as recalled to me an experience of the last war that happened to me. I did ot at the time connect it with the story of the Transfiguration. However, I ave done so since, and the more I think of it and remember the sight I saw, the more convinced I am that it was an exactly similar experience that hap- pened to St. Peter and his two fellow-disciples.

I have no doubt that Jesus and His disciples had slept out that night on the mountain-side. At dawn Jesus went apart from them — for reasons of His own — and was returning to them through the morning mist, His raiment covered with the dew. As He came out of the fog-bank, the sun rose over the hill-top behind the disciples. The moisture on Jesus' garments shone like jewels—all the colours of the rainbow. The two disicples, James and John, in their excitement sprang to their feet — the sun was behind them — and their shadows fell on the fog-bank. Two misty forms rose, one on each side of Jesus. The disciples gesticulated, and so did the misty forms. These, in the account of the Transfiguration, become the figures of Moses and Elias, who thus appeared conversing with Jesus.

I believe this to have been the natural experience which constituted the phenomena of the vision of the Transfiguration. The rest is St. Peter's own story of this experience and his interpretation of it.

C. N. SWAYNE.

37 Broadhurst, Ashtead, Surrey.

## BRANCHES OF THE M.C.U.

SIR,

The Council of the Modern Churchmen's Union wish it to be known that any suggestions for the formation of local branches of the Union will meet with the sympathy and ready help of the central organization. If, therefore, any member is willing and able to start such a branch in his neighbourhood the Hon. Secretary will provide him with a list of members in the district concerned, and both he and the Chairman will help to arrange visits of speakers for any meetings that may be organized.

Such branches will be at liberty to frame their own rules as to membership and procedure, subject to no more supervision from Headquarters than is usual in such cases.

R. B. HENDERSON.

## ELECTIONS, ANNUAL MEETING AND SERVICE OF M.C.U.

SIR,

May I give notice to members of the Union that the following are due to retire from the Council this spring, after serving for a special period of two years, and are not eligible for re-election but may be co-opted for one year: Rev. R. G. Griffith, Canon R. D. Richardson, Canon Alan Richardson, Sir Edmund Phipps, Rev. R. B. Parker, Rev. C. F. Russell, Rev. K. G. Budd, Mr. F. Victor Fisher, Miss Dorothy Ward, Sir Geoffrey le M. Mander; and that the following co-opted members retire but are eligible for election or co-option: Miss K. M. Body, Rev. Dr. G. W. Butterworth, Miss F. M. Fayerman, Canon Marcus Knight, Rev. L. C. Luckcraft, Rev. F. I. L. Rees, Rev. Professor Norman Sykes, Rev. T. J. Wood.

There are ten vacancies to be filled by election, and nominations with the names of seconders should reach me by April 14th.

It was decided by the Council on February 23rd that Tuesday, May 29th, should be the date of the Annual Meeting and Service to be held in London.

The meeting at which the election results will be announced will be held in the Music Room, Y.M.C.A., Central Club, Great Russell Street, W.C.1 (near Tottenham Court Road Tube Station), at 11.15 a.m. The speaker at 12 noon will be the Rev. Dr. J. W. Parkes. The preacher at the service in St. Martin's-in-the-Fields at 3 p.m. (by the kindness of the Vicar) will be the Very Rev. the Dean of St. Paul's.

R. GLADSTONE GRIFFITH,
Hon. Secretary, Modern Churchmen's Union.

Steeple Claydon Vicarage, Bletchley, Bucks.
*24th February*, 1945.

## LECTURES AND DISCUSSIONS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Our readers, especially those engaged in teaching Religion in schools, may be glad to know that Mr. R. B. Henderson, Manchester Reader in Religious Education in the University of Oxford, will be conducting a course of lectures and discussions dealing with important problems in modern religious education with particular reference to theological background, Old Testament and New Testament.

This course will take place at Reed Hall, Exeter, from July 31st to August 7th, 1945. Applications for tickets, terms, etc., should be made to R. B. Henderson, M.A., B.D., New College, Oxford.

H. D. A. MAJOR.